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Art. 1.—ENGLAND IN 1848.

1. *Souvenirs de Alexis de Tocqueville*. Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1893.
2. *Histoire de la Révolution de 1848*. Par Daniel Stern (Madame d'Agoult). Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1878.
3. *London Labour and the London Poor*. By H. Mayhew. Griffin & Bohn, 1851.
4. *Essays on Political and Social Science*. By W. R. Greg. Longmans, 1853.
5. *Self-Help*. By Samuel Smiles. Murray, 1860.
6. *Law and Opinion in England*. By A. V. Dicey. Second ed. Macmillan, 1914.

To a mid-Victorian whose memory carries him back even beyond 1848, the revolutionary movement associated with that year, and well called 'Europe in revolt,' still appears the most extraordinary among the events which determined the subsequent history of Europe during the 19th century and which still tell upon the perplexities of 1920. The revolutionary era was from the first compared to an earthquake or a volcano. It was in many respects astounding. It was generally unpredicted. It was widespread and violent. It came rapidly to a close.

The earthquake which shook the foundations of Continental States was unpredicted. Among eminent men known in England Alexis de Tocqueville was almost the only statesman who foretold the impending outburst of revolution. On Jan. 29, 1848, he delivered in the French Chamber of Deputies a speech of which the general effect is summarised in the following warning:

'On dit qu'il n'y a point de péril, parce qu'il n'y a pas d'émeute; on dit que, comme il n'y a pas de désordre matériel
Vol. 234.—No. 465.

à la surface de la société, les révolutions sont loin de nous. Messieurs, permettez-moi de vous dire que je crois que vous vous trompez. Sans doute, le désordre n'est pas dans les faits, mais il est entré bien profondément dans les esprits. Regardez ce qui se passe au sein de ces classes ouvrières, qui, aujourd'hui, je le reconnais, sont tranquilles. Il est vrai qu'elles ne sont pas tourmentées par les passions politiques proprement dites, au même degré où elles en ont été tourmentées jadis; mais, ne voyez-vous pas que leurs passions, de politiques, sont devenues sociales? Ne voyez-vous pas qu'il se répand peu à peu dans leur sein des opinions, des idées, qui ne vont point seulement à renverser telles lois, tel ministère, tel gouvernement même, mais la société, à l'ébranler sur les bases sur lesquelles elle repose aujourd'hui? N'écoutez-vous pas ce qui se dit tous les jours dans leur sein? N'entendez-vous pas qu'on y répète sans cesse que tout ce qui se trouve au-dessus d'elles est incapable et indigne de les gouverner; que la division des biens faite jusqu'à présent dans le monde est injuste; que la propriété repose sur des bases qui ne sont pas les bases équitables? Et ne croyez-vous pas que, quand de telles opinions prennent racine, quand elles se répandent d'une manière presque générale, que, quand elles descendent profondément dans les masses, qu'elles doivent amener tôt ou tard, je ne sais pas quand, je ne sais comment, mais qu'elles doivent amener tôt ou tard les révolutions les plus redoutables? Telle est, messieurs, ma conviction profonde; je crois que nous nous endormons à l'heure qu'il est sur un volcan; j'en suis profondément convaincu.*

On Feb. 24, 1848, every word of this admonition was more than justified by the fall of Louis Philippe and the proclamation of the second French Republic. Several circumstances added to the impressiveness of Tocqueville's forecast. It was no happy guess. It was the result of the speaker's unrivalled capacity for analysing the moral character both of past times and of events passing before his own eyes. With him insight passed into foresight, and foresight became prophecy. He himself admitted in later years that the vehemence of his

* 'Souvenirs de Alexis de Tocqueville,' pp. 15, 16. The whole speech is too long for quotation. Tocqueville's 'Souvenirs' is little read in England, but it contains the most brilliant and a most authentic sketch of the Revolution of 1848, as it worked in France during the first six months of that year. Tocqueville, whose insight into Socialism became almost prophetic, displayed, however, throughout his career little appreciation of the effect of Nationalism in the 19th century.

feeling when he delivered his prediction carried him further at the moment than did the conclusions of his judgment. The leading men of France did not foresee the fall of the Orleanist monarchy. On Feb. 21, 1848, Louis Philippe was in the highest spirits. The Premier (Guizot) relied on an invincible parliamentary majority and feared neither opponents in Parliament nor insurgents behind the barricades. He felt no dread—he was a man of high courage—either for himself or for the throne until on Feb. 22 he was betrayed and dismissed from office by the King. The members of the Opposition who had roused the agitation for parliamentary reform by banquets at which the drinking of the King's health was significantly omitted did not anticipate their own success; and the insurgents prepared to fight behind barricades were more full of courage than of hope.

It is difficult to convey to the men of to-day the strangeness of the events which immediately preceded or which followed upon the escape of Louis Philippe from Paris and his arrival in England. If one dared trust to the memory of boyhood, my inclination would be to assert that between the end of 1847 and the last days of June 1848 every one in England at least was in a state of perpetual excitement over the news from abroad. From the moment when the Orleanist dynasty was overthrown, insurrections and revolutions throughout the Continent seemed to be every-day affairs. To my own mind this period of successful revolution looks like a dream. Indisputable events prove that the memories of youth are no delusions.

The revolutionary movement of 1848 was widespread and violent. It shook the foundations of nearly all the most civilised and powerful States of the European continent. The political and social earthquake was felt in France, in Italy, in Germany, and throughout the whole of the Austrian Empire; in Hungary it aroused an insurrection and a war in which Hungary would have established her independence but for the aid given to Austria by the Russian Tsar.

The movement of 1848 came rapidly to a close; it lasted, speaking broadly, for not more than four years, that is from Feb. 24, 1848, to December 1852, when Louis Napoleon was declared Emperor as Napoleon III.

These four years may be divided into two periods which overlap each other. The first period, which lasted for not much more than a year, is marked by the frequent successes of insurgents against trained armies. The second period, which extends certainly over more than two years, is characterised by the constant defeat of insurgents by Governments which had the support of trained armies. This rapid alternation of successful revolution and finally successful reaction is one of the essential characteristics of the movement of 1848.

The leading features of the movement of 1848 should be borne in mind. But it is not my aim to describe, even in outline, the history of Europe in arms. My sole object is to show how the movement of 1848 affected England. This end may, it is submitted, be attained first by examining with some minuteness the state of public opinion of England during 1848, and, next, by stating the extent to which English institutions or habits were affected by the outbreak which shook the foundations of many European States.

Public opinion is a term which we all use but which yet bears so vague a sense that it hardly admits of any precise definition. The real meaning of public opinion as applied to a self-governed nation such as England, is best found in a letter from Sir Robert Peel to Croker, written in 1820. Peel refers to the political tone of England, and describes it as that great 'compound of folly, meanness, weakness, prejudice, wrong feeling, right feeling, and newspaper paragraphs which is called public opinion.'* For our purpose this cynical description of public opinion, penned by a real statesman in a moment of low spirits, is worth a thousand definitions, for it warns us against the delusion that the feeling or tone of England consists in the main of definite and rigid political dogmas. But to make Peel's language of any true value we must add, what his words really imply, that popular prejudice is often grounded on the exaggeration of truths discovered by thinkers of genius, and adopted by statesmen of intelligence. We should also bear in mind that, in England at any rate, the only

* Thursfield, 'Peel,' p. 10.

public opinion which counts for much in the conduct of national affairs is the opinion of the classes in whose hands lies the government of a country; and that the England of 1848 was governed in the main by the upper and middle classes, while the feelings of the wage-earners, who were then often called, without any idea of rudeness, 'the lower classes,' or sometimes 'the million,' to use a now forgotten expression, obtained little representation in Parliament, and therefore received little attention in the country. Nor is it irrelevant to note that my investigation into a by-gone condition of opinion must tend to emphasise somewhat too strongly the points wherein the ideas prevalent in 1848 differ from the dominant convictions of 1920; and that a writer who bases his account of a past state of England on memory is a better witness as to a condition of public feeling seventy years ago than he is of facts then occurring. Persons who to-day have not reached the age of 21 may, should they be alive in 1970, have forgotten the main facts of the great war with Germany, and yet remember with vivid accuracy the feeling entertained in England towards Germany between 1914 and 1920.

The public opinion of England during 1848 was marked by two leading features—a belief in England, and a belief in the doctrine of *laissez-faire*.

The first of these beliefs embodied an unlimited faith in English institutions, habits of thought, and, above all, in the renowned and, as Englishmen then believed, universally admired Constitution of England. This patriotic faith in England was then, and for many years later, shared by English Conservatives, Liberals, and Radicals. They all of them felt that our Constitution, with its Queen, its two Houses of Parliament, its earnest Protestantism, was envied by every other European State. In 1830 the Duke of Wellington proclaimed his belief that the Constitution of England, though no human ingenuity could invent an equally perfect form of government, was by far the best Constitution recorded by history. The Whig leaders felt in 1848 that the Reform Act of 1832 had, without the use of revolutionary violence, removed the defects which at one time marred our parliamentary and constitutional monarchy. Palmerston, who was a disciple of Canning

and never showed any enthusiasm for parliamentary reform, believed as confidently as did Lord John Russell that the imitation of English constitutionalism could be unhesitatingly recommended to all European rulers and peoples for their adoption and imitation. The only Radicals of the day who in 1848 counted for much were those of the Manchester school. As a body, they were pretty well contented with institutions which had allowed the repeal of the Corn Laws, and would certainly within a few years permit the extension of free trade, as understood at Manchester, to the whole policy and legislation of Great Britain.

The admiration for English institutions was supported by the traditions of English history. Its existence was patent to acute observers long before Englishmen had become infected with any French revolutionary ideas. In 1762 Goldsmith described a conversation between a debtor condemned, it might be, to lifelong imprisonment for debt, a porter wearied out with a burden he can hardly carry, and a soldier, who each of them announced his resolution to risk life and limb rather than tolerate a French invasion. The debtor detests France because she denies to every citizen his personal freedom; the wearied porter abhors Frenchmen because, slaves themselves, they would impose slavery upon every Englishman; the soldier damns France with a profusion of furious oaths because of her papistry and superstition. The satire is all but incomprehensible to modern Englishmen. They cannot understand how Miss Edgeworth, in a story for children, should tell of an English footman who, in Naples of all places, pressed upon a body of Italian children, called 'little merchants,' the wisdom of deciding all disputes among them by the method of trial by jury. English traditional love for English freedom accounts for many things which now surprise us. It explains the all but incredible folly of Fox and of his Whig followers in believing that the destruction of the Bastille was the first step made by Frenchmen towards the introduction into their country of rational liberty as in England.

The mixed sentiment of detestation for the horrors of the French Revolution, and love for English constitutionalism, accounts for the passionate delight with which Englishmen as a body welcomed 'the three glorious days'

of July which placed Louis Philippe on the throne, and closed, as our fathers believed, the era of revolution by establishing a constitutional monarchy modelled on that of England. It is still, however, astounding to find that so serious a divine and so moderate a politician as James Martineau should have written on Sept. 9, 1830, in regard to these 'three glorious days': 'Has there ever been a week since the Resurrection which has promised such accumulated blessings to our race as that week of national regeneration?' Between 1830 and 1848 this faith in English institutions was kept alive, no less among Whigs than among Tories, by the sense of the miseries which the revolutionary spirit had brought upon France, and by the conviction that the Reform Act of 1832 had proved that revolution might be averted—among Englishmen at any rate—by vigorous legislation which removed pressing evils without any appeal to the use of arms either by democrats or by reactionaries. There must be some men still living who have heard their fathers, whether Whigs or Tories, boast that the Reform Act of 1832 achieved for England by pacific and legal means what a series of revolutionary horrors had hardly gained for France.

England's faith in her Constitution may be measured by the slight effect produced by the invectives of Carlyle or by the polished banter of Matthew Arnold in the attempt to shake a political creed which these authors regarded as a noxious superstition. A person who recollects the years between 1866 and 1870 will admit that these writers did not labour in vain, but there is only one Englishman among the men who played a great part in English public life of whom we can now say with certainty that at one stage of his career he shared Carlyle's distrust of parliamentary government. This leader was Richard Cobden. In 1838 he held that 'For the great mass of the people Prussia possesses the best Government in Europe. I would gladly give up,' he adds, 'my taste for talking politics to secure such a state of things in England.' Did Carlyle and Cobden ever meet together or discover their profound agreement in at least one political conviction? No discredit is due to Cobden. He knew more, at any rate from a mercantile point of view, of foreign countries and of the strong

points of Prussian government than did most Englishmen; he had, we may conjecture, perceived earlier than most thinkers or politicians, either in England or on the Continent, that democratic reforms of a merely political character would not secure the social benefits which most democrats expected from them. Cobden was no Socialist; for the mass of the people he expected more advantage from the extension of free trade and from education than from democratic institutions; and neither he nor Carlyle in the least appreciated the strength of nationalism.

In 1848, at any rate, the worship of the Constitution was the received creed of Englishmen, or at lowest of the body of Englishmen who really controlled, either as electors or as Members of Parliament, the public opinion of the country. Nor should it be forgotten that the Chartists, the most revolutionary party in England, did not introduce into the People's Charter a single provision of a socialistic character. It was, speaking broadly, the demand for universal suffrage, as it was then called, or as we should now say, manhood suffrage. It would be a mistake to draw from this fact the inference that the working-men of England did not desire any socialistic reforms. It is more probable that, like many of their opponents, they assumed that complete democracy, as represented by universal suffrage, would immediately confer upon them all the social advantages which they expected from it. They certainly turned from demanding the People's Charter towards the attempt to modify the Combination Laws in favour of the Socialism latent in Trade Unionism.

Now this belief in England was certainly due, in some degree, to ignorance and insularity. The insularity of England is even now much greater than Englishmen imagine, but the ignorance of Englishmen about continental countries, indeed of all countries outside the British Empire, was certainly far greater seventy-two years ago than it is to-day. Every Englishman, for at least twenty years before 1815, had been excluded from habitual communication with the Continent—and in 1848 the Continent to Englishmen meant practically France. Here and there, in some out-of-the-way country place, was to be found a gentleman who during the Peace of Amiens had gone to Paris and by good luck had

returned to England before Napoleon arrested all the Englishmen he could lay hands on in France. Such a gentleman passed for many years among his neighbours as possessing special knowledge of French affairs not possessed by any one else living, say, in Leicestershire. In 1848 indeed railways and steamships had come into existence. But it was still a long journey from London to Marseilles; no complete line of railway connected Paris with that port before 1855. In 1844 a traveller when going, let us say, from Boulogne to Paris or from Paris to Lyons, had in most cases little choice between travelling by a very slow diligence or, at a very high fare, by a *malle-poste* which never went at a greater rate than eight miles an hour. In 1848 the number of Englishmen who went to France was rapidly increasing, but the number of men or women in England who then read, spoke, or occasionally wrote French easily was assuredly much smaller than it is to-day. To read German was, in 1850, for English ladies or gentlemen a rare accomplishment. One may indeed conjecture that the number of our countrymen who read German easily then was not very much greater than the number of Englishmen who now read Russian.

After 1850 the habit of travel grew, but it is doubtful whether the increased number of English travellers who went abroad really meant a great increase in the knowledge in England of continental or even of French habits or ways of thought. The rapidity of travelling by railway increases the number of travellers but decreases the amount of knowledge which they obtain from their journeys; a gentleman who in 1828 went from London to Bristol, or from London to Paris, did of necessity acquire a real though uncertain amount of knowledge of the country, and at any rate of the towns through which he passed on his journey from London. At the present day it is possible to make either of these journeys without acquiring any material acquaintance with the intermediate towns, or even of the intermediate country. It is certainly conceivable that the more or less wealthy statesmen who in the 18th century governed England acquired a much more intimate acquaintance with foreign lands than did their successors after 1848. The noblemen who made the 'grand tour' often wasted

their opportunities of studying the character of foreign statesmen or authors; but they went abroad with good introductions to men of eminence in France or in Germany. Their inquiries were guided by intelligent tutors; and it is hardly possible to imagine that youths of education and position, who made the grand tour in company with such men as Adam Smith or David Hume, returned home without having acquired a valuable knowledge of foreign countries and their leading statesmen which did not fall to any young nobleman or squire who began his career in public life in or since 1848.

The second of the leading convictions with which I am dealing was the intense faith of educated Englishmen in 1848, and maintained by them with somewhat declining force till 1880 or later, in *laissez-faire*. This faith in *laissez-faire* has been called by various names. In regard to Englishmen at least it may best be called individualism, for in England the creed of *laissez-faire* has always rested upon the conviction entertained by all its votaries that in the modern and civilised countries of Europe the energy, the inventiveness, and the free action of individuals promoted not only each man's individual prosperity and happiness, but also conduced to the welfare of the State, or, in other words, of the great mass of e.g. Englishmen or Frenchmen. But for a full understanding of the strength and nature of this creed among Englishmen from 1848 onwards several considerations must be borne in mind which to-day are often overlooked. Thus the term *laissez-faire*, which is best expressed in its original form of *laissez-faire et laissez passer*, is derived from French economists and was impressed on English thinkers and English statesmen by the works of Adam Smith and Bentham. But the doctrine itself, as it flourished in the middle of the 19th century, came to English Members of Parliament and to their constituents neither through the works of political economists (who have never commanded much real popularity among ordinary Englishmen), nor through the writings of Bentham, who could indeed, when he chose, express himself with great force, but, as his influence and his age increased, came to wrap his ideas up in forms of expression which were sometimes

incomprehensible to the common run of students. The advantages of *laissez-faire* were impressed upon the readers of 1848 by hosts of writers, such as Macaulay and Sydney Smith, who believed not so much in any philosophic system as in what we may call the utilitarianism of commonsense.

Again, we must remember that the doctrines of political economy itself, though they might often be unpopular, possessed a kind of intellectual authority from 1848, say, to 1854 far greater than they possess to-day. On this matter the language of E. L. Godkin deserves particular attention. His life extended from 1831 to 1902. During the greater part of it he observed and criticised with care and knowledge the current of popular opinion as it was traceable in the life of the English people on both sides of the Atlantic. In 1890 he wrote thus to a friend about the teaching of political economy about 1850:

'John Stuart Mill was our prophet, and Grote and Bentham were our daily food. . . . At that period, in England and Ireland at least, political economy was taught as a real science, which consisted simply in the knowledge of what man, as an exchanging, producing animal, would do, if let alone. On that you can base a science, for the mark of science is that it enables you to predict. Since then, what is called political economy has become something entirely different. It has assumed the rôle of an adviser, who teaches man to make himself more comfortable through the help of his government, and has no more claim to be a science than philanthropy. . . . At all events, its influence on statesmen is nothing like what it was when Pitt listened to Adam Smith and Peel to Cobden. But, whatever its value or defects, I and my friends were filled with the teachings of the *laissez-faire* school and had no doubt that its recent triumph in the abolition of the Corn Laws was sure to lead to wider ones in other countries.'*

A matter not quite so obvious is that the doctrine of *laissez-faire* is very closely connected with the then dominant trust in the institutions of England. It was the outcome of our constitutional history. The rule of law, which is the special glory of English constitutional

* 'Life of E. L. Godkin,' i, pp. 11, 12.

government, is the source of our personal freedom; and this freedom itself resulted from the success with which nobles, squires, and merchants closely linked together established the sacredness of their own legal rights or privileges against the arbitrary authority of the Crown; the defeat indeed of monarchical power is an application of the principle, as profound as it is illuminative, that 'in England the law for the great men has become the law for all men.'* The high estimate of individual and personal rights is an aristocratic sentiment handed down in our laws and customs to the English people. One must also never forget that the creed of *laissez-faire* has no connexion with want of humanity or with lack of sympathy for the sufferings of the poor. The teachers who preached and practised the now decried expediency of non-interference with the personal freedom of law-abiding citizens were many of them animated by an almost excessive hatred—if there can in such a matter be excess—of everything which caused needless suffering to men or to other animals. But believing, as Utilitarians did, that liberty of thought and of action was the source of welfare to Englishmen, whether rich or poor, they neither did feel nor could feel that to curtail the unnecessary interference of the State with the freedom of individual citizens was inconsistent with the most perfect benevolence and humanity. Their error, if any, was occasionally to detest too much the infliction of suffering, even where it might be needful for the repression of crime or for the stimulating of energy; to assume too readily that to confer upon human beings full political rights might not be the same thing as giving them the power to use such rights; and (though the error was a somewhat different one) to believe that democracy which gave equality of rights also conferred equality of social advantages, or in other words that true democracy meant true socialism.

The general acceptance, however, by Englishmen of the theory of *laissez-faire* was due to the fact that it had produced excellent results. It had abolished the slave trade; it had put an end to negro slavery; it had repealed the Corn Laws; it had thereby assuaged the

* Pollock and Maitland, 'History of English Law,' i, 203.

bitterness of the English poor towards rich landowners and thus rendered the hatred of landlords recorded in the verses of Ebenezer Elliott all but incomprehensible to the men of to-day. *Laissez-faire*, let it be added, has been justified by the experience not only of the 19th but also of the 20th century. It has gained for England the loyalty of her Dominions; it obtained for her the wealth which labourers, whose wages are raised by the State, seem in their ignorance to regard as literally boundless; and, though no one out of Bedlam would dream of depreciating the bravery of our soldiers or sailors, no man of common sense would deny that the loyalty of the Dominions and the huge riches of England were the all but necessary conditions of the victory by England and her Allies over the immense forces of German despotism.

This sketch of English opinion is best vindicated by reference to three or four writers or speakers who, towards the middle of the 19th century, displayed in their works or words the influence, often combined, of faith both in the English Constitution and in *laissez-faire*. Macaulay published the first two volumes of his History of England * in Nov. 1848. The book was hailed with universal applause. Macaulay was felt to be the representative of what was noblest in the England of his day. He appealed to the leading English ideas of his time, and displayed them in their best form. With him love for his country was a passion. The main object of his life was to draw for his countrymen a never-to-be-forgotten picture of English history from 'the accession of James II to a time within the memory of men now living.' In so far as life was allowed him he achieved his object. The many admirers and the numerous critics of Macaulay will admit that the only parts of English history really known to the mass of the English people are the periods which he has described for every English reader. He attempted, and with great success, to make the England of the past known to ordinary Englishmen by constant comparison with the

* Compare the celebrated cap. lli of Macaulay's History with his review of Gladstone's 'On Church and State' (1839), and Macaulay's speech on the People's Charter, May 3, 1842, and on the factory legislation, May 22, 1846.

England of Queen Victoria. He was filled, like his contemporaries, with pride in what England had achieved in by-gone days and of confident hope in England's future. His tone is different from the tone of the 20th century. This contrast arises from Macaulay's intense belief in the blessings to be derived from political, moral, and religious freedom, and from his conviction, grounded upon historical knowledge, that the welfare of England and of individual Englishmen had arisen from the constant increase of the rational liberty enjoyed by Englishmen, which of itself guaranteed the prosperity and the greatness of England. Here we come across the legitimate blending in Macaulay's mind of trust in English institutions and in the individualism which finds its expression in *laissez-faire*. He was not a Benthamite; he had exposed with telling effect the historical errors of Utilitarianism. He was no doctrinaire; he refused to lay down any rigid rule as to the limits within which Government interference was defensible in matters usually managed by individuals. But his whole doctrine is summed up in the dictum that a Government which went beyond its obvious functions of defending individual rights would soon find itself in the absurd position of 'an academy of painting which should also be a bank [and] would [therefore] in all probability exhibit very bad pictures and discount very bad bills.' The moral splendour of Macaulay's History and of his teaching lies in the fact that his passionate love for England is based upon his philosophic faith in intellectual, moral, and religious freedom.

Mill's 'Political Economy' was published in 1848, his treatise 'On Liberty' appeared in 1859. Put these books side by side with Macaulay's History. Each of Mill's two works gave increased force to individualism. They convinced youthful Liberals between 1850 and 1870 that personal freedom of action and of belief was the one true source of personal excellence and of public progress and welfare. Of Mill it has been well said that, 'if he appears to the modern Socialist as a follower of Ricardo, [yet] he would have been regarded by Ricardo's disciples as a Socialist.' But, though Mill tried hard to qualify the rigidity of economical facts by sympathetic treatment of socialistic ideals, and though, in common with Macaulay,

he recognised exceptions to the application of *laissez-faire*, he was at bottom an opponent of governmental interference with matters generally left to the control of individuals. He denied the power of the State to regulate the rate of wages. The only method he could discover for increasing the material welfare of wage-earners lay in the rigid and apparently enforced adherence to the practice of Malthusian doctrine. He looked with favour on the position of the stationary State, though the difficulty found by France during the recent war in resistance to the overflowing population of Germany suggests that any country whose population is stationary may be unable to preserve its freedom against a warlike neighbour with a constantly increasing population.

Two authors of far less fame than Macaulay or Mill typically represent the English liberalism of 1848. W. R. Greg was a forcible writer of marked intellectual independence. He perceived, at a time when British colonies were generally held to be a burden to the mother-country, the close connexion between the greatness of England and the maintenance of her colonial Empire. Yet he taught that 'State interference is [in general] omnipotent for evil and very impotent for good.' Most paupers were, in his eyes, no better than criminals. Our duty towards the poorer classes is summed up by him in one sentence: 'We should enable them to *get* everything, we should *give* them nothing, except education; and, if we give this to one generation, the rest may be trusted to get it for themselves'—an anticipation by the way falsified by the Education Acts passed from 1870 onwards.

Samuel Smiles was the author of a well-known book entitled 'Self-Help,' the sale of which between 1859 and the end of the century amounted, it is said, to at least 270,000 copies. The title of the book describes its character. It was a continuous illustration, from the lives mainly of working-men, of the thesis that by energy, good conduct, and if possible a little genius, men who begin life with comparatively small means may rise to comfort, wealth, and eminence. Smiles was not a writer of any distinguished merit, but he fully believed in the doctrine which he preached. It is possible that some of Smiles' disciples may have been led into a confusion between the effort to raise one's moral character and the very much lower

achievement of getting on in life, or in other words, of becoming the associate of persons richer and more prosperous than those among whom a man was born. Still, teaching which makes any large number of men feel that success in the conflict of life must depend upon one's own vigour, self-control, and character, and not on patronage or the help of the State, is in the main wholesome, and is certainly characteristic of the teachers of England in the middle of the 19th century.

To Cobden, again, and the whole Manchester school, the very policy of free trade, and the energy of argument and action by which it was forced upon the adoption of England, were, as already pointed out, the great and standing argument in favour of *laissez-faire*. Two illustrations of this are worth noting. No man had less sympathy with what one may call Cobdenism than Palmerston, but in 1852 he told his constituents roundly that Protection 'means practically taxing the food of the many for the sake of the interests of the few.' The Exhibition of 1851 was believed in England to be the one great event of the year; and it was considered by Buckle, who in 1859 was treated as a considerable thinker, as a sign that wars were coming to an end and that civilised men had entered upon an era of perpetual peace.

The movement of 1848 produced among Englishmen two different effects of which the one may be called perplexity, and the other immobility. This perplexity may be looked at from two different points of view. It meant, in the first place, a certain not unnatural fear that the revolutionary movement in France might spread to England. Not more than sixteen years had passed since the Reform Bill of 1832 had been carried by means of an agitation which all but became a revolution. Even so late as 1839 the Chartist movement had excited an actual rebellion in Wales. The Chartist leaders, it is true, were none of them men of much ability. But Ireland seemed to be on the point of rebellion; and the trials of now forgotten Chartists, such as Dowling, Cuffey, and Ernest Jones, showed that they counted on rebellion in Ireland aiding revolution in England. Perplexity, however, in so far as it was equivalent to fear for the maintenance of order in England, came to an end within

about six weeks from Feb. 24, 1848. It was terminated by the events of one now forgotten day, April 10, 1848. On that day the Chartists held what was meant to be an enormous meeting at what is now Kennington Park; and it was intended that a gigantic petition for the Charter should be carried to the House of Commons by thousands of Chartists, who should then and there force its acceptance on Parliament. On Sunday, April 9, there was serious alarm among quite sensible Liberals; as the evening went on, one heard the sound of wagons carrying artillery down Hampstead Hill to be used against possible insurgents. The Government was prepared; the Duke, as Wellington was always then called, had attended a meeting of the Cabinet and had arranged every detail of defence; he was rightly sure that there would be no real need to use soldiers, and that there would be no fighting, though both soldiers and police were placed in position for resisting the mob. The Chartists were really defeated neither by soldiers nor policemen. 200,000 special constables were enrolled to face the rioters; the bridges leading to Westminster were properly defended; the rioters were overawed. It used to be told that some foreigner or Irishman had summed up the matter in the words: 'Men of England, ye are slaves, Beaten by policemen's staves.'

In truth, the revolutionists were defeated by the voice of the nation, as they almost always have been in England. English perplexity meant, in the second place, a far more lasting and important feeling than fear of the disturbance of order in England. It arose from the singular incapacity of Englishmen for understanding the course of events abroad, and especially in France. Although they knew and cared more about French affairs than about the politics of any other continental State, they could not understand why the Orleanist dynasty should have been overthrown. The invasion by a mob, on May 15, 1848, of a National Assembly duly elected by universal suffrage, and no doubt in the main representing the French people, was to most Englishmen incomprehensible. The terrible slaughter resulting from the insurrection of June 1848, when political Republicans like Cavaignac, supported by the mass of the nation, defeated Socialistic Republicans, supported by the workmen

of Paris, seemed in England all but unexplainable. The triumph of Cavaignac seemed the triumph of law and order; and Englishmen expected that the successful General who had saved the Republic would naturally be the First Republican President. Under Cavaignac's government the Presidential election was conducted, it was believed, with singular fairness. The result was that, by a decisive majority, France elected Louis Napoleon, who had no claim to confidence except that he was the representative of Napoleon I, and declined to elect Cavaignac, who in the eyes of Englishmen had been the saviour of the country.

The *coup d'état* of Dec. 2, 1851, was indeed, to some few Englishmen, the natural though detestable result of the election of Louis Napoleon as President of the Republic; a conspirator, whose life-long dream had been the unscrupulous vindication of his claim to the Imperial throne of his uncle, was not likely to be deterred, when President of the Republic, from seizing the crown as the Emperor Napoleon III. English indignation at an outrageous act of political immorality was natural and in a sense creditable. But it is a curious example of English blindness in regard to foreign affairs that among eminent Englishmen two alone understood why the crime of the *coup d'état* of 1851, hateful though it was to the best and ablest of Frenchmen, was condoned almost immediately by the vote of France. The youthful insight of Walter Bagehot and the aged experience of Lord Palmerston enabled them to perceive how it happened that a successor to the great Napoleon, who at the worst might restore Napoleonic despotism and possibly Napoleonic glory, would seem to thousands of Frenchmen far preferable as a ruler to a body of socialistic fanatics who might renew some terrible reign of terror.

The second effect referred to above (p. 236) is immobility. The immediate effect of the movement of 1848 in England may be summed up in one sentence: Englishmen became thereby determined that they would not change the institutions of their country, and in matter of fact it may with substantial truth be asserted that the main institutions of the United Kingdom—the Crown, the House of Lords, the House of Commons, the position of the National Church—were not seriously

changed either by direct legislation or by the force of custom during the movement of 1848, or indeed until 1867. England happily was a living country; and changes of many kinds went on uncontrolled by the action of Parliament or of politicians. But constitutional changes were during and after the movement of 1848 almost unknown. Of the two main ideas which that movement has impressed upon the world, namely, Nationalism and Socialism, we may say with truth that, though each of them affected many Englishmen, neither of them produced any great effect on English policy or legislation. Nationalism indeed, especially as applied to Italy, did enlist the most vehement sympathy of many among the best and the most enthusiastic of Englishmen. In 1838 Wordsworth had addressed that 'illustrious country' in a sonnet which expressed the hope of a not distant time,

'When thou, uprisen, shalt break thy double yoke
And enter, with prompt aid from the Most High,
On the third stage of thy great destiny.'

Some eleven years later Clough, almost broken-hearted over Italy's failure to gain her independence, repeated the sentiment of Wordsworth and of England in the well-known lines:

'Say not, the struggle nought availeth. . . .

'If hopes were dupes, fears may be liars;
It may be, in yon smoke concealed,
Your comrades chase e'en now the fliers,
And, but for you, possess the field.

'And not by eastern windows only,
When daylight comes, comes in the light;
In front, the sun climbs slow, how slowly,
But westward, look, the land is bright.'

The working-men of England were captivated by the speeches of Kossuth. They knew that he hated Austria, and that Haynau, an Austrian General, had flogged Italian women who showed sympathy with Italy.* But

* They had not discovered that Kossuth had sent Hungarian soldiers to aid in the suppression of an Italian rebellion; and few Englishmen knew that the Magyars, though genuine Hungarian patriots, were quite prepared to tyrannise over fellow-citizens who were not Magyars.

neither English love for Italy nor English sympathy with Hungarians fighting for national independence made it possible for the English Government to do anything effective on behalf of people with whose desire for independence English ministers, such as Palmerston or Lord John Russell, sympathised. In later years Gladstone's denunciations of the cruelty inflicted by King 'Bomba' of Naples on men guilty only of having been at one time his Liberal Ministers, hardly sufficed to check the tyranny of a petty despot whom a few English men-of-war or regiments could have driven from his throne. *Laissez-faire* was identified with the maxim of non-intervention, which as interpreted, at any rate by the Manchester school, forbade the attempt to check the cruelty of an Italian despot who retained his throne solely by the support of Austria or of Russia. Bright's outburst, 'Perish, Savoy—though Savoy, I believe, will not perish and will not suffer—rather than that we should involve the Government of this country with the people and the Government of France in a matter with which we have really no interest whatever,'* may have been justified in the particular instance by the conviction that Savoy did not object to union with France, but went much too near to proclaiming in words what John Bright assuredly did not himself hold, that England had no duty to oppose injustice where her own immediate interest was not at stake.

Socialism, discredited by the failure of the national workshops in Paris and by the sanguinary insurrection in June 1848, had in the middle of the 19th century no attraction for sensible Englishmen. Here the subject of this article comes strictly to an end, but it may appropriately close by noticing a curious inquiry raised by Tocqueville.

'Le socialisme restera-t-il enseveli dans le mépris qui couvre si justement les socialistes de 1848? Je fais cette question sans y répondre. Je ne doute pas que les lois constitutives de notre société moderne ne soient fort modifiées à la longue; elles l'ont déjà été dans beaucoup de leurs parties principales, mais arrivera-t-on jamais à les détruire

* Trevelyan, 'Life of John Bright,' p. 289.

et à en mettre d'autres à la place? Cela me paraît impraticable. Je ne dis rien de plus, car, à mesure que j'étudie davantage l'état ancien du monde, et que je vois plus en détail le monde même de nos jours; quand je considère la diversité prodigieuse qui s'y rencontre, non seulement parmi les lois mais parmi les principes des lois, et les différentes formes qu'a prises et que retient, même aujourd'hui, quoi qu'on en dise, le droit de propriété sur la terre, je suis tenté de croire que ce qu'on appelle les institutions nécessaires ne sont souvent que les institutions auxquelles on est accoutumé, et qu'en matière de constitution sociale, le champ du possible est bien plus vaste que les hommes qui vivent dans chaque société ne se l'imaginent.*

To this inquiry the lapse of seventy years has, as regards England, given a reply in words that have become proverbial: 'Nowadays we are all Socialists.' This dictum means, if rightly understood, that Englishmen of the 20th century have learned to sympathise with many of the ideals of honest Socialists without taking the pains to ascertain whether these ideals are in fact attainable. We may go a little further than this without absolutely going beyond the bounds of the subject of this article. The movement of 1848 excited in many minds a reaction against the over-contentment of England; indeed with some men, as for example with Macaulay, it needed no outbreak abroad to rouse indignation against the sufferings of children overworked in factories. It stands to the eternal credit of the English nobility that Lord Shaftesbury (as Lord Ashley) excited and carried through the agitation in favour of the Factory Acts. He thus represented the socialistic humanitarianism latent in the English creed of *laissez-faire*. In 1851 Mayhew's letters on 'London Labour and the London Poor' made the English world aware that neither the freedom ensured by law to every Englishman, nor the right to poor relief which protected the poor against threatened starvation, always gave to honest wage-earners that comfort in life which good institutions secured for the richer class of Englishmen. Maurice, Kingsley, and their friends, while laying this lesson to heart, also showed that some socialistic ideals harmonised with Christian morality.

* 'Souvenirs de Alexis de Tocqueville' (1893), p. 111.

From the moment indeed when Christian Socialists and other humane and enlightened Englishmen perceived that the possession by the poor of the widest political rights did not ensure anything like social equality with the well-to-do members of a civilised State, absolute belief in the doctrine of *laissez-faire* became qualified by the force of English humanitarianism. We can already indeed perceive the shape under which Socialistic proposals might most easily conciliate the goodwill of many English voters. A thoughtful writer, utterly uninfluenced by political prejudice of any kind, has laid down that Communism might be defined as a universal and compulsory insurance society which is to take account of all departments of business and in some of its forms to invade the province of social and domestic life as well.*

The grant of Old Age Pensions and the passing of the National Insurance Act show that, in the shape suggested by this author, Socialism has already gained the assent of many Englishmen. But here another inquiry suggests itself: What are the steps by which the individualism of 1848-1890 has become in England the latent Socialism of 1920? My answer is that this question lies far beyond the scope of this article. It may, however, be allowable to suggest that the modified Socialism of to-day is easily connected with the humanitarian feeling which dictated the emancipation of the negroes, and in the middle of the 19th century enforced the factory legislation which, advocated by one of the most rigid of Tories, has, in common with the English Poor Law, a recognisable affinity to Socialism. It may be well to repeat that the recognition by many democrats, in 1848, that political equality did not of itself produce social equality, justified to many Englishmen the need of imposing some considerable limits upon their faith in *laissez-faire*.

A. V. DICEY.

* John Venn, 'Logic of Chance,' 3rd ed. pp. 374-375.

Art. 2.—LORD KITCHENER'S LIFE AND WORK.

1. *Lord Kitchener*. By Sir George Arthur. Three vols. Macmillan, 1920.
2. *A Gallipoli Diary*. By General Sir Ian Hamilton. Two vols. Arnold, 1920.
3. *The Dardanelles: Campaigns and their Lessons*. By Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell. Constable, 1919.

A BIOGRAPHY written immediately after the death of the man whose story it tells suffers of necessity from two serious disadvantages: essential information is usually not available; proximity makes perspective, balance, and proportion difficult to attain. This latter handicap is accentuated when its subject has died, not in tranquil retirement with his work achieved, but, as death came to Lord Kitchener, in harness, immersed in the greatest of his labours. Is it not indeed too early to tell the story of the man who, before the tragedy of H.M.S. 'Hampshire' startled the world, had taken the lion's share in that development of the latent resources of the British Empire which multiplied the little Expeditionary Force of 1914 more than twelve-fold on the Western front alone? But, if any account of Lord Kitchener's work in the late war must be at best approximate, if in view of the publication of Sir Ian Hamilton's 'Gallipoli Diary' all earlier accounts of the Dardanelles venture need reconsideration, there are cogent reasons for the attempt. Sir Ian Hamilton, who writes with warm admiration of his energy and capacity, speaks (II, 238) of 'the fable that K. was a great organiser. . . . Organisation cramped his style. K. was an individualist. He was a Master of Expedients, probably the greatest the world has ever seen.' There is some danger that a 'Kitchener legend' may grow up about his work in the war.

Among those best qualified to write of Lord Kitchener from close association and personal knowledge the war made many gaps, but Sir George Arthur, his Private Secretary while at the War Office, has, fortunately, had special facilities for knowing what Lord Kitchener did and meant to do. He has, moreover, been able to utilise many important letters, from Lord French, from Sir Ian Hamilton, from Sir William Birdwood, sources especially

valuable because so much of Kitchener's work was done by interviews or over the telephone, while he himself hated writing (I, 204) and occupied his voyage to India in 1902 in destroying the accumulated private correspondence of twenty-five years (II, 114). The great value of Sir George Arthur's volumes to the historian, their profound interest for all readers, and the temperate tone, altogether free from acrimony, with which highly controversial questions are handled, cannot altogether extenuate considerable shortcomings. The chapters are awkwardly short and follow each other on no apparent system; at times the English degenerates into such phrases as 'a telegram depressed his [Lord French's] mentality' (III, 238); and the last volume is inconveniently arranged. Through the method adopted, not only is the inter-action of the operations in East and West obscured but some repetition is involved, notably over the Salonica expedition. Minor errors are unduly numerous. To include among 'New Army' Divisions the Twenty-Seventh, Twenty-Eighth, and Twenty-Ninth Divisions (III, 320) is as inaccurate as to class the Royal Naval Division among Territorials or to show the Seventy-Fourth (Yeomanry) and Seventy-Fifth Divisions as having 'embarked from Egypt' in February and May 1917 (III, 321). It is worse to talk of the 'potent contribution' which the Sixth Division 'brought to the battle of the Marne' (III, 41), and then to describe it as arriving 'fresh and in fine fettle for the battle of the Aisne' (III, 62). Had the Sixth Division been on the Aisne on Sept. 14 to improve the advantage Sir Douglas Haig and the First Corps had gained, it might indeed have made a 'potent contribution'; unfortunately, on Sept. 14 the Division was still on its way up from St Nazaire.

Sir George Arthur has been criticised in some quarters for giving only a third of his space to the war against Germany and her allies. However, if Palestine, Egypt, South Africa, and India fill two volumes, these parts are excellently told, with more perspective and better arrangement; and their story not only explains why the Empire welcomed Lord Kitchener's appointment to the War Office, but shows how his earlier activities had, consciously or unconsciously, been to some degree a

preparation for the final struggle. In Egypt Kitchener first captured the imagination of the country and established his reputation for strength, for efficiency, for energy, for capacity to take long views and to pursue ends unflinchingly in face of formidable obstacles. That reputation he maintained in other fields. In South Africa he not only carried through successfully a difficult military task, but showed himself daring and far-sighted in his advocacy of a conciliatory policy; in Sir George Arthur's words, 'having fought and won he sought to bring about a generous peace on the basis of mutual agreement' (II, 106). In the loyalty of the bulk of the Dutch in the hour of trial, in the services of the South African contingents in their own continent, and above all on the Western front, the fruits of his work were reaped. And his biographer's claim (II, 283) that 'but for Lord Kitchener's work India could never have given the great help she has . . . during the war' is amply justified. The Indian Army's presence in France was of great political and military importance. It was the first proof of the solidarity of the Empire; and vital assistance was rendered by the two divisions with which India reinforced the hard-pressed seven who were staying the German thrust at the Channel Ports. Arriving at the crisis of that desperate struggle, the additional guns and rifles of the Lahore and Meerut Divisions made an incalculable difference. It was Kitchener who had made their arrival possible by his reorganisation of the Indian Army, his formation of 'War Divisions' (II, 135 ff.), and his increase in the British officers of the Indian battalions. In Australia and New Zealand again he had sown good seed (cf. II, 296 ff.). Sir George Arthur might have enlarged on his starting their military organisation on sound lines; if there was smooth and efficient co-operation when Australians and New Zealanders worked alongside of troops from the mother-country, this was largely because Kitchener had induced them to adopt common establishments and a common system of training.

To such extent, then, as the Empire east of Suez was prepared for the shock of August 1914, it may be largely attributed to the man who found England herself not merely without the army the situation required, but, even worse, 'without any preparation to equip one'

(III, 265). To many who realised the extent of our unpreparedness, the creation, equipment, and maintenance of a British Army adequate to the Empire's needs seemed beyond the bounds of possibility; while those who held the generally accepted theory that failure of financial resources must make modern war brief, wondered if the 'New Armies' could be formed and trained in time to affect the decision. So gigantic a task required a rare combination of qualities. It wanted that capacity for looking far ahead, that mind 'big with broad views,' those 'moments of God-sent intuition,' of which Sir Ian Hamilton speaks (II, 149, 184). It was truly characteristic that when, as Sir Ian Hamilton puts it, 'every other soldier except Douglas Haig believed he'd be back before the grouse-shooting was over' (II, 184), Kitchener predicted a three years' war and laid his plans accordingly. The task wanted also that vast driving power and energy which had always pre-eminently distinguished him. But, above all, the situation called for a man who inspired confidence.

With the mere declaration of war the utter inadequacy of our military preparations was disclosed beyond concealment. Excellent as had been the work of the military authorities in the limited sphere in which preparation had been allowed, the provision of the Expeditionary Force, the largest, best equipped, best trained, best organised that ever left the country, the realisation of the disproportion between what we had at stake and our preparations for its defence was enough to discourage any one. It would have been very difficult for any one not altogether outside politics and altogether free from responsibility for the perilousness of the situation to arouse in his countrymen the necessary degree of confidence. In Kitchener these needs were met. He had done great things with small resources in the past. A soldier, he was absolutely outside politics; it was even something of an advantage that he had never been identified with the efforts of Lord Roberts, now shown to have been more than justified, to awaken the country to its dangers. If his unfamiliarity with the War Office, with the Territorial Force and its problems, increased his difficulties, it was some compensation that he approached Army administration at home with an

open mind. He was something new, a great reserve of strength. His name seemed to guarantee success. His mere readiness to attempt the creation of a vast army in time of war persuaded others that it was feasible.

To the creation of the New Armies there are only two parallels, the American Civil War and the French Revolution. But in neither instance were the difficulties and dangers so great. The North, vastly superior in material resources, faced an enemy equally ill-prepared. The French opposed a coalition divided by political jealousies and imbued with obsolescent military traditions; moreover, in 1793, warfare depended little on materials and elaborate equipment, and no infantry battalions were kept back from the front then because their affiliated artillery had not received their guns. The full meaning of Kitchener's task was hardly apparent at the outset to many who took part in it. It is only now that a retrospect of August and September 1914 reveals the vastness of the undertaking, the magnitude of the achievement, and the courage needed in the man who called upon the country to undertake it. It is to be hoped that some day a full account of the making of the New Armies will be produced, filling in details where Sir George Arthur unfortunately has only traced outlines, and giving an adequate picture of the difficulties against which the organiser of the New Armies had to contend. It would rival, both in interest and value, the record of their great achievements in the field. It is easy now to indicate mistakes. For instance, it was a serious error to allow so much splendid officer material to go to the front and be expended in the ranks of Yeomanry and Territorial units; no Staff College graduates should have been allowed to go out as mere company and platoon commanders in the Expeditionary Force; the Officer Cadet Battalions should have been started at least twelve months earlier. But, considering the emergency and the hurry, it is marvellous there were not more mistakes. The question of expansion had apparently never been considered, despite the Elgin Commission's recommendations; or two General Staff Officers working for a couple of months might have examined and settled many of the throng of details that clamoured for solution in August 1914. Kitchener had to start from

the absolute beginnings, in a willing but naked land; and, in comparison with his achievement, even serious errors in detail are negligible.

But, while the new Armies were being trained there was more to be done. To develop the vast resources, human and material, of the unarmed and unready British Empire was itself a Herculean task. Kitchener attempted to shoulder the additional burden of directing the employment of our existing forces, to guide the strategy of the Empire as well as to arm it for war. His task was all the harder because on the outbreak of war the General Staff had practically dispersed. Most of its members went overseas with the Expeditionary Force; and the new Secretary of State found himself without the expert advice for which he might have looked (III, 6, cf. 13). Sir Ian Hamilton speaks (I, 11) of 'K's horror' of being War Minister or Commander-in-Chief; 'now he is both.' The double rôle, too much for any one man, was particularly so for one who, as Sir George Arthur admits, had been too much absorbed in the East to study in detail the problems of the West. And, full as his hands were with the New Army, his other anxieties were even more urgent. Even after the first crisis was past, and the Marne, followed by Ypres, had given the British Empire the chance to develop its resources, the situation remained perilous. We had to maintain and supply our existing forces and to assist our allies to hold our enemy in check until such time as the British Empire could throw its full weight into the scale. Till then the paramount necessity was to maintain an unbroken defence; and, though hopes were entertained of reaching a successful issue earlier, Kitchener's plans were framed to make certain in the long run. But with the Germans within sixty miles of Paris, French opinion naturally favoured an earlier effort to expel the enemy (cf. III, 224); and a purely defensive strategy had its own perils. To leave the initiative entirely to the enemy was a policy no soldier would willingly adopt, calculated to discourage troops and civilians, to say nothing of allies and possible allies. The offensives of 1915 may have been premature and disappointing, but were not therefore necessarily avoidable or without justification. How far their failure, so far as they did fail, was due to

misdirection of effort, how far to inadequacy of material, is a question with which Lord Kitchener's biography is naturally concerned.

Serious as was the lack of trained men, the difficulties of providing guns, ammunition, and many articles of equipment were even acuter. It was no good crying out, 'What shall we spend to be saved?' The nation had plunged into Armageddon without armaments; and worse even than the lack of munitions was the lack of means of producing them. The things that were wanted took months and even years to produce. Kitchener's plight was that of 'the *chef* who to produce an omelette must first establish a poultry farm' (III, 265). On the much-disputed question of munitions, Sir George Arthur establishes an excellent case, successfully refuting those who have tried to lay at Lord Kitchener's door the inadequacy of our munitions and our consequent checks on the Western front in 1915 (cf. chap. cxxv and cxxvi). That Lord Kitchener and the War Office were early alive to the need for heavy guns, for machine-guns, and for high explosives is clear (III, 266). The Ministry of Munitions undoubtedly did splendid work, but not till 1916 did its efforts begin to produce real effect (III, 288); and all the supplies available for Loos were the work of the War Office. Trade Union regulations and the enlistment of real 'indispensables' no doubt hampered output in the early days; an earlier adoption of National Registration (advocated by the 'Spectator' almost at the outset) would have been an advantage; but an important reason why deliveries of guns and ammunition fell short of expectations was the failure to co-ordinate; different contractors were calculating on the same sources for raw materials (cf. III, 267). That a system of 'rationing' raw materials might have obviated this is easy to see now, but not therefore reasonable to expect of 1914.

That Lord Kitchener was always happy in his strategy can hardly be maintained, and to assert that he made no blunders, no decisions of doubtful wisdom, is the more futile because, whatever his errors, his services far outweigh them. Strategy was not his special province; he had never been through the Staff College; neither on the Nile nor in South Africa had his experiences prepared him for the problems of a

European war. Indeed it is something of a paradox that, while he was called to his great task largely because he was a soldier, it was as a statesman, the leader and inspirer of his country's efforts, in the broad lines of policy rather than in the more technical sphere, that he achieved most. But it is not in connexion with the Western front that he can reasonably be criticised. With all his knowledge of the East he was never under any delusion as to the true relation between the Western and the Eastern spheres; he knew that enterprises in the East could only be justified in so far as they would contribute appreciably to success in the vital Western theatre (cf. III, 111). From the outset he was firm on absolutely harmonious co-operation with the French. 'We must at all hazards support our Allies' was the keynote of his policy; there must be no operating on our own (III, 36, cf. 50). It was on this account that, on receiving the telegram of Aug. 31, announcing Lord French's intention to withdraw his troops from the front line, he hurried to Paris for the celebrated interview of Sept. 1. Sir George Arthur's version, most judiciously given, is not easy to reconcile in every detail with Lord French's '1914,' but it is impossible not to feel that a grave blunder, political and military, was averted, and that Lord French was hardly doing himself or his troops justice by the proposal, or when he declared his force unfit to withstand an attack by one German army corps (cf. III, 52). Haig's First Corps, at any rate, which had not been engaged in more than rear-guard actions, could surely have given an excellent account of its own number of Germans, who, after all, would have been no more fresh or at full strength than the men they were pursuing. What would the 12th Brandenburg Grenadiers and the rest of the Third (Brandenburg) Corps have been worth in an attack after their bitter experiences at Mons, so vividly related in Walter Bloem's 'Vormarsch'? Lord Kitchener's intervention, then, would seem to have been fully justified, nor does it appear to have interfered with the harmonious and friendly relations between the Commander-in-Chief and the War Secretary to which Lord French's many letters here quoted afford ample testimony. It may be added that, when the Government decided to replace Lord French in

the command in France by a soldier who, in Sir George Arthur's words, 'added to Sir John's fine military qualities an even temper, a cool judgment, a broad outlook, and an aloofness from politics' (III, 293), Lord Kitchener was absent at the Dardanelles.

It was this resolution to co-operate absolutely with the French which was the basis of Lord Kitchener's action. With characteristic intuition he had foreseen that the Germans, having once violated Belgian neutrality, would not confine themselves to the south of the Meuse; and, anticipating their great enveloping movement against the Allied left, he had protested against concentrating the B.E.F. so far forward (III, 22). But he bowed to the necessity of conforming to the plans of our Allies, just as, when the retreat came, it was in accordance with his instructions (cf. III, 50) that the British fell back upon Paris, instead of playing into the enemy's hands by retiring on the Channel ports, on which von Kluck had persuaded himself we must fall back (cf. 'The March on Paris,' *passim*). But it is noteworthy that, though he was strongly in favour of unification of military control, he set his face absolutely against anything like the Versailles Council of 1917, and would not hear of 'arming an international council with executive powers' (III, 262).

It was mainly because of his resolution to do nothing to jeopardise the position in the West or to fall short in the assistance which we could give to our French allies, that Lord Kitchener's handling of the problems which the East presented was less happy in its results. To him the hope of doing something in the East was specially dear. Over-anxiety for Egypt (cf. 'Gallipoli Diary,' I, 165, and II, 232) may have warped his judgment; his knowledge of the probable effects of a successful blow at Turkey may have induced him to attempt more than our available means could justify; but, whatever the reason, in the Gallipoli affair he shows to least advantage.

If ever during the war a blow struck in the East might have been decisive, it was in the spring of 1915. The state of the Balkans, the situation, military and political, in Russia, England's unreadiness to put forth her whole strength, made the scheme of resolving the the Western deadlock by vigorous action in the East

peculiarly attractive. The aim was not the crushing of Turkey, but that through Turkey Russia might be reached, since effective help to Russia would deal the most telling stroke at the principal enemy. It might be a way round, but one that led to, and not away from, the goal. Moreover, the Levant did seem to open to the British Navy the opportunity for decisive action denied to it in the North Sea by the masterly inactivity of its opponents. 'Amphibious' power, judiciously handled, might enable a force too small to secure decisive results on the stabilised Western Front to change the whole face of the war. But, if the delicate weapon of amphibious power was to be used to full advantage, the most skilful handling was essential. Army and Navy must work in closest co-operation and simultaneously; the scheme must be systematically examined by the experts of the Naval War Staff and of the General Staff in conjunction. But the First Report of the Dardanelles Commission and Sir C. E. Callwell's authoritative and judicious study of the campaign show the trail of the amateur over the whole affair. The General Staff had investigated the Dardanelles problem so long ago as 1906 (Callwell, p. 4); it was not called upon for its opinion in January 1915 (*ibid.*, p. 11, cf. p. 333 n.). The decision was taken by a so-called 'War Council,' which contained only one person qualified to give a verdict, and attended by 'experts' who did not consider it their function to speak unless spoken to.

Sir George Arthur throws some little light on Lord Kitchener's share in the matter. He defends him with success against some of the conclusions of the Dardanelles Commission (cf. III, 118 and 299-300), a Commission scarcely better qualified in constitution to express a verdict on technical naval and military questions than the War Council itself. But the more the story is read the harder it becomes to clear Lord Kitchener of some responsibility, not so much for the initial and most fatal error, but for later mistakes. What stands out clearly is that the decision to force the Straits by purely naval action, if ever it was justifiable, was certainly fatal to the chances of successful amphibious attack at a later stage; once the Navy had delivered a serious attack, the Turks would be warned, and the element of surprise,

still the most potent weapon of amphibious power, altogether eliminated. Should the Navy fail, their failure was not likely to be repaired by committing the Army to a difficult task made doubly difficult by the Navy's failure. The course actually followed was essentially a half-measure with all the faults and none of the advantages of a compromise.

When, in November 1914, an attack on the Dardanelles was first suggested, not even Mr Churchill had contemplated a purely naval attack (cf. III, 98 and 104); but, as no troops were available, the project—and others—had to be dropped. Unfortunately, by January, Mr Churchill had changed his mind, having become so impressed by the tremendous powers of the naval guns now available, that he was prepared to set aside all the teachings of past experience on the vexed question of ships against forts, and to expect from the guns of the 'Queen Elizabeth' all that the heavy Austrian howitzers had accomplished against Liège and Namur. On such technical points Mr Churchill's own opinion was worthless; and the unfortunate thing was that Lord Kitchener did not realise the exact nature of the naval opinion by which Mr Churchill was, as Sir George Arthur somewhat indulgently puts it, 'fortified,' and did not insist on submitting the question not to naval experts only, but to artillery officers. He allowed Mr Churchill's assurances to persuade him into approving an attempt which his own instinctive judgment had rejected when first proposed (III, 104). To that extent only can he be held responsible for the initial error. It is easy to understand how, finding his calculations utterly upset by the fleet's inability to fulfil Mr Churchill's confident prophecies, he was led, through anxiety for our prestige and position in the East, to endeavour to redeem the first false step, to pass from the dispatch of a small military force for minor and subsidiary operations in support of the fleet (III, 114) into a major military operation as a substitute for the unsuccessful naval attack. Sir George Arthur traces the steps in this process clearly. He argues rightly that the 'cardinal error' was 'an over-sanguine estimate of the power of the ships' guns' (III, 116); but his contention that 'every subsequent step was consequentially right and had to be taken' (III, 128-129) goes too far.

The worst of an initial error is the subsequent errors it infallibly breeds.

That Sir Ian Hamilton and his splendid troops more than once nearly attained success is little short of miraculous, considering the handicaps under which they laboured; but it does not extenuate the error of going on with the purely naval attack in February when the situation in the Caucasus had substantially improved, and the repulse of the Turkish attack on Egypt had set free troops for a serious amphibious attack. There was still time to postpone the naval attack when, on Feb. 16, the War Council decided to prepare a military force * (cf. Callwell, p. 31). But that the much-criticised holding back of the Twenty-Ninth Division was a serious factor it is impossible to believe (cf. Kitchener, III, 118-119), not because the Turks were not much better prepared in April than they had been a month earlier,† but because weather conditions in the *Ægean* were against attempting extensive landing operations before April (cf. Callwell, pp. 31-32).

Sir Ian Hamilton's despatches from the Dardanelles were masterly in their lucidity, their vividness, and their power. His *Diary* has all these qualities, and in addition it lifts the veil from much that the despatches had to leave obscure. It is indispensable to the student, especially when read in connexion with Lord Kitchener's biography; not that it is in any way an attack on Kitchener, of whom Sir Ian always speaks in tones of friendship. His constant cry is, 'If only K. were here to see for himself.' He appreciates his old chief's difficulties, and if he sometimes criticises, it is in no carping spirit. The whole book is written with extraordinary frankness and candour, with regretfulness, but without bitterness. It is a notable and welcome addition to the literature of the war. Brilliantly and fascinatingly written, not even those who are weary of 'war books' will readily lay it down; it has valuable lessons for the citizen as well as for the soldier, and leaves little room

* It is not clear why Sir Ian Hamilton was not then selected for the command and given more than two days in which to make his preparations and consider his problems.

† The evidence of Major Prigge, one of Liman von Sanders' Staff, is conclusive against Sir G. Arthur's contention (III, 125) on this point.

for controversy over the reasons why we never got through. Only four words are needed; 'not enough' and 'too late.'

At the original landing the force employed was less than half the 150,000 men that the Greek General Staff had estimated as needed for the enterprise. General Callwell believes that the best chance would have been to land the whole force north of Gaba Tepe (pp. 128-131); but, if the East Lancashire Territorials or even Cox's Indian Brigade, who arrived in the first days of May (cf. Gallipoli Diary, I, 174, cf. 182), had been present on April 26, it seems almost certain that the stupendous achievement of the Twenty-Ninth Division in forcing a landing at Cape Helles would have been crowned with success, at least as regards the capture of Achi Baba. As it was, more than half the Division was allotted to a 'covering force' which had practically no main body behind it (cf. I, 163); and on April 28 the same men who had forced the landing, who had been fighting or on fatigue for four days on end, had to be called upon for a task which was beyond their exhausted powers though within those of fresh troops (I, 170).

April 28 saw the fatal check; after that the chances grew steadily worse. The Turks, whom we had after all surprised—by our astonishing success—had time to dig themselves in and to bring up reinforcements, while ours were invariably too late. The initial failure to send out with the Twenty-Ninth Division the usual ten per cent. of 'first reinforcements'—'the essential cause of our repeated failure to make that little push which just differentiates partial from conclusive success' (II, 232)—was followed by a constant failure to keep up the absolutely essential flow of drafts. The 5th Royal Scots, for example, the only Territorial battalion in the Division, who in the repulse of the Turkish night attack of May 1-2 had saved the day (I, 198), were allowed to dwindle to less than a company. And with guns and ammunition matters were even worse. The proportion of artillery was below that on the Western front—the Royal Naval Division had none at all; the heavy guns originally sent out were of old pattern; of howitzers, specially valuable against the well-dug and well-sited Turkish trenches, scarcely any were available; and even

for this inadequate artillery the ammunition supply was so scanty that, as General Simpson Baikie explains in a most valuable Appendix, the French used to call our gunners 'un coup par pièce.' For want of ammunition we could not utilise the really favourable moment when the repulse with tremendous losses of the repeated Turkish counter-attacks on the positions captured by us on June 28 had broken the Turkish moral and shattered several of their best divisions (cf. I, 373-378). By August there were rested, refreshed, and reinforced Turks to meet.

When the great 'push' was tried, success seemed at one moment attained. Despite dogged opposition and most difficult ground, Birdwood's Australians and New Zealanders, reinforced by Shaw's Thirteenth Division, gained a footing on the heights; the skilfully planned landing of the rest of the Ninth Corps at Suvla was a most successful surprise; but at the critical moment 'the advantage of time and place,' 'in all martial actions half a victory,' proved irrecoverable. The new troops were doubtless inexperienced; as one of their officers told the present writer, 'We didn't know how to do it—then'; but the Lincolnshires and Irishmen who stormed Chocolate Hill, the Yorkshires who rushed Lala Baba, the 6th Borders on Scimitar Hill, only wanted directing. It was most unfortunate that on Aug. 8 the Headquarters of the Eleventh Division were ignorant of the position of two battalions, so that an all-important position was evacuated, to be promptly occupied by the Turks; to which catastrophe the next day's reverse was largely due (II, 67). That the Corps Commander failed to rise to the occasion is undeniable; but does not that go back to the man who, being asked for 'Byng or Rawlinson,' sent Sir Frederick Stopford to what he himself admitted was 'a young man's war' (II, 104)?

Even after Suvla Sir Ian remained sanguine of success if reinforcements, drafts, and ammunition could be sent promptly. Possibly a renewed attempt in September might have succeeded—the Turks had been fought to a standstill and tried no more counter-attacks (II, 189)—but the lack of depth in our positions and the want of room for manœuvre would have been severe handicaps. However, the September offensive in France intervened, and then came Salonica. Sir Ian has no

good word for the Salonica venture; its advocates (he wrote) are 'the dupes of maps' (II, 213); whatever else it did, clearly it was fatal to another effort at Gallipoli. But, if there was not to be another attack, the retention of our hold on the Peninsula was dubious wisdom, with winter approaching and only make-shift piers and harbours at our landing-places. Between attacking and evacuation there was no compromise.*

The upshot of the Gallipoli story is simplicity itself. We undertook the expedition without adequate resources, without adequate consideration or preparations. Sir Henry Wilson has well said ('North Russia Blue Book'): 'Once a military force is involved in operations on land, it is impossible to limit the magnitude of its commitments.' We attempted to force the Dardanelles on a limited liability basis, and the natural consequences followed. We tried to run with the Eastern hare and hunt with the Western hounds. There is great force in Sir Ian Hamilton's cry, 'It would be well if they could make up their minds if they wish to score the next trick in the East or in the West' (I, 304). It was of paramount importance not to jeopardise the position on the Western front, but there was a difference between refraining from attacking in the West, where our primary object was secured by a successful defence, and allowing our offensive in the East to be held up for want of a relatively small amount of ammunition; a check there was equivalent to complete failure. Nothing is easier than to be wise after the event, but, once the May offensive in France had proved a disappointment, while the German efforts were clearly directed against Russia, would it not have been safe to support the Gallipoli venture more strenuously? Even in August the old troubles re-appeared. The New Army divisions brought no 'first reinforcements'; most of their artillery went to Egypt and stayed there; the two Territorial divisions brought no artillery at all. Reliance had once again to be placed on ships' guns, despite repeated proofs

* It is interesting to read in Sir C. E. Callwell's biography of Sir Stanley Maude (p. 167) that General Maude was hopeful of success had the attack been renewed, even so late as Oct. 30; but by December he was convinced that, if that was not allowed, 'the only alternative is to get out of this; and we ought to have done so long ago' (p. 170).

of their inadequacy as substitutes for howitzers. Not even then was sufficient ammunition available (II, 143).

Gallipoli will remain the greatest 'might have been' of the war. As it was, it saw no mean achievements; and, if the evacuation, as skilful in accomplishment as it was undoubtedly necessary, was not followed by the ill-effects Sir Ian Hamilton and Lord Kitchener himself had dreaded, this is no small tribute to what our troops had accomplished at Gallipoli. The Turks prevented them from getting through, but at a cost which left Turkey crippled. The fruits of Gallipoli were reaped more than two years later in Palestine.

If Gallipoli was a bitter disappointment, the nation has only itself to thank for having neglected preparation for war because it would not believe war possible. Lord Kitchener may have failed to stiffen his back sufficiently and to prevent headstrong and amateur colleagues committing the country to enterprises for which he had not been able to equip it (cf. III, 111); but, if he failed here, it is only 'the measure of the dangers through which he had to steer the country. He did not live to see the New Armies launched upon their first great venture, but the last New Army division was crossing to France when he started on his ill-fated journey; and he had seen his New Armies afford valuable help to France at a most critical moment in the Verdun struggle by relieving French divisions on a long front north of Arras. The great bombardment which ushered in that great struggle on the Somme, which was to prove the real turning-point of the war, was a fitting salute to the man who had armed an unready nation, and had put into the field the batteries and the battalions that were massing for the attack.

Art. 3.—THE PILGRIM FATHERS AND THEIR PLACE
IN HISTORY.

1. *History of Plymouth Plantation, 1620-1647.* By William Bradford. Two vols. Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1912.
2. *The Story of the Pilgrim Fathers, 1606-1623, as told by Themselves, their Friends and their Enemies.* By Edward Arber. Ward and Downey, 1897.
3. *The Works of John Robinson.* With a Memoir by Robert Ashton. London: Snow, 1851.
4. *Smith the Se-Baptist, and the Pilgrim Fathers.* By Walter H. Burgess. London: Clarke, 1911.

ON Nov. 9, 1620, a company of Separatists from the Church of England, voyaging in the 'Mayflower' with intent to settle in North America, sighted land off Cape Cod. On the 11th, they decided to go no further, but to establish themselves on the shores of Cape Cod bay. The passengers numbered one hundred and two—forty-four adult men, nineteen adult women, and thirty-nine young people under age. Of the hundred and two, thirty-five came from the congregation of English Separatists who, since 1609, had been dwelling at Leyden in Holland, under the pastoral charge of John Robinson. It was by the leading spirits of this body that the migration had been carried out; and they expected, if the enterprise succeeded, to be followed by their minister and the rest of the congregation. Their sixty-seven companions had been collected in England on the way over; presumably they were also mostly Separatists or sympathisers. But some of these 'strangers' let fall mutinous speeches: that when they came ashore they would use their own liberty; for none had power to command them, the patent they had being for Virginia and not for New England. Accordingly, before any one was allowed to leave the ship, a formal agreement was drawn up.

'We, whose names are underwritten . . . covenant and combine ourselves into a civil body politic . . . and, by virtue hereof, to enact . . . such just and equal laws, ordinances, acts, constitutions, and offices . . . as shall be thought most meet . . . for the general good of the Colony, unto which we promise all due submission and obedience.'

The signers were the grown men; they were probably wont to assume—in any case their pastor was wont to teach—that women must have no voice in Church matters, and that wives must allow their husbands to decide their place of residence.

After spending a month in exploration, the company decided to settle at the place already marked on the maps of the well-known explorer, Captain John Smith, with the name of Plymouth. Dec. 11 is the traditional date of 'the landing'; it was not till the 16th that the 'Mayflower' brought the women and children into Plymouth harbour, and not till Christmas that they began to build houses. Before the end of March 1621, forty-four had died of a 'general sickness.' Early in April the 'Mayflower' started homeward, and left the colonists to their own resources until another ship should arrive in the autumn. Bradford, their historian and for many years their Governor, who was one of the leaders, says finely of the departure from Leyden: 'They knew that they were Pilgrims . . . but lift up their eyes to the heavens, their dearest country, and quieted their spirits.' It was not till far on in the 19th century that this designation was given a terrestrial application, and that the settlers of 1620 came to be known, to the exclusion of all others, as 'the Pilgrim Fathers.'

Such were the events which fittingly give rise this year to tercentenary celebrations. The American Republic, of which these men, and we will now add these women, were among the earliest, though unconscious, builders, and the Congregational Churches, on both sides of the Atlantic, who see in them some of the earliest champions of their principles, may well be proud of their loyalty to conscience and their high courage. After the lapse of three hundred years it should not be impossible to view the Pilgrim Fathers with reasonable impartiality. Recent investigations have made it easier to assign them their place in the movement of English thought. The original narratives have been reprinted by the late Mr Arber, and in the sumptuous issue of Bradford's 'History,' recently edited by Mr Ford for the Massachusetts Historical Society. The pamphlet literature of early Dissent has been assiduously sought out by Mr Burrage; though it may be remarked that the three-volume

edition of John Robinson's 'Works,' published so long ago as 1851, could never have left those who troubled to read them in much doubt as to the teaching received by the Leyden church. More freshly illuminating have been the works of Principal Lindsay on the Reformation, and of Prof. Usher on the English Church, since these fill in the background of the Independent movement; while the researches of Mr Burgess and Mr Braithwaite into Baptist and Quaker beginnings, show the later stages of a development which Independency did but partially arrest.

While the more intensive study of the 16th and 17th centuries puts the facts into a truer setting, a good deal of lingering prejudice, on one side or the other, is dispelled by our better understanding of a much earlier period, the first Christian century. The ecclesiastical controversies of the Elizabethan period were controversies primarily concerning Church government. It is true that the earlier Puritans were anxious to amend the 39 Articles in a more thoroughgoing Calvinist direction; though the Augustinian sense in which these Articles had been drawn up is not readily distinguishable from pure Calvinism. They almost succeeded in getting inserted the Lambeth Articles of 1595, which announced outright that 'it is not in the will or power of every man to be saved.' They were greatly disappointed by their failure to effect this at the Hampton Court Conference in 1604. Still, they could manage to put up with the unamended Articles; and Robinson, on behalf of his Leyden church, wrote in 1618: 'To the Confession of Faith published in the name of the Church of England, and to every article thereof, we do assent wholly.' It was of course long before the Puritans and the main body of Separatists objected on principle to doctrinal subscription; Calvin himself had recommended it to the English Reformers. What was now at issue, to quote Bradford, was not doctrine but 'the holy discipline and outward regiment of the kingdom of Christ.'

Even to-day it is hopeless to expect anything more than an attitude of patronising tolerance on the part of modern Churchmen towards early Dissenters, or of modern Dissenters towards Elizabethan Churchmen, so long as a belief survives anywhere in the 'divine right'

of any particular form of Church organisation, any supposition that in the New Testament a pattern of church government is laid down for all time. That no such divine right was claimed for Episcopacy by the first founders of the Anglican system, and that it was on behalf of Presbytery, or government by Elders, that the claim was first put forward, is now generally recognised. Some modern writers have laid stress on the argument that 'prelacy' was 'not the free choice of the English Church itself, but was imposed upon it by the secular government. It was on no such contention that Cartwright and the early 'presbyterians' based their views. They absolutely denied the right even of the Church to depart from the supposed divine model; and it was their arch-opponent, Whitgift, who stood for 'the liberty of the Church.' Not till the time of Bancroft (1588) did any leading spokesman of the English Church assert divine right for Episcopacy. Contemporaneously, in the opposite camp, the rising Independents were equally absolute in a similar claim. They were continually attacking the Anglican theory of the Church as consisting of all baptised English subjects. They frequently wrote as if all save 'professors' of the true doctrine of Justification by Faith were evil doers. When confronted by the fact that, after all, most English people were decent folk, and 'looked to be saved by their good meanings and well doings,' as Robinson puts it, they thought such a state of mind exceedingly dangerous. Yet the soundest personal faith, accompanied by the best of good works, they declared far from sufficient.

'Though the whole Church of England, and every member of it,' said Robinson, 'did personally profess the true faith, in holiness, yet could not this make it a true church. The bare profession of faith makes not a true church, except the persons so professing be united, in the covenant and fellowship of the gospel, into particular congregations.'

But the profound transformation which has taken place, in our generation, among competent scholars of all the Churches, in their conception of primitive Christianity, has cut away the ground from beneath divine right claims from every side. For the Church of the Apostolic age was so possessed by the idea of the speedily

approaching end of the earthly order and the early coming of the Reign of God, that the very notion of a permanent ecclesiastical organisation must have been entirely foreign to it.

That, regarded as statecraft, the Elizabethan Church Settlement was greatly successful will be denied by none who know what happened in other countries. It is equally undeniable that it vastly narrowed the opportunities for religious emotion and religious activity. For centuries the Christian Church had found room for two ideals: the collectivist ideal of a whole people, accepting the Faith on authority, and helped, though still 'in the world,' by the sacraments and the ministrations of 'secular' priests, themselves supervised by diocesan bishops; and the individualist ideal of particular men and women, responding to an inward vocation, and 'entering into religion' to live on a higher plane. To ardent spirits an alternative to parochialism had been presented by monasticism, in the wide sense which includes both monks and friars; and monasticism had been marked by the principles of personal profession and the autonomy of freely-formed communities, and by the effort to escape from episcopal jurisdiction. It was in monastic circles that the great saying of St Jerome was treasured: 'Aforetime presbyter and bishop were the same, and the Churches were governed by the common counsel of presbyters'—a saying incorporated by the monk Gratian in the Canon Law, and the starting-point of the legally-trained Calvin.

It was natural that fervent or ambitious temperaments should find the parochial system cramping, when that was all the English Church had to offer; and, making allowance for changed conditions, English Dissent may be looked upon as the post-Reformation equivalent to mediæval monasticism. Many causes contributed to the Puritan revolt. We need not accept without qualification the Puritan picture of their conforming brethren; after three centuries of further experience, 'dumb dogs' may create a certain liking! Still, patronage probably saddled many a parish with incompetent parsons. And, when men began to take Church fellowship seriously, the degradation of excommunication to a trivial penalty, imposed by antiquated

courts and remitted on payment of fine, was sure to arouse a not unreasonable indignation.

On the early stages of the attack on the established system it is not necessary to dwell. In its origin, and for much of its course, it was an academic movement, set going by theologically-trained fellows of Cambridge colleges, just as Tractarianism was afterwards set going from Oxford. Cartwright and his followers demanded a complete remodelling of ecclesiastical government, and the organisation of the Church in each locality under a Presbytery or Eldership. This Eldership should be composed of a teaching—and ruling—elder, commonly known as pastor or minister, and of a number of ruling elders, known later simply as elders; and it should have the assistance, for the less spiritual task of collecting and distributing alms, of a number of deacons. Such a system, and such a system alone, Cartwright declared, it was the plain duty of the civil magistrate to recognise; such, together with 'the holy discipline,' which ought to go with it. 'Discipline,' when distinguished from 'regiment,' meant the exercise by every local Church, acting through its body of elders, of the right and duty to censure its members, and to proceed, in the last resort, to a real excommunication, that is, expulsion. 'God keep you constant, dear brethren,' runs one of his pamphlets, 'that ye yield neither to toleration, nor to any other subtle persuasions of dispensations and licenses.'

The situation, in the closing years of Elizabeth, reached a turning-point. Under threat of deprivation of benefices, the great body of the 'forward preachers' submitted and conformed. A secret attempt in certain counties to set up 'classes' by voluntary agreement, i.e. an organisation of the ministers of each district on the model of the French Reformed Church, was discovered and suppressed in 1584-5. But, while the large majority of the Puritan clergy grumblingly conformed, men of fiercer mood were driven to extremes. 'Reformation without tarrying for any'—for the civil authority or for public opinion—was the rousing war-cry of Robert Browne, so early as 1582. Some of the Puritan incumbents had already formed inner Churches, within the

general body of their parishioners. Extremists now began to maintain that such voluntary local associations of professors of sound doctrine were alone worthy of the name of 'Church'; that it was the duty of believers to form such associations, under covenant with God and one another; and that they ought definitely to come out from the so-called Church of England. Thus arose 'the Churches of the Separation.'

We are apt to take 'Presbyterian' and 'Independent' or 'Congregational' as always standing for clearly distinguished politics. In fact, Independency grew out of Presbyterianism insensibly; under the cover of each of these terms lies concealed a significant evolution. When we refer to the New English Dictionary, we find, not without surprise, that the earliest citations for 'Presbyterian' and 'Presbyterianism,' 'Independency' and 'Congregational' are no earlier than 1641—a time when the floodgates of controversy were thrown open by the Long Parliament, and differences of opinion were sharpened into mutually exclusive systems. Belief in the divine right of Elders or Presbyters was common at first to all the 'forward preachers.' 'For the holy presbyterial government, as Christ's institution by His Apostles, we do,' said Robinson, 'in word and deed, give a free and full testimony.' It was only gradually that the organisation of the local Churches, under their elders, into the 'classic hierarchy' which Milton assailed in his sonnet of 1646—the gradation, that is, of church assemblies or 'courts,' from the local 'church session' or 'consistory,' up through the 'classis' or 'presbytery,' and from that to the 'synod' and 'general assembly'—came to be regarded as characteristic of Presbyterianism. Similarly, it was only gradually among the Independents that the Elders were, first, shorn of independent authority and made the representatives rather than the rulers of each local Church, and then dispensed with altogether. In subsequent Congregationalism, the deacons have added the spiritual functions of elders to their original modest rôle of dispensers of charity.

It was one of these Separatist churches, still in the early presbyterian stage of Independency, which transferred itself in 1608 from Scrooby, in Nottinghamshire, first to Amsterdam and then, a year later, to Leyden.

The well-to-do local layman who brought it together and became its ruling elder was William Brewster, who had succeeded his father in the lucrative position of agent for the Archbishop of York in his Nottinghamshire estates after a year or two at Cambridge. At Amsterdam, John Robinson, then about thirty-three years of age, became their minister. He had been ordained on his fellowship at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge; and took college work for six years before marriage. Then, for some little time, he held a preachiership in a Norwich parish church. Such preachershires or lectureships the Puritan clergy, both now and afterwards, frequently tried to utilise, in order to have an opportunity to preach the Word without being bound by the rules affecting parochial incumbents. He lost the post in 1605 or 1606; probably as a result of the renewed enforcement of subscription which followed upon the Canons of 1604. Still seeking a clerical position more or less free from episcopal jurisdiction, he became a candidate for the Mastership of St Giles' Hospital, in the gift of the Corporation of Norwich. It is interesting to observe that it was in a similar Mastership, at Warwick, in the patronage of a nobleman, that Cartwright had found a refuge in his old age; and that such foundations were among the scanty survivals from the ecclesiastical multiformity of pre-Reformation times. Failing in this candidature, and becoming clearer as to the duty of separation, he returned to his native county of Nottingham, and came into association with the Scrooby Church. Through his mother and his wife he was possessed of some private means, which did not indeed place him in affluence, but no doubt made his career as a Separatist minister a good deal easier.

The migration was a courageous proceeding, attended by adventures and hardships; but it was not so original a step as modern readers may suppose. Business intercourse between England and the Netherlands was then closer than at any time before or since. At Middleburgh the powerful English company of Merchant Adventurers had long enjoyed the use of a church building and the services of a more or less conformist English minister; the famous Cartwright had once held that position. At Middleburgh also Robert Browne had had an unfortunate

experience of what the discipline of a Separatist church meant for a man of his temperament. Several Separatist congregations had migrated to Holland more recently, after the passing of the severe Act of 1593 against sectaries. The English government must have viewed their departure with mixed feelings—annoyance that they could not be compelled to remain and conform, relief that they had anticipated the banishment which the Act of Parliament would bring upon their obduracy.

Whether the Scrooby congregation in particular can be properly described as fleeing from persecution is really a question of the use of words. Considering the execution of Barrow, Greenwood, and Penry for Separatist propaganda in 1593, the Separatist ministers had reason to feel alarm. Lay members of Separatist bodies were breaking the law by simply staying away from their parish churches, and by frequenting conventicles; and, whenever the officials of the ecclesiastical courts in any diocese had a spasm of activity, separatist laymen were liable to fines and short terms of imprisonment, even if they were not banished. But there is no reason to believe that Separatists were generally popular; men who spoke and wrote as they did about their neighbours could hardly expect to have a comfortable time, even if the law left them alone. Bradford puts it fairly enough: 'The poor people were so vexed with apparitors and pursuivants and the commissary courts as truly their affliction was not small'; at the same time they were 'scoffed and scorned by the profane multitude.' Criticising his conforming brethen, Robinson writes: 'They are not set over flocks of sheep, but over herds of swine, goats and dogs, with some few sheep scattered amongst them, which the wild and filthy beasts push, worry and defile.'

From Leyden, as we have seen, the more enterprising part of Robinson's congregation migrated to New England eleven years later. By this time the situation had changed. Abbot, now Archbishop of Canterbury, was inclined to be conveniently blind, and to leave Separatist conventicles unmolested, so long as they did not come out into the open; several years had to pass before Laud, with a less prudent and tolerant policy, took control of the ecclesiastical administration. During this period of

comparative safety, several of the leading Separatists returned from Holland to England. Thomas Helwys, for instance, to whom we shall return, not only led back a little following and founded a Separatist church in London in 1610, but also severely criticised by pamphlet those Separatists, like Robinson, who declined to follow his example: 'When will these men shake off the dust of their feet for a witness against Amsterdam and Leyden, which cities neither receive them nor the word they bring, otherwise than they receive Turks and Jews?' Robinson took the implied charge of cowardice rather hardly; his reply, also by pamphlet, was that even Helwys, in spite of all he said about facing persecution, did not venture to preach 'in public places.' Nevertheless, in 1616, Henry Jacob, a Puritan preacher who had reached the Independent position in middle life and had joined Robinson in Leyden about 1610, thought it his duty to return to England, and founded the oldest Independent church now existing in this country.

With such exhortations in their ears, and such examples before their eyes, Robinson and his flock may well have become a little uneasy in their minds. And there were quite sufficient other reasons for leaving Holland. Bradford gives some of them: the 'great labour and hard fare' which the members of the congregation were compelled to endure, and also their inability to prevent their children from running into evil courses. Winslow, one of the Pilgrims, adds that they found it 'grievous to live from under the protection of England.' We can well believe him. The friendship between Holland and England which had been created by English assistance in the War of Liberation, was rapidly giving place to international friction, though it was not till the time of Cromwell that it resulted in war. The Dutch and English were rivals alike in the fisheries near home and in the spice trade of their competing East India Companies. Negotiations carried on by English commissioners in Holland in 1615 were quite in vain. In 1616, the international bickerings must have directly affected the Leyden congregation. Leyden was the chief centre of the thriving woollen manufacture in Holland; most of the men of Robinson's congregation had found employment in one or other of its less skilled

branches. But a large part of the trade was based on the finishing and dyeing of English cloth imported in the rough. James' government were anxious to secure the finishing branches for England, and announced its intention to prohibit the export of undressed cloth. The Dutch replied by giving liberal bounties to the early stages of the manufacture, so as to be independent. Englishmen in Leyden could hardly fail to be aware of the changed feeling. Whether, up to this time, they had been popular with their neighbours cannot be said with certainty. Bradford declares that they were much respected for their honesty; but we learn from other sources that their militant Sabbatarianism had not contributed to pleasant relations.

We can hardly doubt, however, that there was another motive at least as powerful, and one which helps to explain why, leaving Holland, they did not go back to England; but this we are left to gather from the general situation. They had already left Amsterdam for Leyden to escape from Separatist dissensions. Feeling ran high in Amsterdam on two subjects: the rights of the elders and the practice of excommunication. On the first Robinson suggested from Leyden that the parties should compromise. He proposed 'that all the business of the Church should be first considered and resolved upon by the pastor and elders privately, and then submitted to the Church for confirmation.' His advice seems to have been thrown away. Discipline caused more open scandal. Weekly meetings for mutual criticism must often have been far from edifying; though it is to be hoped that things seldom came to such a pass as in the Separatist church at Amsterdam in 1599 and 1602. First the pastor's brother called upon the Church to condemn the pastor's rich wife for going about with high heels and whalebone in her bodice; and then, when the father of the two brothers came over from England to intervene, he was promptly excommunicated, and at once told the story in the usual pamphlet. Perhaps Robinson's people at Leyden were more considerate or kept better in hand; he felt himself able to write, 'My soul is filled with spiritual joy that I am under the easy yoke of Christ, the censure of the Church.' And when, towards the close of his ministry, a group of members threatened to leave

if the Church would not expel two persons who had 'upon some occasion heard some of the [conforming] ministers in England preach,' and would not drive out another for 'the very speaking of a word, through frailty, about worldly business on the Sabbath day,' Robinson was strong enough to let the objectors go.

But at Leyden new and more disintegrating forces began to play on Robinson's flock, from two different quarters. The University of Leyden was the centre of that Arminian movement among the learned Dutch clergy which sought to modify the more repulsive features of Calvinist doctrine and to teach that salvation was possible to all men. The better-educated classes in Holland were inclined to sympathise with the more humane clergy; the same classes were keenly suspicious of the monarchical designs of the Prince of Orange. Orange, on his side, relied upon his popularity with the masses, and at the same time thought it his interest to support the high Calvinist preachers. Political antagonism and religious fanaticism were thus combined, with the result that for years the Dutch Church and State were torn asunder. The sympathies of Robinson and his people, as of practically all the Puritans in England, whether conformist or separatist, were on the side of unbending Calvinist orthodoxy. Eventually the Orange and predestinarian party got the upper hand. On April 23, 1619, the Synod of Dort agreed upon canons affirming that, as God had decreed the end, namely, that one part of the human race should be damned, He had likewise decreed the means, namely, that they should sin; on May 13, Barneveldt, the leader of the burgher pro-Arminian aristocracy, was executed; and by 1624 John Robinson had ready for the press a substantial 'Defence of the Doctrine propounded at the Synod of Dort.' But in the summer of 1617, when Robinson's congregation first entered into negotiations with the Virginia Company for a passage to America and a grant of land, victory had not yet declared itself on the high Calvinist side. The Town Hall of Leyden was being held by the magistrates against the mob, behind a palisade bristling with cannon—'the Arminian fort' as the populace called it. Miscellaneous fighting was going on in the town, and lives were being lost on both sides.

Robinson was then living in a large mansion which he and three friends had bought on mortgage; houses for some of the congregation were probably already being built on the vacant land around. And this little English colony was only some two hundred and fifty yards from 'the Arminian fort.' They must have had many uncomfortable moments.

The other cause of perturbation came from a different quarter. Sir William Temple, who knew the Netherlands well, tells us that the Arminians are 'few in number though considerable by the Persons, who are of the better Quality, the more learned and intelligent Men.' He goes on: 'The Anabaptists are just the contrary, very numerous, but in the lower Ranks of People, Mechanicks and Sea-men.' The Anabaptists had long freed themselves from the mad extravagances which had ruined their cause in the days of the siege of Münster (1534); and the religious body reconstituted by Menno Simons, and commonly known after him as Mennonites, had settled down into a law-abiding people, especially numerous in Holland. The rite from which they took their name was not yet one of immersion but one of 'affusion,' i.e. the pouring of water on the head of the candidate; and the meaning of 'anabaptist' was simply 're-baptiser.' If baptism marks entrance into the Church, there are only two consistent positions: that which thinks it should be administered to infants and regards them thereafter as members, however imperfect, of the Church—the Catholic and Anglican view; and that which, assuming the Church to be composed only of those able to make a personal profession of faith, restricts baptism to adults. The Baptist position represents the most logical phase of religious individualism—so long as the sacrament is retained at all.

Outside Leyden, as within, it was these two influences above all—one from the learned penetrating downward, the other from the humbler classes penetrating upward—which now began to work on English Puritanism, and made it evident ere long that Calvinist Independency was not going to be the permanent resting-place of all 'the brethren of the Separation.' Among men who 'had a concern' for religion, the passage from conforming Puritanism to Independency, from Independency to

Anabaptistry, and from that to Quakerism, with its rejection alike of a professional ministry and of the sacraments, became, under the Commonwealth, a frequent and contagious phenomenon. Robinson's own son, out in Plymouth Colony, spent his latter years as a Quaker.

Tendencies of this nature must soon have made themselves felt by Robinson's congregation. Bradford says of certain Separatists who immediately preceded the Scrooby group in going to Holland: 'These afterwards falling into some errors in the Low Countries, there, for the most part, buried themselves and their names.' But history does not dispose so easily as did Bradford of John Smith 'the Se-baptist.' John Smith matriculated at Cambridge six years before Robinson, and at the old universities a few years make a great difference in 'seniority'; in the midst of later controversies Robinson shows, again and again, how much he had been accustomed to look up to him. He became the pastor of the Separatist Church at Gainsborough, of which the Scrooby Church was apparently an offshoot; and both groups found a friend and helper in Thomas Helwys, a neighbouring squire. It was Helwys who made the arrangements for the migration to Holland. Smith with Helwys went first, with the Gainsborough group, to Amsterdam, and there for a time remained. Brewster and Robinson went over a little later. And it must have been a painful shock to them when next year both Smith and Helwys fell victims to 'the Wiles of Anabaptistry,' and reconstituted their Church on the basis of adult baptism. It was a still more painful shock when they learnt that their old leader and friend had succumbed to Arminianism also. Smith and Helwys began to fire off pamphlets at their former allies, and Robinson was not slow in replying.

We may pass over the thrust and counter-thrust concerning infant baptism. More instructive is Robinson's attitude towards the abandonment of Calvinism. Helwys had been bold enough to say that 'the sacrifice of Christ doth not reconcile *God unto us*, who did never hate us, nor was our enemy, but reconcileth *us unto God*, and slayeth the enmity and hatred which is *in us* against God.' This, pronounces Robinson, 'is most untrue, and

indeed a very pernicious doctrine, destroying the main fruit of Christ's sacrifice and death.'

Against such alarming dangers—especially that arising from working-class Anabaptistry—Robinson must have seen that pamphlets were but a poor defence. In 1617 an Independent of Amsterdam tells us that 'the Anabaptist error greatly spreadeth, both in these parts and, of late, in our own country.' It was in 1617 that the leaders of Robinson's people first made overtures to the Virginia Company. The Pilgrims went to New England to practise their religion in peace—in peace, they surely must have desired, as much from those who went further than themselves on the Separatist road as from those who refused to enter upon it at all.

It may be remarked that in Robinson's own voluminous treatises there is little clear indication of any further movement of thought after he had once taken up the Calvinist Independent position. The two bits of evidence often cited for something of a prophetic vision on Robinson's part are much too weak to build upon, in the absence of confirmation from his own writings. One is that, according to Bradford, the Church covenant of the Nottinghamshire Separatists contained an agreement to walk in all the ways of the Lord, '*made known or to be made known unto them.*' The phrase in italics was an addition to the usual covenant formula. We find it used by Jacob, who broke away from Robinson in 1616; and it was not unusual apparently among English Separatists somewhat later. But Robinson himself gives the formula in one of his books in the earlier form, without the 'forward-looking' addition; and it was in that form that the Massachusetts churches took it over from Plymouth Colony. It is probable that Bradford's memory misled him; but, if not, it must be remembered that in those earliest days in Nottinghamshire Smith was a leader, and Robinson had not yet joined them. The other piece of evidence is found in what has come to be known as Robinson's Farewell Address to the Pilgrims. In this occur the words: 'He was very confident that the Lord had more light and truth yet to break forth out of His holy Word.' But this so-called Address is only given by Winslow in a pamphlet written so long after as 1646—a pamphlet

written with an eye on contemporary English controversies, and designed to show that Robinson was not as 'rigid' a Separatist from everything like a national Church, properly reformed, as many supposed.

To return to the decision to seek a less troubled home across the Atlantic. To obtain the tacit consent of the English government and the financial support of some of the wealthy Conformist-Puritan merchants of England, Robinson and his friends so far bowed to circumstances as to state their position in terms which have caused a pained surprise among their modern admirers. The document, when interpreted by a skilled casuist, may not completely surrender any fundamental Independent principle. Yet for Robinson and Brewster to 'judge it lawful for His Majesty to appoint bishops, civil officers, or officers in authority under him . . . to oversee the Churches and govern them civilly,' and to explain further that they agreed 'wholly and on all points with the French Reformed Churches touching the ecclesiastical ministry,' although the French Reformed Church was quite distinctly not congregational in polity, was to use phraseology which could easily be misunderstood. It gave occasion afterwards to some of their financial backers, when the Plymouth Colony was not turning out a commercial success for the home investor, to accuse them of duplicity.

The story of how the Pilgrims got themselves carried over the Atlantic and equipped with the stock necessary for a plantation, and how they shook themselves free from the industrial bondage in which they were held by the investors at home, is a significant chapter in the economic history of the times. The more, however, the recesses of plantation history are explored, the less singular does their venture become. A self-governing colony of quite commonplace Anglican Conformists had made a success of the Virginian settlement at Jamestown ten years before. Many ships were going to and fro between the Old and the New World; and many ventures, half of settlement, half of trading or fishing posts, were made on that Atlantic coast in the years immediately before and after 1620. Only the year before, another English Separatist congregation had gone in a body

from Amsterdam, and had mostly perished miserably on the voyage. Some Walloon congregations in Holland, rebuffed by the Pilgrims when they begged to be allowed to go with them, followed them three years later, and prospered in the New Netherlands from the very first. Except for the 'general sickness' due to imprudent exposure, the Pilgrims benefited by an extraordinary streak of good luck. The winter was unusually mild, and they came in for a crop of maize planted by an Indian tribe which had been conveniently removed by plague a year or so before. They showed plenty of English pluck, and their intense religious feeling doubtless helped to sustain them. But quite as wonderful is the courage of many a contemporary band of adventurers on those coasts who had only the unemotional and undogmatic faith of the ordinary Englishman to support them.

With 1627, when the Plymouth Colony may be regarded as permanently established and free from imminent danger of starvation, the heroic period of the Pilgrims comes to an end; their venture 'fades into the light of common day.' In 1630 came the great exodus of more moderate Puritans, up to that time more or less conforming, who established the colony of Massachusetts; and into this, in two or three decades, Plymouth Colony was absorbed, ecclesiastically and politically. It is possible that the influence of Plymouth hastened somewhat the adoption by Massachusetts of the Congregational system of Church government, though even this is not certain. In any case, the Massachusetts system never quite so sharply emphasised the self-sufficiency of the several local Churches as did early English Independency. It was for this very reason that the term 'Congregational' was preferred in America. 'Independency is not a fit name,' writes Cotton, the Boston divine, in 1648, 'of the way of our Churches. In some respects it is too strait and in others too large.' New England Congregationalism, in fact, was long characterised by a system of 'consociation of churches,' which gave to Councils, representing the churches of a district, the right to advise erring congregations, and, if need be, to renounce fellowship with them—a system which clearly represents a compromise between Independency and Presbyterianism.

Soon Plymouth, with its daughter-towns, was indistinguishable from the rest of Massachusetts. They were slow in following the example of Massachusetts—to this we shall return—in maintaining their ministers from town taxes, but they fell into line in 1655; and Congregationalism was the 'established' religion of the whole state well into the 19th century. Like Massachusetts, Plymouth identified Church and State by confining, down to 1692, the political franchise to male Church members. And the researches of the historians of Quakerism have shown that Plymouth was just as intolerant of other forms of the Christian religion as was Massachusetts proper; though, as no particularly troublesome Friends happened to come into Plymouth, it was spared the shame of putting a Quaker to death.

It is sometimes said that all this was the sad effect of Massachusetts influence. But this is not clear. Robinson's views of the problem was this. If the preaching of the Word (as Calvin understood it) and the practice of the Holy Discipline were unhindered, those Christians who were predestined to salvation would spontaneously group themselves by mutual covenant into self-governing Churches. The magistrates, convinced, by the same preaching, that this was the only justifiable regiment of the Church, would be in duty bound to suppress everything else—from Prelacy to Anabaptism—as contrary to Holy Writ. And, while it would certainly be wrong to compel men to profess themselves believers, it would clearly be the duty of the magistrate to compel every one to attend the preaching of the Truth. On this point Robinson did but echo the words of Barrow, the Independent martyr. More than thirty years later, all the leading Independent ministers in England submitted a scheme to the House of Commons for compulsory attendance at the public preaching of the Gospel every Lord's day, and for making illegal all public preaching against the Fifteen Christian Fundamentals.

With regard to the public maintenance of the ministry, Robinson himself no doubt definitely accepted the 'voluntary principle.' But the early Separatist pastors had abundant opportunity to learn how little dependence they could place upon the voluntary

contributions of their flocks; and it was fortunate that some of them, like Robinson, possessed some private means, or could practise a secular profession. In Plymouth Colony the voluntary principle was not abandoned till it had had a fair trial. Until Robinson died in 1625, the Plymouth people were in constant expectation that he would join them. Till then they were content with the ministry of their elder, Brewster; though Robinson, on being referred to, told them very distinctly it would not be lawful for a mere ruling elder to administer the sacraments. They did not get a settled minister till 1629; and from 1654 they were again without one for thirteen years. In 1658, in seven out of the eleven towns of which Plymouth Colony by that time consisted, the pastorate was vacant or not yet established. Ministers of learning and ability came for brief periods, and then left for securer livelihoods elsewhere. How the Plymouth situation struck the Puritan statesmen of Massachusetts is shown in a later reference by Cotton Mather: 'There was a time when most of the ministers in the colony of Plymouth left the colony, from the discouragement which the want of a competent maintenance among the needy and froward inhabitants gave unto them.' When Plymouth did decide to abandon voluntaryism, it could point to the fact that the leading Independent ministers in England had accepted Cromwell's scheme of concurrent endowment.

While the subsequent history of Plymouth Colony has little to distinguish it, it is hard to see in what way the Pilgrimage itself left any mark on the general course of events in either Europe or America. Perhaps their success in maintaining themselves on the New England coast encouraged the far larger movement in that direction ten years later. But, when one remembers how successful Jamestown was known to be, and above all how prosperous the Walloon plantation on the Hudson had been ever since 1623, and the great attention then being given in commercial circles in England to all the Dutch were doing, we cannot be quite sure that the Plymouth settlement counted for much in turning men's minds to America.

A distinguished Swiss writer, M. Borgeaud, has made much of the Covenant in the 'Mayflower' cabin. It was,

indeed, a happy idea to strengthen the agreement by introducing a term with such hallowed associations as 'covenant.' But the Virginia Company had expressly authorised 'leaders of particular plantations, associating with them divers of the gravest and discretest of their companies,' to make temporary 'Orders, Ordinances and Constitutions.' As soon as they possibly could, the London friends of the Pilgrims regularised their settlement in unauthorised latitudes by getting a fresh patent; and, the temporary expedient having served its purpose, we find no further reference to it. So far as we can see, it had no effect on the subsequent constitutional development of America.

Constitutionally, ecclesiastically, economically, of hardly discernible influence on the broad current of human history, the Pilgrim Fathers are sure of a place in the record of English and American thought as the most conspicuous exemplars of one of the doctrines that have divided Christendom with regard to the nature and form of religious association. And in this matter, the lesson of charity taught by the history of the first Christian century is confirmed by what is now going on under our eyes in England. It is apparent that in all the large 'denominations' the need is now felt for an element both of Episcopacy, in the sense of superintendence over local 'Churches,' and of Congregationalism, in the sense of local self-government. In the Church of England, the Enabling Act has just created Parochial Church Councils, based, in spite of their name, not on the geographical parish, but on 'habitual' attendance at a particular place of worship. And, while the signing of a form of application to be put on the Electoral Roll of a parish is not quite the same thing as the signing of a 17th-century 'Covenant,' it goes a long way in that direction. For the first time it creates in the Church of England, in each geographical parish, an inner body alone possessed of the Church franchise, and possessed of it by virtue of an individual adult act of will. On the other side, the determination of modern Congregationalists not to let their weaker Churches pass out of existence even if they cannot support their ministers, has led them, at the very time the Church of England has been adopting congregational features, themselves to

adopt episcopalian ones. The Baptists led the way by dividing England and Wales into ten areas, each presided over by a minister, with the title of 'General Superintendent,' whose duty it is to aid the several congregations by his counsel, and to advocate the claims of the general Sustentation Fund. The Congregationalists have followed suit, giving their overseers the title of 'Moderator.' When one observes that these Moderators are relieved from ministering to particular congregations that they may be free to serve all the Churches of their 'province,' one recalls John Robinson's argument that the only legitimate Christian ministers are those in charge of 'particular Churches.' The first year of the new Congregational system is the three-hundredth from the Pilgrim Fathers. In the Induction of these Moderators on Nov. 19, 1919, Dr Arnold Thomas, venerable among the leaders of present-day Dissent, indicated the true character of the proceedings by the courageous use of one word: 'We are here to appoint certain brethren who are to be in a sense—in a very real sense—bishops.' Perhaps the Committee of the new National Assembly of the Church of England, which has been entrusted with the consideration of the functions of Parochial Councils, will be equally clear-sighted.

WILLIAM ASHLEY.

Art. 4.—BRITISH RATIONING DURING THE WAR.*

'THIS nation at war is an army : it must be looked upon as an army ; and it ought to be rationed and provided and supplied like an army.' So said Mr Winston Churchill in the course of the food debate on Nov. 16, 1916, when the President of the Board of Trade, Mr Runciman, announced the imminent appointment of a Food Controller on the German model, and the imposition of maximum prices and other restrictive measures, which were bound to interfere with the free course of trade upon which Mr Asquith's Government hitherto had chiefly relied for the maintenance of our food supplies. A week later the War Committee seriously considered the suggestion of compulsory rationing as a possible means of meeting the shortage of shipping and other difficulties of the food situation, and even went so far as to call upon the Local Government Board to prepare a suitable scheme.

Before any progress could be made in this direction Mr Asquith's Government had come to an end ; and in Mr Lloyd George's list of new Ministers appeared the name of Lord Devonport as Food Controller. On Dec. 22 the Act was passed establishing the Ministry of Food ; and four days later Lord Devonport took up his office 'for the purpose of economising and maintaining the food supply of the country,' with full legal powers for that complete State control over supplies and their distribution for which the Labour Party had long been clamouring. From various causes, however, a full year was to elapse before any system of rationing was imposed upon the nation.

At the moment, though popular discontent centred on numerous local shortages of sugar, the real problem was to obtain adequate supplies of wheat from North America in place of the 3,000,000 tons which the Government had long ago bought in Australia but now could not lift through lack of tonnage. Naturally, therefore, Lord Devonport devoted his energies chiefly to the solution

* The Ministry of Food has given the author access to its official records, but is in no way responsible either for his presentation of the facts or for his expression of opinion.

of this more pressing problem; but he did not neglect the question of rationing, and early in January 1917, appointed an influential Committee 'to consider and recommend the most suitable and effective machinery for carrying out the policy of rationing supplies among the whole population of the United Kingdom.' The instructions were general; but it was understood that, if there was to be compulsory rationing, the first experiment had best be made with sugar; it was one of the easiest to ration of articles widely used as food and was already wholly purchased and distributed to traders by the Sugar Commission. As food it was not indispensable, so that, if the first attempt should prove a failure, less harm would be done than by unsuccessful attempts to ration bread or meat.

On Jan. 31, 1917, the Committee produced a Report, which in all essentials laid the foundation for the scheme of sugar rationing which was enforced eleven months later. The Report dealt first with the then existing inequalities in the distribution of sugar to traders based on their sales in the year 1915, proposing sundry remedies; and secondly, with the whole problem of rationing in such a way that, though sugar only was considered, the machinery and system recommended could easily be extended to other articles as well. For administrative purposes the Committee favoured a decentralised system. They proposed the appointment of Local Food Committees by the ordinary Local Authorities and the creation of Local Food Offices, grouped in Great Britain into fifteen Divisions under the charge of Divisional Officers to act as a link between the Committees and the Ministry. As for rationing, they insisted that the only practical means of controlling consumption was a ticket distributed to every member of the population entitling him to purchase week by week the ration prescribed by the Food Controller. The distribution of food-stuffs, the Committee recommended, should be effected through the ordinary trade channels rather than through the already over-worked Local Authorities; and to insure equitable distribution, though they did not put it among their formal recommendations, they strongly emphasised the desirability of tying the customer to the retailer. The Report also made provision for the strict

rationing of hotels, clubs, and other catering establishments, which the German system had almost openly suffered to slip through the meshes of its net—to the great detriment of the *moral* of the German people.

Meanwhile Lord Devonport had sent to the War Cabinet a memorandum reviewing the dangerous situation of our bread and meat supplies and strongly urging the compulsory rationing of both these articles, as the only effective means to secure the necessary economy. But the Cabinet was at the time too uncertain of the temper of the people to sanction compulsory rationing, though it gave its cordial support to an alternative suggestion—a strenuous campaign for voluntary rationing, which, even if ineffective in its results, would at any rate prepare the popular mind to submit to compulsion, should it prove necessary.

On Feb. 2, the day after the Germans began their unlimited submarine warfare, the Food Controller issued a strong appeal calling on the nation to impose upon itself certain prescribed rations. The appeal was well responded to in London and some of the country towns, but failed to move the industrial and rural districts. In April it was renewed with the help of the ubiquitous War Saving Committees, but was almost killed by a seasonal shortage of potatoes of unusual severity. At the end of the month Lord Devonport issued a second appeal warning the people that compulsory rationing was the only alternative. The campaign was again renewed with still greater vigour and with so much success that in June it was claimed that the consumption of bread had been reduced by 10 per cent.

Meanwhile, by March, the officials of the Ministry had reduced the recommendations of the Rationing Committee to a practical shape and had drafted all the documents necessary to put their scheme into operation. The Government, however, refused to move, although the depredations of the submarines grew worse and worse, till they even imperilled our bread supply. Figures were produced to show that only about nine weeks' supply of wheat and flour was immediately available, and that by September the country would be left with only four weeks' stock—about one half of the margin of the year before. The Food Controller appointed

a Committee to consider the immediate rationing of bread. Five days later (April 21) its report was ready, recommending the speedy creation of the proposed rationing machinery, the control of all flour mills, and the compulsory rationing of bread; the practical results were the taking over of the larger flour mills, sundry Orders restricting the use of cereals and sugar, and the establishment of a Rationing Department within the Ministry. It was unnecessary to go further, for by this time the United States had entered the war (April 6, 1917), and had assured the Allies that every exportable ton of corn should as soon as possible be placed at their service. Heavier imports began to arrive, and on May 8 Lord Devonport was able to announce that in all likelihood we should get through to the time of next harvest with a fairly satisfactory margin in hand.

Nevertheless it was in the month of May that the War Cabinet came to important decisions on the question of rationing. On the 2nd the Food Controller submitted to their consideration the official compulsory scheme based on the Report of the First Rationing Committee, asking them at least to sanction the creation of the Local Machinery. The Cabinet appointed a small committee to go into the question, with the result that the original memorandum was materially revised. So far as the machinery was concerned, the proposals remained the same; but side by side with the official scheme for the compulsory individual rationing of sugar was placed as an alternative an entirely different scheme, based on rationing by households and on tying the householder to the retailer, who was to give his registered customers a preference, but was not to be prohibited from selling to other customers, if he had any surplus to spare.

At this juncture of affairs ill-health compelled Lord Devonport to resign (June 1, 1917). The Cabinet then gave its sanction—subject to the approval of the new Food Controller—to the setting up of the Local Machinery and to the new alternative. This scheme was practically identical with the 'registered order' or 'family' scheme, which had been put forward several months earlier by the War Emergency Workers' National Committee, and had recently been powerfully advocated in the pages of the 'New Statesman.' Though it did not profess to be a

water-tight scheme, it had the merit of insisting upon the tie of customer to retailer, which, though it had no place in the official scheme, later experience proved to be essential to the equitable distribution of food-stuffs. Under either scheme the ordinary trade channels were to be the means of distribution.

The Government experienced considerable difficulty in finding a successor to Lord Devonport; but at last the Prime Minister prevailed upon Lord Rhondda to leave the Local Government Board, which he had set his heart upon transforming into a Ministry of Health, and to fill the vacant post. Lord Rhondda at once announced that he meant to take strong measures against all speculation in the necessaries of life, and that his first effort would be directed to reducing the price of bread. One of his first acts, therefore, was to set up a Costings Department in his Ministry, whose duty would be to ascertain the costs of producing and handling food-stuffs at every stage from the producer to the consumer, with the object of fixing prices by reference to actual costs *plus* the normal pre-war rate of profit, quite independently of market fluctuations. At the same time Lord Rhondda signified his approval of the new Sugar Scheme, and instructed his officials at once to draft the documents necessary to put it into operation. These measures coincided with the appearance of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into industrial unrest, which stated that its principal causes were high prices, the unequal distribution of supplies, and the general belief in the existence of profiteering, and that there was a wide-spread demand for a thorough system of food control as the best remedy.

On July 26, 1917, Lord Rhondda reviewed the whole situation in the House of Lords. He announced his firm intention (1) of fixing the prices, as determined by his Costings Department, of some of the principal food-stuffs, over which the Government could secure a virtual monopoly; and (2), while adhering to the ordinary trade channels of distribution, of eliminating all unnecessary middlemen. The price of bread, which had risen to 11d. for the 4lb. loaf, he meant to reduce to 9d., meeting the resultant loss to the State by a subsidy, which he justified as the only means of securing to the very poor a bare sufficiency of their chief food. The price of meat presented greater

difficulties, but he hoped to devise means to reduce it by 6d. a pound before the year ran out. Fixing prices without first securing complete control over the articles in question might, he admitted, lead to a breakdown in the ordinary arrangements for distribution, based as they were on the law of supply and demand; but he had already provided against local shortages, and trusted, if general shortage should occur, to be able to arrange in good time for the equitable distribution of supplies.

In the first week of August the Local Authorities received their instructions, and in the course of the next six weeks were busily occupied in setting up their Food Control Committees and offices—1809 in England and Wales and 104 in Scotland; for it had been decided to omit Ireland from the scheme. Their original composition excited a good deal of dissatisfaction; the instruction about one woman and one labour representative, it was complained, had been interpreted too literally; and co-operative societies felt aggrieved that private traders were in a majority on a large number of Committees. Steps were soon taken to set matters right, but it was not till six months later that discontent was finally allayed by sanctioning increases in the total membership of Committees—the average number had been twelve—by the addition of extra women, labour and co-operative representatives.

Simultaneously with the institution of these Committees, England and Wales were divided into twelve and Scotland into three Food Divisions, in charge of which, as Commissioners, were appointed men of some local standing and influence to act as intermediaries between the Committees and the Ministry. Events proved the wisdom of Lord Rhondda's selection; these Commissioners showed themselves fully prepared, if necessary, to take responsibility upon their own shoulders in place of depending wholly upon central instructions.

The local organisation of the rationing machinery was now complete. Meanwhile the details of the Sugar Distribution Scheme for loosely rationing sugar by households had been published, and the time-table of its various parts so fixed that the whole should be in operation on Jan. 1, 1918. The Food Controller was therefore now free to concentrate his attention on lowering prices.

Imported articles presented but little difficulty ; for over them the Government either had already or could easily get complete control. Thus, to fix the price of the quartern loaf at 9d., if the State were willing to pay the subsidy of 40,000,000*l.* to meet its real cost, was little more than a matter of administration. At least three-fourths of our wheat supplies were imported ; and Lord Devonport had already taken over all the larger flour mills. To complete the control all that was needed was a new Flour Mills Order, taking over the remainder, and a Grain Prices Order fixing the prices of home-grown cereals, which were published on July 31 and Aug. 14, 1917, respectively.

Meat was a much more complex problem, which could not really be solved until an elaborate scheme, already in preparation, for the State purchase and distribution of all cattle for slaughter and dead meat could be brought into operation—a task not completed till the end of the year 1917. To fulfil his promise of lower prices for meat, Lord Rhondda found himself obliged to rely on a Meat Maximum Prices Order (dated Aug. 29) only, without waiting to secure anything like complete control over the trade. The Order fixed a scale of wholesale prices, descending from 8*s.* 8*d.* per stone in September to 7*s.* 4*d.* in January, and limited retailers' profits to 2½*d.* per pound. The wholesale prices corresponded to the live-weight prices fixed some weeks previously for Army purchases, which were to have been extended to cattle sold for civilian consumption on Sept. 1, though this extension was as a matter of fact delayed till December. The higher prices of the earlier months were meant to safeguard farmers against serious losses on their sales of store cattle bought before the publication of the Order. It was foreseen that the result would be excessive slaughterings in the autumn, but the Cabinet, owing to the growing dearth of feeding-stuffs, favoured an appreciable reduction of our herds. What was not foreseen was that the meat trade would be reduced to chaos before the scheme of State control could be got to work ; for the butchers, who could only sell at the controlled prices, found themselves forced either to buy cattle from the farmers at prices which they could not afford or to get no meat at all. About the

same time maximum prices were imposed on butter and cheese, bacon, hams and lard; and the prices of milk were again revised. A little later steps were taken to control the prices and distribution of tea.

Maximum prices once imposed upon all the chief articles of food, State control of their distribution was the necessary corollary, followed in the more important articles, except bread, by State rationing. The weak link in the chain was the long interval between the fixing of prices and the preparation of the schemes of distribution; for prices, now being everywhere uniform, had ceased to be any indication of demand. The natural result was local shortages long before there was any national shortage, because traders had now no motive for transferring their supplies to places where they were most wanted.

Meanwhile certain defects in the Sugar Distribution Scheme were becoming apparent. Only uncomfortable shortage, and not real scarcity, had been contemplated by the Government; the scheme therefore was not compulsory but preferential. The unit adopted for rationing was the household and not the individual, a plan which ignored the fact that our population in time of war was constantly shifting. The statistics, therefore, obtainable from householders' applications for sugar cards would not, it was feared, be accurate enough to form the basis of any exact distribution of sugar to meet varying local needs—let alone the probability that numbers of people, not being legally compelled, would certainly not take the trouble to register themselves with retailers, yet would be grievously discontented as soon as they found themselves sugarless.

In face of these difficulties, Lord Rhondda decided that the sugar scheme must be so modified as to be both watertight and compulsory, and that a second campaign for voluntary rationing, even if it failed in material results, would be the best means of educating the nation to realise the need of compulsory rationing. So many weeks, however, were spent in the preparations that, when the campaign opened on Nov. 12, the time for voluntary rationing had obviously gone by. There was now a real shortage; while most people made little or no effort to conform to the scale of rations now published, even the

more patriotic minority often found themselves unable to purchase at the shops the modest quantities prescribed. From the first the Labour Party had been hostile; within a month, not the Labour Party only but the whole nation was crying out for compulsory rationing.

In October steps were taken within the Ministry to remedy the defects of the Sugar Scheme. It was decided not only to take the individual instead of the household as the unit of rationing, and to make the necessary provision for dealing with the floating population, but entirely to replace the old scheme by a new centralised scheme worked, if possible, through the Post Office, or—should that prove impracticable—through some thousands of newly created offices centrally administered. The tie of customer to retailer was to be abandoned; and for the household cards already distributed by the Local Committees were gradually to be substituted individual 'ration papers,' as identification certificates, distributed from a Central Registration Clearing House in London. The ration papers would enable their holders to get coupons from any Post Office for use with any retailer. All persons as yet unregistered were to apply for the new ration papers, but registered householders were to get from their retailers individual cards, one for each member of the household. The transition from the old system to the new was to be disguised under the form of instructions to the Local Committees, how to deal with the floating population.

Lord Rhondda gave his consent to the new scheme on Oct. 18, and at the same time decided, subject to the Cabinet's sanction, to introduce national compulsory rationing as from the end of March, 1918. On Nov. 19 the Local Committees were given their new instructions; and, a week later, the Central Registration Clearing House was opened for the issue of ration papers. Meanwhile, however, the Postmaster-General let it be known that the Post Offices could not be made available for the working of the new scheme of rationing.

In November and December, 1917, the food situation rapidly grew worse. Existing stocks of cereals fortunately were large, and the shortage of foreign meat was for the moment being met by recourse to home supplies, though a general shortage was soon to be anticipated.

But the practical cessation of imports of tea and of butter, margarine and bacon from Holland, Denmark and Sweden created serious shortages in these articles, not merely local, but general throughout the country. The pre-war system of voluntary distribution broke down in all directions; traders knew not where or how to replenish their stocks; the public rushed in vain from shop to shop, or patiently waited in long 'queues' outside shops more lucky in their supplies.

At this crisis the local Food Control Committees saved the situation; for they could and did ration locally until the Ministry of Food was able to institute national rationing. To the Ministry, the rationing of the consumer was but the last stage in the process of supply and distribution. Supply was of course the most urgent of all problems, encompassed with difficulties both of transport and finance. But, even when the food-stuffs were forthcoming, to secure their equitable distribution among traders required weeks and in some cases months of patient organisation and re-organisation of the ordinary trade channels. Till this had been completed national rationing was obviously impossible. On the other hand, Local Committees could by rationing at least secure that every individual in the locality should secure his fair share of the food-stuffs there available, although they could not guarantee the continuance of supplies.

Gravesend had the honour of being first in the field; here the Local Committee instituted a system of sugar rationing early in November, and on Dec. 8 extended it to include butter, margarine and tea. Pontypool was only a week behind Gravesend. The schemes in both towns were equally successful in stopping the 'queue' trouble and appeasing the growing discontent. Once begun, the movement spread rapidly. Early in December Birmingham, with its 872,000 inhabitants, indicated to Lord Rhondda that it desired, with his sanction, to formulate a scheme of its own on the household basis as an attempt to meet the 'queue' evil which threatened to reach dangerous dimensions among the munition workers. Similar steps were taken at Leicester, Chesterfield and in other industrial areas.

On Dec. 14, Lord Rhondda informed the public that he would like to see more Local Committees follow

the example of Birmingham and other districts, and discover what could be done to obviate 'queues,' or at any rate greatly reduce them in size. Two days later he decided at once to increase the legal powers of the Committees in order to enable them to deal with the evil, and also to issue to them as soon as possible a code of instructions which would practically amount to a model scheme of rationing modifiable in details so as to suit local needs. The necessary Orders were quickly drafted and published—the first on Dec. 20 empowering Committees to requisition retailers' stocks of margarine and to re-distribute them at their own discretion; the second on Dec. 21 bringing the whole trade in margarine under control by compelling wholesalers to obtain licences from the Food Controller and retailers to register with their Local Committees; and the third on Dec. 22—a 'Local Distribution' Order—authorising Committees to adopt and enforce rationing schemes of their own, provided that the schemes had first been approved and sanctioned by the Ministry. The instructions setting forth the model scheme were in the hands of the Committees by Dec. 31.

These decisions of the Food Controller and the action that followed them were momentous in the history of British rationing; for practically its course was thereby diverted from the centralised system, embodied in the new edition of the Sugar Scheme, to the original decentralised scheme formulated under Lord Devonport's régime, with one important modification, which appeared in the scheme published in August—the tie of the 'registered' customer to the 'registered' retailer. The Ministry's model scheme recommended, but did not prescribe, as articles for rationing, butter, margarine and tea, but the rations were not to exceed the amounts announced by the Food Controller. Committees were left liberty of choice, whether they would take the individual or the household as the unit of rationing; the former method, it was pointed out, rendered it easier to deal with the removals of individuals, but the latter required less paper and printing and could be more quickly introduced. Specimens of suitable cards were circulated, but free choice was allowed.

Before these measures had time to bear practical

fruit, the shortage of meat, which the Ministry had long dreaded, fell on the public like a bolt from the blue. Since the autumn the farmers had been rushing their cattle to market, partly to profit by the higher prices, but mainly owing to the growing scarcity of feeding-stuffs; for so far back as Oct. 9 Lord Rhondda had promised that the higher prices of November and December should be continued in January. The stoppage came with the publication of the Cattle Sales Order on Dec. 24. This Order did indeed allow prices for cattle considerably above even the December level, but it was coupled with complicated provisions for sale in State-controlled markets, which were really part of an elaborate scheme for the distribution of meat and live stock that had been some months in preparation. The farmers failed to understand the meaning of the Order, and held back their cattle at a moment when the stock of frozen meat was at its lowest. For a fortnight beef was unobtainable. Sheep were slaughtered in place of cattle, till this too was stopped on Jan. 14 by the issue of the Sheep Sales Order drawn on the same lines as the Cattle Sales Order. Everywhere meat-queues outstripped the margarine-queues. Local rationing of meat was of little avail, and national rationing was out of the question till the distribution scheme just started was in working order. The complexity of the problem now in process of solution was afterwards well described by Mr Clynes; it meant that the trade had so to be controlled that

'the required number of beasts and sheep should be killed in 14,000 slaughter-houses and delivered, together with their proportion of frozen meat, to 52,000 retailers' shops through 2000 local Food Committee areas; and that this must be done at the right moment in order to supply the demands of 40,000,000 customers.'

For the moment the Ministry was reduced to devising mere palliatives; it ordered two meatless days a week to be observed at all public meals in hotels, restaurants, etc., and recommended a similar observance in private households; and it restricted butchers' purchases to 50 per cent. of the amounts that they had bought in October 1917.

Meanwhile local schemes of rationing multiplied.

Of these schemes far the most important was one to ration London and the Home Counties—nearly one-third of the whole population—for butter and margarine, which the Ministry had been asked by the Local Committees concerned to formulate for them. Before it was ready, Lord Rhondda announced that it was absolutely necessary that meat should be included, and that the whole scheme must be in operation by Feb. 25. At the end of January 1918, it was reported that Scotland, Wales, and the South Midlands Division of England were adopting the London scheme, and that of the other Divisions all the industrial districts were covered by local schemes of their own, only the Eastern and South-Western Divisions being in a backward position.

Rapid indeed as well as effective had been the response of the Local Committees since Lord Rhondda's appeal in December. The Ministry too had ably played its part in guiding their efforts. Its policy was summed up by the Food Controller on Jan. 18:

'I propose from time to time to guide Committees in points of procedure common to all schemes in which uniformity is desirable. Subject to these common principles being followed, no Committee need hesitate to adopt a scheme through fear that its labour will be found to have been wasted, if and when the time comes to develop a single national system out of the various schemes now proposed.'

Meanwhile the officials at the Ministry, working at high pressure, were elaborating the multitudinous details of the London scheme, and with the help of the Local Committees it was duly put into operation on the appointed day, Feb. 25, 1918. The effect on the 'queue' evil was instantaneous. During the week Feb. 18-27, the police in the Metropolitan Area had counted 1,339,392 persons standing in queues. In the first week of rationing the numbers fell to 191,030, and in the fourth to 15,197. The most novel feature of the scheme was the money-value instead of the weight-value given to the meat coupon, which, supplemented by a table of equivalent weights, went far towards solving the difficulties in rationing so variable an article as meat—difficulties which the German system had failed to meet. This device left the customer free to select what joint he would buy with

his limited number of 5*d.* coupons. The London scheme, too, though hastily drafted and hampered, like all local schemes, by its restriction to a comparatively small area, was remarkable for the thoroughness with which it dealt with all classes of the population. Few indeed could escape the meshes of its net.

In the middle of February Lord Rhondda announced that the London scheme, so far as meat was concerned, would shortly be extended to the whole country. Applications, however, for the approval of local schemes for rationing butter, margarine and tea continued to pour in, and by the middle of March numbered a thousand. The Ministry could not cope with such a mass of details: Lord Rhondda therefore issued a general Order, setting forth a model scheme and announcing that all Committees which by formal resolution might adopt it, would thereby be legally empowered to enforce it. Up to this time, save in some half-dozen instances, local schemes had possessed no legal validity; yet so strong had been the force of public opinion behind them and so powerful the hold that Local Committees possessed over traders through the Requisition Orders, that the legality of their activities had never been called in question.

By April 3, out of the 39,000,000 persons in Great Britain, 35,859,000 were rationed* for butter and margarine, 17,600,000 for tea, 15,337,000 for meat, 1,977,000 for cheese, 1,421,000 for lard, and 229,000 for other articles. Local schemes, though they continued for some weeks longer, had by this time done their work; they had fixed once for all the type of rationing machinery to be employed in this country. The Local Committees had by their vigour and efficiency made any transition to the centralised scheme latent in the Revised Sugar Scheme practically impossible, and—what was more important—had gained the confidence of all classes of the population by their justice and fair dealing.

National rationing began with the enforcement, on New Year's Day, 1918, of the Sugar Scheme, which, owing to the careful distribution of supplies, worked at once with unexpected smoothness. Not unnaturally, therefore, Lord Rhondda, when at the end of January he asked

* Rationing for butter and margarine was made universal on June 16.

the War Cabinet to sanction national rationing, still recommended the centralised scheme up to which the Sugar Scheme was intended to lead. On the question of machinery the Cabinet gave the Food Controller a free hand; national rationing for meat and fats it sanctioned at once, but reserved bread rationing for further consideration, whenever it should become necessary. The first step forwards was taken when, on Feb. 16, as already mentioned, Lord Rhondda decided to extend the London scheme of meat rationing to the whole country—a decision which practically involved the abandonment of the centralised scheme in favour of the gradual development of the existing local schemes into an uniform national system. The decision was due to the unfavourable situation in regard to meat, fats and cereals, which had rendered the national rationing at least of meat at once imperative, and had brought the possibility of bread rationing nearer perhaps than ever before.

The scheme for the purchase and distribution of live stock and meat had been in working order throughout the country since the end of January; there was, therefore, no difficulty either in theory or practice about rationing the whole of Great Britain instead of the London area only. The London scheme had made no provision for extra meat rations for heavy manual workers, because at the moment supplies were insufficient for the purpose. Strong representations were now made to Lord Rhondda on the point; and recognising the justice of the claim, he at once announced that supplementary rations would under the national scheme be made the first charge upon any increase in the supplies.

In fulfilment of this promise a scheme was rapidly prepared and published on March 11, under which all heavy manual workers, estimated at $6\frac{1}{2}$ millions, were to be divided into three classes—F, very heavy industrial workers; E, heavy agricultural workers; and D, heavy industrial workers, including all women and boys engaged on heavy manual work. The Local Committees were to classify the applicants according to a prescribed schedule of occupations. But the publication of the scheme raised such indignation in Labour circles against the proposed discriminations within the ranks of manual workers, that the Ministry was at once obliged further to explain

that the division into three classes had been made in view of the near possibility of bread rationing, in the scheme for which it was an essential element, but that for the present the same ration would be assigned to all three.

In the middle of March Mr Hoover's efforts to maintain the export of cereals from America were sufficiently successful to enable Mr Clynes to tell the House of Commons that it was now hoped that bread rationing might be indefinitely postponed. At the same time the supplies of meat, both home-grown and foreign, continued to be seriously low, while the imports of bacon were rapidly increasing. The Food Controller, therefore, decided that the supplementary rations must take the form of bacon, and, to allow time for its better distribution, postponed the inauguration of meat rationing from March 25 to April 7; the supplementary rations, however, were not to begin till April 14, and those for adolescent boys (Class C), who were for reasons of health to be allowed an extra ration of half the amount, not till May 5. By the appointed dates all the necessary arrangements were complete, and the National, like the London, Scheme was immediately successful in stopping queues all over the country. From April 7 to July 13 only changes of detail were introduced to make the rations correspond with the fluctuations of supplies.

Meanwhile, under the Sugar Scheme, which was administered in all its details, like all the other rationing schemes, by the Local Committees, the work of issuing 'ration papers' instead of sugar cards to members of the floating population still went on; but during the three months of its working the staff of 900 at the Central Clearing House in London had only added one million names to the Central Register over and above the original two million, and obviously could not cope with the whole nation. So, after some discussion with his officials, Lord Rhondda decided on April 16 to abandon central registration altogether—its chief use was supposed to be as a safeguard against fraud—and to use the staff to check retailers' sales. The way was thus cleared for the formulation of an uniform national scheme inclusive of all rationed articles of food, which was to come into operation on July 14. The rationed articles were to be

sugar, butter, margarine and meat (including pork and bacon), and perhaps also lard and tea.

The only matter of principle involved was the question whether the system of supplementary rations should be continued. Not only the rank and file of the Labour Party, but the great Triple Alliance of Railwaymen, Miners and Transport Workers had almost unanimously demanded them; while the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress had from the first been hostile. The opposition took three forms: some were opposed to any distinction of classes in the population as a whole; others to any distinction of grades among the manual workers; others again resented the inclusion of all women heavy workers in Class D, even when their work was more or less identical with that of men in Classes E and F, and the exclusion of adolescent girls from Class C. The question was referred to a committee of experts, and numerous Local Committees were consulted, three-quarters of whom were in favour of continuance. On the evidence adduced, the Ministry in June decided to continue them, and at once issued application forms to the workers concerned. The small number of applicants showed that the question was of no great importance; in April only $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions had applied instead of the anticipated $6\frac{1}{2}$ millions; now the number sank to $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions (women 90,050), doubtless because the normal ration was now to be 32 oz. instead of the 20 oz. in April, and because people in general disliked bacon as a substitute for meat, and were unwilling to pay the high price for it then prevailing.

Compared with its predecessors, the comprehensive scheme of July was chiefly distinguished by the necessarily elaborate machinery for dealing with the old problem of removals and by the careful provisions made to meet the needs of exceptional sections of the population, like vegetarians, Jews, Mohammedans, and invalids; otherwise the changes consisted in co-ordinating the various local schemes into one, and in introducing such improvements as had been suggested by experience.

Meanwhile the Supply Divisions of the Ministry had duly perfected their various schemes of distribution. The general result was that on July 14, after four years of warfare, the whole population of Great Britain was

under a system of national rationing, developed, as Lord Rhondda had promised, out of the local schemes devised in the previous winter. Practically the new scheme made but little difference, as the whole country was already rationed for sugar, meat, butter and margarine. Lard was the only article added to the list; tea, which had been threatened, was excluded owing to the satisfactory state of the stocks.

Unfortunately Lord Rhondda did not live to see the day of national rationing, which he had done so much by his unswerving justice and his frank methods of winning general confidence to make not only tolerable but almost popular with the nation. He died on July 3, 1918, and was succeeded by Mr Clynes, who had for the past year been his second-in-command and had by his unique position in the Labour world firmly secured the support of the great trade organisations. Almost the first act of the new Food Controller was to sign the Rationing Order of July 31, which enforced and stereotyped the system of rationing current during the remaining four months of the war.

Side by side with the general schemes for civilian rationing there had grown up a subsidiary system applicable to fully 8,000,000 persons under the charge of a special Department of the Ministry, known first as the Food Survey Board, and subsequently as the Public Services Branch. This large minority included all persons serving in the Navy and Army and the Women's Auxiliary Services in Great Britain, the inmates of all institutions under the control of the Home Office and Local Government Board, prisoners of war and interned aliens, and persons in hospitals and sanatoria of every kind. It was the duty of the Board to fix special scales of rations, suitable for these various classes, in agreement with the Government Departments concerned, and after consultation with their medical and scientific advisers.

Henceforward the history of rationing down to the Armistice in November 1918, was little more than a record of variations in the amount of the rations and of the inclusion or exclusion of articles on the rationed list due to the fluctuations of supplies. One change there was, however, far-reaching in its effects. Bacon and ham, owing to the large accumulation of stocks, which

had poured in from North America ever since March, were on July 28 made ration free. With this change the whole system of supplementary rations disappeared and with it the attempt, unique in English history, to give manual workers the right to purchase more food than their richer neighbours.

British rationing was a success, because it had behind it the whole force of public opinion. The system was in its main outlines devised under Lord Devonport's régime; it was put into operation jointly and severally by his two successors, 'an odd combination,' as Mr Clynes once described it 'of a peer of the realm and an ordinary labourer asked to join together in such efforts as they could make to serve the nation at a time of extreme difficulty and stress,' who found that 'their objects were the same and that their methods for obtaining them were substantially identical.' When Lord Rhondda entered on his office, he found a very angry feeling growing in the public mind against high prices and inequitable distribution of food-stuffs; he set himself not only to remove the causes of discontent, but to change the current of the public mind. He seized every opportunity of frankly explaining his policy by his speeches and through the press.

One measure that he cordially adopted at the suggestion of Mr Clynes was specially remarkable—the organisation, in January 1918, of a Labour element within the Ministry itself. This was an advisory Committee, known as the Consumers' Council, composed of some twenty men and women, the majority of whom represented Trade Union and Co-operative organisations. Some of its members were put upon all the important Departmental Committees, and were thus given access to all the confidential information in the possession of the Ministry. Through this Council therefore—again to quote Mr Clynes—the great 'Trade Unions and Labour Parties were able to act like organised critics'; and through it again the Ministry was able to meet their criticisms and remedy its own blunders. A few weeks later the weekly meetings of the Council were supplemented by periodical Conferences of London Labour organisations presided over by some official of the

Ministry, at which the Food Controller's policy was frankly stated and freely discussed. As time went on, similar conferences were held by the Food Commissioners in various parts of the country. By such measures as these the current of the public mind was completely changed; on the introduction of national rationing many Trade Unions sent votes of thanks to the Food Controller.

The more immediate causes of success are not far to seek. The State control over both the supply and the distribution of all rationed food-stuffs was absolute. To obtain this control in the case of imports was a comparatively easy matter. Meat was the only home-produced article of importance on the rationed list; and the greatest triumph of the Food Ministry was its carefully organised scheme for the State purchase and distribution of home-killed meat. With this exception our chief difficulty was to get the supplies to our shores. In Germany, dependent mainly on home produce, the chief difficulty was to transfer supplies from the surplus to the deficit areas; there the efforts of the Central Authorities were defeated, first, by the failure of the Confederate Governments cordially to carry out the Imperial regulations, and, secondly, by the impossibility of extracting from the farmers the prescribed quantities of food to feed the industrial districts. In the United Kingdom we avoided the first difficulty by practically leaving Ireland out of account; and the second difficulty was of primary importance only in the case of meat, which, as just stated, was most successfully dealt with; while difficulties in distributing milk and potatoes were met by price regulations and a strict control over the ordinary trade channels, coupled, in the case of milk, with 'priority' distribution to mothers, children, and invalids, and, in the case of potatoes, with a subsidy to guard producers against loss.

Again, in Germany the Imperial Government fixed only the proper quotas of food for each locality, and allowed the local authorities to devise their own systems of rationing; often, however, the prescribed quantities failed to materialise, sometimes owing to shortages general or local, sometimes through defective transport, which grew worse as time went on. Left in the lurch, the local authorities resorted to illegal practices to obtain supplies in competition with and at the expense

of their neighbours, till *Schleichhandel* became universal and sapped the *moral* of the people. In Great Britain even the early local schemes of rationing were all under central control; the national schemes were uniform in their incidence and well enforced by the Local Committees. The supplies to meet the rations were so regularly distributed that the Food Controller could boast that the Government coupon was as secure of being honoured as a Bank of England note.

Finally, our list of rationed articles was short. The rationing of bread was always—though at times with very great difficulty—avoided; the rationing of potatoes was never really considered. Bread indeed was artificially cheapened, so that the poorest of our people could always fall back on cheap bread and potatoes, if their rations failed to satisfy their hunger. The period of our rationing too was short, covering only nine or ten months of the fifty-one months of the war; the Germans were rationed for forty-five months, starting with bread and ending with practically all food-stuffs. Our people therefore were never subjected to that prolonged and severe strain which befell the German people and finally broke their 'home front.' None the less, though we were never so hard pressed, we may legitimately pride ourselves on the success of the vast administrative machinery which sprang up from nothing and in the face of great difficulties of organisation under the direction of our three Food Controllers. They had indeed the advantage of German experience before them to guide them both in what to do and more especially in what to avoid; but we owe it to the wisdom and ready resource with which they and the army of skilful officials that they gathered round them surmounted crisis after crisis, that our food hardships proved no worse and never for a moment seriously weakened our national will to win the war.

G. E. UNDERHILL.

Art. 5.—THE PRESENT STATE OF FEELING IN GERMANY.

1. *Erlebnisse und Betrachtungen aus der Zeit des Weltkrieges.* By General von Stein. Leipzig, 1919.
2. *Der Deutsche Generalstab in Vorbereitung und Durchführung des Weltkrieges.* By General H. von Kuhl. Berlin, 1920.
3. *Die deutsche Kriegführung und das Völkerrecht-Beiträge zur Schuldfrage*, herausgegeben im Auftrage des Kriegsministeriums und der Obersten Heeresleitung. Berlin, 1919.
4. *Materialien betreffend die Waffenstillstandsverhandlungen, Teil VIII. Die Deutsche Waffenstillstandskommission.* Charlottenburg, 1920.

DURING a recent visit to Germany I took every opportunity to study the mind of the people by discussing the war, Germany's defeat, the German revolution, and the new conditions created by it, with numerous men and women belonging to all ranks of society. I had expected that the defeat would have opened the eyes of the Germans, that they would recognise the evils of the late Imperial regime, and that they would condemn Germany's aggression in 1914 and the actions of the German diplomatic service and of the German army as loudly as would any Englishman or Frenchman. To my surprise and dismay I found that the people in general were utterly unacquainted with the wrongs suffered by the Allies and with the crimes perpetrated by the German forces. Assertions that Germany had wantonly begun the war and had carried it on with incredible barbarity were received either with wide-eyed surprise or with emphatic incredulity. Even well-informed men of the world belonging to one of the liberal professions—bankers, lawyers, doctors, etc.—told me, as if they still lived in 1914, that the war had been 'forced' upon peaceful Germany by France, Russia, and England, who had formed a criminal conspiracy against Germany, into which Belgium had entered; that France and Russia had made the struggle inevitable by invading Germany in the midst of peace; that Russia had been animated by the lust of conquest, France by the passion of revenge, and England and America by sordid, commercial envy.

The Germans with whom I conversed either had not read the revelations of Prince Lichnowsky, Dr Mühlton, Karl Kautsky and others, or they dismissed them as fables and hallucinations. They knew nothing about the massacres of thousands of civilians, the wanton destruction of towns, churches, farms, and mines, the deportation of women and girls, the starving of the conquered peoples, the extensive robbery of goods and of works of art, the bombing of hospitals, the sinking of hospital-ships, etc. They told me that the German military and naval forces had fought a clean fight, but that the Allies had disgraced themselves for all eternity by starving German women and children by means of the blockade, by sending coloured barbarians to fight civilised Germans, by murdering helpless German sailors, reminding me of the 'Baralong' affair, etc. Having explained to me that right had been on Germany's side throughout, they protested loudly against the inhumanity of the Peace of Versailles, against the extortionate terms enforced by the Allies and against President Wilson's faithlessness. Believing that the war had been forced upon an innocent Germany, the men and women whom I met could not conceive that Germany was bound to make reparation to the limit of her capacity for the damage she had done in France, Belgium, and elsewhere. The Germans, while eloquently telling me of their own sufferings, never mentioned the far greater sufferings of devastated France, Belgium, Russia, Italy, Serbia, etc. Only two persons whom I met habitually admitted Germany's wrong. Because of their attitude, they were ostracised by all their acquaintance.

The ignorance of the German people seemed to me inexplicable until I began to study the German press and to explore the book-shops. I then discovered that the German publicists, professors, politicians, and generals were strenuously engaged in keeping alive the legend of Germany's innocence and of the wickedness of the Allies which had been firmly established during the four and a half years of the war. The German publicists and journalists, who, under Government pressure, had unceasingly proclaimed Germany's innocence during the whole course of the struggle, had either become victims of auto-suggestion and of auto-intoxication, or think

it injudicious to disavow their former writings and reveal to their readers the startling truth. The unfortunate result of this continued campaign of deception is that all Germans, a few well-informed people excepted, live under the impression that they are the victims of a conspiracy and are suffering a great wrong. The legend of Germany's innocence is being 'scientifically' established by the leading soldiers, statesmen, and historians, and it may before long find its way into the school-books. Hence it seems likely that the coming generation will grow up with a burning sense of injustice suffered at the hands of the Allies. A passionate hatred of the victors is being aroused among the German people, and thus the foundations are firmly laid for a war of revenge.

The ex-Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, the ex-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, von Jagow, the ex-Vice-Chancellor, Dr Helfferich, and many other initiated diplomatists have published memoirs designed to show either that the war was forced upon Germany, or that the Allies intended to attack and destroy the German Empire, and that Germany merely tried to forestall her inexorable enemies. Similarly, the leading generals and admirals, such as Hindenburg, Ludendorff, Tirpitz, have published books in which they endeavour to prove that Germany's methods of warfare were perfectly legitimate and absolutely irreproachable. Nor is it only the principal actors, personally responsible for the conduct of diplomatic and military matters, who have proclaimed Germany's good faith, fairness, and unexceptional good conduct—apologies and explanations are natural on the part of those who directed Germany's affairs and know that they may be called to account by their countrymen—but also secondary authorities and the official spokesmen of the various departments as well have strenuously maintained that Germany has a perfectly clean sheet as regards the war.

In his recently published reminiscences, General von Stein, the former Minister of War, attributed the outbreak to France, Russia, and England, and pointed out that William II was a Prince of Peace. He writes :

'The Russian railways, which had been built with French money and which led towards the German frontier, showed

that Russia meant to attack us. The anti-German policy of the Powers emanated from England. Germany had asserted her love of peace and the peaceful intentions which had directed her policy for decades. We had asserted our love of peace so frequently and so strenuously that our protestations were at last received by the world with derision. William II had meant to live and die as a peace emperor. The German nation should always remember these facts and not repeat the accusation of Germany's enemies that Germany had brought about the War. . . . It would have been suicidal for Germany to sit still until all her enemies had finished their preparations and begun the War.'

General von Kuhl, of the German General Staff, published a book entitled 'The German General Staff in Preparing and Conducting the War,' which was intended to be an apology for that institution. The General is very anxious to prove the guilt of France, Russia, England, and Belgium, and he does so by drawing upon the files of the General Staff and collecting therefrom every scrap of information, treating the pronouncements of unimportant politicians and the articles of third-rate journalists as important evidence revealing the policy of the countries to which they belong. Turning to France's responsibility for the war, he writes:

'On the 17th of January, 1912, "*La France Militaire*" wrote, "The war must dominate all our thoughts." Four months before the outbreak of the War George Aubert wrote in his book "*La Folie Franco-Allemande*" that not Germany, but France, was responsible for the tension between the two countries, that France and Germany were drifting towards war. The enormous armaments of Germany's enemies corresponded with the views described. Their burden, especially that weighing upon France, was so great that it could not possibly be borne for long. France had assumed that burden in view of an early war. . . .

'The French bills for increasing military armaments preceded the German army bills in point of time. The French deputy, Chantemps, complained on the 2nd of June, 1913, of France's aggressiveness, which was becoming more and more accentuated, and stated that the French army bills had been prepared long in advance of the German army bills.'

Russia's evil intentions are proved by similar means.

'In the spring [of 1914] an article, inspired and approved of by the Russian Minister of War, was published in the journal

"Birschewyje Wjedomosti," which stated: "Russia is ready for war and France must be ready too." The sentiment in Russian army circles, and especially within the military party, had risen to boiling point. No one can be in any doubt whether evidences of militarism should be looked for among the Entente Powers or in Germany.'

The article in the Russian journal mentioned by von Kuhl was, it is true, inspired by the Russian Minister of War, and it had created a great sensation in Germany because it was vigorously exploited by the semi-official press. Germany had previously announced her intention to increase her army very greatly. Russia was alarmed at Germany's preparations. She wished to make corresponding counter-preparations but desired, at the same time, that France should do likewise. Hence the inspired article addressed to France.

England's war guilt is proved by the same means as that of France and Russia. Von Kuhl writes:

'The aim of England's policy was proclaimed clearly and unreservedly in the English press. I would merely mention the celebrated article of the "Saturday Review" published in autumn 1897, which closed with the words "Germaniam esse delendam." . . . Events at the outbreak of the War, and the documents which were later discovered in Belgium, confirmed the correctness of the opinion which the General Staff had formed before the War as to England's sentiments and intentions. Baron Greindl, the Belgian Ambassador in Berlin, reported on February 18th, 1905, to Baron Favereau, the Minister for Foreign Affairs: "The true reason why the English hate Germany is obvious. Their hatred is due to their envy of the prosperity of Germany's merchant marine, of her commerce and of her industries." The same gentleman reported, also in 1905, that the Entente concluded by the Governments of England and France had the approval of the French and English nations because that arrangement was an expression of their common hatred of Germany.'

The eminent general 'proves' the aggressive intentions of England in the summer of 1914, by quoting an article written by an unknown journalist seventeen years previously. Like so many other Germans, he feels keenly the reproach of having invaded and brutally ill-treated the weak State of Belgium, the neutrality of

which was guaranteed by Germany herself. Therefore he is particularly anxious to prove the evil intentions of that country and of its government.

'The cultured circles of Belgium (he states) stood under French influence. The influence of France was continually increasing owing to the community of language, the activity of the press, and friction with Germany. The French encouraged Belgium's hostility to Germany, expecting that, in case of war, that country would turn against Germany. . . . The French had carefully organised a service of information in Belgium and Luxemburg in preparation for war. . . .

'In November 1912 the "Chronique" discussed the joint action of the armies of England, France, and Belgium. General Ducarne, the former chief of the Belgian General Staff, wrote in 1912 in his "Doctrines Stratégiques" that probably arrangements had been made between the General Staffs of Belgium and England. On the 12th of December, 1909, Monsieur de Favereau, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, asserted in the Senate that he had seen diplomatic documents which had given him the conviction that the Belgian Treaty of Neutrality was an entirely valueless scrap of paper. Belgium's neutrality would be seriously threatened in case of a Franco-German war by France, because that country had a strong inducement for invading Germany by way of Belgium. In a publication of the Belgian War Academy, published against the will of the Belgian Government in 1913, occurred the phrase: "The French Commander-in-Chief demands, in accordance with the agreement entered upon, that the Belgian Commander-in-Chief should co-operate with him against the German Army."

'Owing to information, such as the foregoing, we men of the General Staff had arrived at the conviction that *Belgium herself had abandoned her neutrality long ago*. The correctness of our views was confirmed later on by the discoveries made in the archives of Belgium. The documents found bore the title "Conventions Anglo-Belges," and they proved that the two States had prepared everything for a joint campaign in Belgium with the utmost care many years ago.'

In calling these conversations 'conventions,' he does not hesitate to repeat an old and exploded forgery. The fact that Germany had demonstrated her intention of invading Belgium in case of a war with France by constructing a number of military railways towards the frontier of that country and that many German generals

and military writers had advocated a Belgian invasion naturally entitled Belgium to take some measures for protection. That fact is, of course, as well known to von Kuhl as it is to every Belgian. After having shown at considerable length that France had intended to invade Germany by way of Belgium, and that therefore Germany was entitled to take suitable counter-measures, the general, forgetting his previous argument, endeavours to prove equally fully that Germany was compelled to violate the neutrality of her smaller neighbour, and that her action was dictated not by the intentions of France, but by German necessity. We read:

'As Germany's march through Belgium has been described as a blameworthy action, it is interesting to see the views which the French themselves took with regard to it previous to the War. The publication "*Armée et Démocratie*," wrote in 1911: "It is not merely in Germany's interest to march through Belgium, but she is compelled to do so." In the sitting of the Senate of the 6th of April, 1911, one of the French Senators stated: "The enormous fortifications on our eastern frontier, and lack of room between Luxemburg and the Vosges, must induce the Germans to extend their military front, for only then can they undertake an enveloping sweep as they desire." General Maitrot wrote in 1911 that for Germany an advance through Switzerland was difficult, while penetration through Belgium was highly attractive. The French in general had become convinced that Germany was compelled to march through Belgium. . . .

'Germany was compelled to attack the French flank. A march through Switzerland was not suitable because of the difficulty of the ground and because of the strength of the Swiss army. A flank attack could not be made by marching through the gap between Verdun and the Luxemburg-Belgian frontier. There was not enough room. An army crossing the Meuse river north of Verdun was threatened with being cut off from its base, should it turn south. We had to make up our mind to march through Belgium into France. Necessity imperatively demanded it.'

Germany has been told by the high authority of the spokesman of the General Staff that the neighbouring Powers had formed a conspiracy to destroy the Empire, and that Germany had been forced into the war against her will. The same high authority has explained to the

German people that no reproaches can be levelled against the army and navy for the methods by which the war was fought on Germany's part. Even the wanton devastations and the carrying away of the inhabitants, including women and girls, are either excused by the plea of necessity, or are described as measures undertaken in the interest of the inhabitants and approved by them. For instance, we read :

'The Entente has reproached Germany with having devastated the evacuated territory and having scorned the demands of international law and of humanity. In view of this assertion it ought to be stated emphatically that destruction was limited by military necessity, and that the inhabitants were treated with the greatest consideration and kindness. They were evacuated chiefly by railway, and the greatest possible consideration was shown to them. Family bonds were respected as far as possible. Endeavours were made to keep together the inhabitants of every locality. Evacuated agriculturists were sent to agricultural districts elsewhere, and the inhabitants of towns were despatched to other towns. Large columns of vehicles carried the people to the railway-stations from which they departed, and fetched them from the stations where they arrived. Hospital trains staffed with German nurses transported the sick. Numerous inhabitants expressed to the German authorities their gratitude for the consideration with which these militarily necessary measures were carried out by the German command. I would particularly mention the unsolicited expressions of gratitude received from the authorities of St Quentin. . . .

'The Supreme Command was absolutely compelled to make use of the submarine weapon. We were urged from all sides to send out the U-boats. The people loudly demanded it, and one can imagine to what reproaches we should have been exposed had the Supreme Command refused to carry out the will of the people.'

According to von Kuhl, Germany's only fault was that she had not made adequate preparations for her defence. We read on p. 108 (the italicised portions are printed in special type in the original) :

'*Germany had no aggressive aims similar to those which were pursued by England, France, and Russia.* The gigantic economic development of Germany urgently required peace until it had come to full fruition. In order to ensure the

continuance of peace, Germany, threatened with encirclement, required a powerful army. Owing to its geographical position, the country could be compelled to fight on two fronts, while France, Russia, and England would have to fight only on one front. . . .

'Unfortunately Germany's military preparations were neither in accordance with the difficulties of her position, nor were her preparations in accordance with the armaments of the countries hostile to us. Militarily we were in a position of inferiority compared with our opponents. That was our principal mistake.'

Other military authorities have been as anxious to show the good faith and innocence of Germany as the General Staff. A considerable number of books and pamphlets have lately been published on behalf of the Ministry of War designed to clear that organisation from all reproaches. Among these is a publication of 1919 entitled 'Germany's Conduct of the War and International Law—Contributions to the Question of Guilt—published on behalf of the Ministry of War and of the Supreme Command.' In that publication, as in so many others, the accusations levelled against the military authorities are lightly brushed away as a tissue of fables which need not be considered seriously. According to the principle of Frederick the Great, that the best defence is the attack, this official statement, like so many others, is chiefly devoted to proving the guilt of the Powers leagued against Germany and the inhumanity of their conduct. For instance, on p. 47 of the book we read that, according to scientific investigation, 763,000 people had died in Germany in consequence of the blockade. England is held up to odium for thus having made war on women and children. The 'scientific investigators' took the average of the German peace mortality and attributed all deaths above that average solely to the blockade. They omitted to draw attention to the fact that the mortality of the civilian population was greatly increased during the War, not only in blockaded Germany, but also in the unblockaded countries leagued against her. Likewise they omitted to mention that the excess of mortality was largely caused by a world-wide attack of influenza which directly and indirectly slew hundreds of thousands of people in England, France, and Italy during

the last few months of the war. By such dishonest pseudo-scientific propaganda the feeling of hatred of England and the Allies is kept alive.

It is notorious that many English prisoners were treated with the utmost inhumanity in Germany, that they were singled out for special ill-treatment, particularly during the early stages of the war, while German prisoners were treated with the greatest generosity by the English. The army publication above mentioned, after contemptuously dismissing the accusations of inhumanity brought against the German military authorities, proceeds to show in detail that, while the German authorities practised the utmost humanity, those of Germany's opponents inflicted the most hideous cruelties upon the German prisoners. We read, for instance, under the headings 'English Atrocities—Murder of German Prisoners by Englishmen—Ill-treatment of German Prisoners in England':

'German prisoners had to suffer the greatest severities at the hands of the English. In numerous thoroughly authenticated cases they were, for instance, forced to participate in fighting the German troops. They had to carry munitions into the firing line, and had to construct entrenchments and fortifications. They were herded in hundreds within narrow compounds behind the front and were left there without a roof over their heads in rain and frost without sufficient food. German officers and doctors were, as a rule, transported in closed cattle-trucks without seats and deprived of any accommodation for satisfying the most necessary physical needs. The prisoners' camp at Havre was in an unsanitary condition, and nearly all the prisoners had to suffer there before they were sent to England.

'The German wounded were treated extremely badly in the English field-hospitals. The severely wounded men were particularly ill-treated by English nursing sisters, who assaulted those who were in their keeping and jeered at their sufferings. These facts, which have been corroborated by numerous witnesses, and the deplorable condition of the German civilians interned at Olympia, in the Isle of Man, and at the Brocton camp, throw a very peculiar light upon the moral indignation of the British citizens who like to contrast the "barbarous" treatment meted out by Germany to her prisoners with the humanity with which England treated the prisoners who had fallen into her hands.'

The endeavours of leading Germans to prove that the German prisoners of war were treated with the utmost inhumanity by their opponents are not limited to occasional assertions, but special publications are issued with this object in view. There is, for instance, a closely-printed volume of 312 pages entitled 'German War Prisoners in Enemy Countries. Documentary Evidence: France,' which was printed at the Government printing works and published late in 1919. A short preface explains that the book has been issued in order to enlighten the world and to cause those guilty of the ill-treatment of German prisoners abroad to be held responsible. Not a single word is said about the ill-treatment of foreign prisoners in Germany. The reading of the book is calculated to engender the utmost hatred of France among the Germans. Apparently the book mentioned is the first volume of a series designed to accuse the Powers of atrocities perpetrated against the Germans.

The policy of preaching hatred of the Entente Powers is not limited to innumerable books and pamphlets but also appears constantly in the periodical and the daily press. A particularly interesting paper is 'The Watch in the West,' a weekly organ of the new army, the *Reichswehr*. It tries to arouse an aggressively military spirit among the soldiers by the same means as were used in feudal Prussia. In the issues which I saw, there were two series dealing with the unspeakable cruelties which German prisoners had to suffer from the French. Publications such as those described will scarcely promote the spirit of conciliation and of mutual goodwill between the Germans and their neighbours.

Before the War the soldiers enjoyed the greatest prestige in Germany. The military governed the country. While the political history of Germany was neglected, the military history of the State was assiduously taught. According to the German text-books, Prusso-Germany had been created by its ever-victorious army. During the War the legend of Germany's invincibility was kept alive. Victory followed victory up to the sudden collapse of Germany in November 1918, which took even many well-informed people by surprise. That may be seen by the fact that Stock Exchange prices in Berlin were at

their highest a few weeks before the Revolution. The German authorities never mentioned the defeat at the Marne in 1914, and even now many people do not know of it. The leading generals, military writers, statesmen, politicians, historians, and journalists, some outspoken Socialists excepted, still speak of the undefeated German army, and explain that its morale was undermined by Allied propaganda, by the agitation of the German Socialists, and by shortage of food and of clothing. According to hundreds of accusations made by the representatives of militarism, Germany might have won the war, had the Social Democrats not stabbed the ever-victorious army in the back. The Socialists, it is true, have published the appeals of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who demanded the unconditional and immediate conclusion of an armistice because the German army was no longer able to resist. However, owing to the great prestige of the representatives of the old regime, the assertions of the militarists are believed by the greater number of Germans. The defeat has not destroyed the military spirit of the German people. The effects of two centuries of a semi-military education are perhaps as strongly in evidence as they were before the war. The German people has not lost its faith in the army; and even many of those who proclaim themselves enthusiastic democrats expect a rebirth of Germany only from a successful war.

The spirit of 1914 is kept alive not only by the representatives of the army but also by the representatives of German diplomacy. During the war, Germany's political leaders endeavoured to prove that the war had been forced upon Germany by publishing misleading and partly garbled official documents, such as those which were discovered in the Belgian Archives. The publication of such misleading evidence has continued since the armistice and even since the signature of the Peace. For instance, in the course of the year 1919, the publishing house of Reimar Hobbing of Berlin brought out a series of five volumes entitled 'European Policy 1897-1914. Unpublished Documents issued by Order of the Government.' These volumes give hundreds of carefully selected extracts from the correspondence of the Belgian diplomatic service. They were chosen with a view to

proving Germany's innocence and peacefulness and the guilt of her opponents, and they are meant to provide historians and publicists with material. One of the first documents given in this collection is dated Jan. 12, 1901. It is a letter addressed to Baron d'Anethan in Paris. In the middle of the letter we read, in the thickest print :

'Everything shows that the German Emperor is chiefly pre-occupied with maintaining the peace of Europe, and he will, in the future as in the past, avoid all causes of friction and maintain with France the best possible relations.'

A few pages further we read in a document dated Brussels, Feb. 22, 1901, in very thick print :

'The English see in the Germans dangerous competitors in commerce and industry, and they show their jealousy of the uninterrupted progress which the Germans make both in England and in neutral countries.'

One of the last documents of this bulky and misleading collection is dated Brussels, July 3, 1914. We read :

'Monsieur Poincaré went to Petersburg when he was Prime Minister of France. Nobody doubts that he tried then to induce Russia to increase her armaments to the utmost. He sent to that country Monsieur Delcassé with the same object in view, and in a few weeks he will once more go to Russia as President of the French Republic. . . . Nobody doubts the peaceful character of the Emperor William. But how long will the world be able to count upon his peacefulness in view of the provocative proceedings of France and of the effect which France's actions may have upon the chauvinistic and militarist circles of Germany?'

After the revolution of November 1918, the new German Government was urged from many quarters to dissociate itself from the old regime and to publish without delay all the documents likely to establish the war guilt of the Imperial Government and of its adherents. It opened the archives of the Foreign Office to Karl Kautsky, the Socialist historian, but prevented for some time the publication of the documents he had copied, as we may learn from his book, 'How the World War Came About.' Instead, it brought out a one-volume White Book superscribed, 'Is Germany Guilty?' which did not contain the salient documents, but was merely

a clumsy and uncandid apology. On p. 67 of that compilation, which was issued by the Foreign Office, we read :

'We must particularly deplore that the conditions of peace which have been placed before Germany will probably confirm for all time to come the conviction held by the German public that the war was prepared and was fought by England with a view to destroying a hated competitor in the economic field.'

Only when Herr Kautsky had brought strong pressure to bear upon the German Government, and when the publication of the extremely damaging reports sent from Berlin to Munich by the Bavarian representative had shown that Germany had planned the War, and had been acquainted with the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia long before it was sent, did the German Government permit the appearance of the diplomatic correspondence. The truth could no longer be withheld. However, notwithstanding the publications of documents which clearly showed that Germany forced the war upon the world, German publicists of all ranks continue to deny this, and are believed by the majority of the people.

Peace has been concluded, but Germany continues to be in a latent state of war with her former enemies. Every opportunity is utilised to poison the mind of the German masses against the victorious Powers. Every official document relating to the Peace is made an instrument of propaganda. The number of official and semi-official protests against the Peace terms is past counting. Particularly interesting is a large volume published in 1920 entitled 'Documents Relating to the Armistice Negotiations, Part 8,' which gives a report of the activities of the German Armistice Commission. At every opportunity that report asserts the guiltlessness of Germany, and protests against the barbarities of the victorious Powers. According to that report the Germans did not rob cattle and furniture from the invaded districts. We read :

'As regards the driving away of cattle, it should be mentioned that the German authorities maintained numerous herds on French and Belgian territory, and that the majority of the troops had cattle of their own since a long time back.

The animals which were driven back to Germany were as a rule the property of the army. With regard to furniture, the position was similar. In order to make the empty houses and barracks comfortable for the soldiers, the troops and the army factories produced vast quantities of furniture, while the officers purchased large quantities of furniture for their own use. It is therefore not right to consider furniture which was taken to Germany on military vehicles as unjustly acquired property.'

The report mentioned is full of complaints about Marshal Foch, and asserts frequently that demands were made through sheer greed, while military necessity was used as a pretext. For instance, we read on p. 25 in spaced type:

'The handing over of arms and munitions, which at first was obviously considered to be a measure for weakening the fighting power of the German army, became at last purely a business matter. The enemy wished to enrich himself as much as possible; and the Allies proceeded to disarm Germany in a spirit of persecution and of greed.'

Under the heading, 'The Surrender of Works of Art to France and Belgium,' we do not find a single line admitting the fact that vast quantities of art-treasures were stolen by the invaders. On the other hand, we find statements such as the following, which serve to create the impression that no such robberies took place:

'For the protection of works of art during the war measures were taken which were explained to the world in a richly illustrated publication in German, English, and French. . . . The works of art which were taken to Germany during the war by the authorities were, with a few exceptions, objects which were public property. They had been sent to Germany either through ignorance of the regulations, or because they came under the category of arms. . . . The French Government sent to the Armistice Commission a large number of claims of private men who missed art-treasures belonging to them. If the objects claimed should be found in Germany, they will be collected in Frankfurt and sent thence to Metz.'

The concluding chapter of the Report of the Armistice Commission frankly appeals to German indignation, for we read:

'The Allied commanders have repeatedly tried to describe the behaviour of their troops in the occupied districts of Germany as excellent. In view of these assertions it must be put on record that acts of violence on the part of the troops have compelled the German Armistice Commission to act unceasingly for the protection of the population. Brutal violations of the regulations regarding the use of arms have caused the death of many innocent people of both sexes. Numerous outrages on women, physical ill-treatment and violence, theft, burglary, etc., perpetrated on the helpless population must be put on record. Commanding officers have often taken part in such transgressions with complete disregard of all consideration; extravagant punishments have been inflicted for trifling transgressions; and unjustifiable orders have been given by the commanders of the occupying troops which were bound to outrage the feelings of German inhabitants. . . .

'This volume shows what the Armistice conditions mean to Germany. Unfortunately they are not designed to carry out the great aim which President Wilson proclaimed in his speech of the 4th of July, 1918, in the words: "What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organised opinion of mankind."

The Great War broke out owing to a number of causes. Among these, a very important, if not the most important, one was the fact that the mind of the German people had been utterly warped by centuries of mis-education. Successful war had been exalted to the utmost. A spirit of chauvinism and of aggressiveness had been aroused among the people. The average German was as much interested in military affairs as the average Englishman is interested in sports and politics. The Universities, the schools, the Prussian State Church, and the Press had by their teachings aroused a militant spirit which greeted the outbreak of war with hysterical jubilation. Unfortunately, Germany's defeat and the revolution have not killed that dangerous spirit; and, unless the German nation is enlightened in time, the great tragedy of 1914-1918 may be followed by another and an even greater catastrophe.

J. ELLIS BARKER.

Art. 6.—THE LABOUR PARTY AND ITS POLICY. ✓

THE Labour Party appeals with growing insistency to popular suffrage in opposition to the old political parties; it styles itself the champion of democracy; it describes them as effete social forces, as nothing more than pretentious reactionaries against democratic progress. Soon the country must weigh in the electoral balance the avowed principles of the Labour Party in relation to national interests and the common weal. What is the Labour Party, whom does it comprise, what is its declared policy? To these questions this article attempts, in broad outline, an answer.

There are two great Labour organisations: the Trade Union Congress, with its Executive, the Parliamentary Committee, whose expansion into a General Council of Labour is now under discussion, representing the industrial wing; and the Labour Party, with its National Executive, representing the political wing. The present Labour Party dates from 1900, when the Labour Representation Committee was formed at the instance of the Trades Union Congress, the Independent Labour Party, the Social Democratic Federation, and the Fabian Society. Of fifteen Committee candidates who ran at the subsequent General Election of 1900, two were returned, Mr Keir Hardie and Mr Richard Bell, nine Trade Unionist members being also returned, but not under the auspices of the Committee. Before 1900 individual Trade Unionists had been, from time to time, elected to Parliament. After the Reform Act of 1868, the first effective steps were taken in that direction by the Labour Representation League, formed in 1869; and in 1874, thirteen Labour candidates went to election; the first two 'Labour Members' were elected, one being the Right Hon. Thomas Burt. In 1880, three were returned; in 1885, eleven; in 1892, fourteen; in 1895, twelve. The successful Labour candidates stood on an industrial and not a socialist 'ticket'; where Socialists did stand they received no support. At the election of 1885, the Social Democratic Federation ran a candidate in Kennington and one in Hampstead; the former polled 32 votes, the latter 29.

In 1886 the Trade Union Congress formed an Electoral

Labour Committee, the Labour Representation League having been dissolved. It soon fell under the influence of the Liberal Party; this led to Mr Keir Hardie's campaign, opened at the Swansea Trade Union Congress in 1887, for an independent parliamentary Labour Party. Mr Keir Hardie himself unsuccessfully fought Mid-Lanark as an independent Labour candidate in 1888, but was returned for South-West Ham in 1892. At his instance the Independent Labour Party was founded in 1893; it sent 28 candidates to the poll in 1895, with no success. But the political activity of the Independent Labour Party roused the Trade Union Congress. In 1899 the Congress passed a resolution directing its Parliamentary Committee to arrange a conference of Trade Unions, Co-operative and Socialist Societies, to secure an increased number of Labour members in Parliament. The Labour Representation Committee was then formed in 1900.

The constitution of the Labour Representation Committee in 1900 was as follows: 41 Trade Unions, with a membership of 353,070 members; 7 Trades Councils and Local Labour Parties; 3 Socialist Societies, adding a further membership of 22,861, and making a total of 375,931. At bye-elections between the General Elections of 1900 and 1906, three prominent candidates of the Labour Representative Committee were elected: Mr (now Sir) David Shackleton for Clitheroe, Mr Will Crooks for Woolwich, and Mr (now the Right Hon.) Arthur Henderson for Barnard Castle. The Newcastle Trades Union Congress of 1903 passed a strong resolution enjoining political independence, and instituted a parliamentary fund. At the General Election in 1906, out of 50 candidates run by the Labour Representation Committee, which in that year rechristened itself 'The Labour Party,' 29 were elected; and under the Chairmanship of Mr Keir Hardie, the Parliamentary Labour Party was immediately established with all the paraphernalia of a separate political party in the House of Commons. At the General Election of January 1910, out of 78 candidates, 40 were elected; at that of December 1910, out of 56 candidates, 42 were elected; at that of December 1918, out of 392 candidates, 59 were elected. At this last election, with a total vote in Great Britain of 9,690,100,

2,375,202 were polled by Labour; under proportional representation Labour would have 120 members.

At the Trade Union Congress at Nottingham in February 1918, a revised constitution of the Labour Party was proposed and was adopted in London in March of that year. That constitution preserved the Party as a Federation of Trade Unions, Socialist Societies, Trades Councils, and Local Labour Parties; and it established the principle of individual membership in the local organisations. The Women's Labour League, previously affiliated to the Labour Representation Committee, ceased to exist as a separate body. Every man and woman, therefore, accepting the objects and constitution of the Labour Party, may now join the Party and exercise a voice in its Local and National Councils. It is intended to form a Local Labour Party in every Parliamentary constituency, as a unit of organisation to which Trade Union local branches and local Trades Councils, Co-operative, Socialist, and other societies will be affiliated; each individual local supporter of the Labour Party will be a member of the local Labour Party. Every candidate for Parliament must be chosen or approved by the local organisation and accepted by the National Executive. He must stand as a Labour candidate, and, if elected, must act in harmony with the constitution and standing orders of the Party, and be guided by the decisions of Party meetings. He must include in his electoral address those issues defined by the National Executive as the Labour Party's programme for the election. For the year 1917, prior to its re-constitution, the Labour Party's membership was as follows: 123 Trade Unions, 119 local Trades Councils and 80 Local Labour Parties, with a total membership of 2,417,991; 3 Socialist Societies, namely, the British Socialist Party, with a nominal membership of 10,000; the Independent Labour Party, with a membership of 35,000; and the Fabian Society, with a membership of 2140, bringing the total membership of the Party up to 2,465,131.

Turning from the Labour Party to the Trade Union Congress, 'Labour's annual Parliament,' we find that, when founded in 1868, it consisted of 34 delegates, representing about 20 Societies, and an affiliated membership of 118,367; in 1919, although it does not

include all Trade Unions, it had grown to 851 delegates, representing 266 Societies, and an affiliated membership of 5,283,676. At the present time its membership is estimated at 6½ millions, and may be taken to represent industrially the organised Labour of Great Britain—the largest Trade Union affiliated membership in the world. There is close co-operation between the Trade Union Congress and the Labour Party Executive through a Joint Board consisting of an equal number of members from each of the two National Executives. Through this Board, common action between the Congress and the Labour Party on political and industrial matters is secured.

The Trade Union Congress must be distinguished from the General Federation of Trade Unions created under its auspices in 1899, and now representing an affiliated membership of about 1½ millions. Its chief object is to maintain trade union rights, and to assist financially or otherwise affiliated unions involved in disputes with employers or employers' organisations.

The Labour Party claims to be the true national Democratic Party. It challenges the old party system. It is working to constitute itself into 'a nation-wide political organisation with branches in every Parliamentary constituency in which members will be enrolled, whether they be men or women, and whether they belong to any Trade Union or Socialist Society or are unattached "democrats" without allegiance to any industrial or political movement.' The Labour Party appeals to the electorate as 'the Party of the producers, whose labour of hand and brain provides the necessities of life for all and dignifies and elevates human existence.' 'Producers have been robbed,' it says, 'of the major parts of the fruits of their industry under the individualist system of capitalist production; and that is justification for the Party's claims.' One of its main aims is 'to secure for every producer his or her full share of those fruits, and to ensure the most equitable distribution possible of the nation's wealth on the basis of the common ownership of land and capital and the democratic control of all the activities of society.'

A clear distinction is drawn by the Labour Party

between domestic and foreign policy; we will accordingly summarise its policy first in regard to home affairs. As the basis of all social reform it is contended that 'the individualist system of capital production based on the private ownership and competitive administration of land and capital', with its reckless profiteering and wage slavery, its glorification of the unhampered struggle for the means of life, and its hypocritical pretence of the survival of the fittest, must go.' With it must be eradicated the 'monstrous inequality of circumstances which it produces and the degradation and brutalisation both moral and spiritual resulting from it'; and, along with it, must disappear the present political system, enshrining the ideas in which the capitalistic system naturally finds expression. The Labour Party advances a new basis of social reorganisation; it proposes to reconstruct society on four pillars resting upon the common foundation of 'the democratic control of society in all its activities.' These four pillars are: '(1) The universal enforcement of the national minimum; (2) the democratic control of industry; (3) a revolution in national finance; and (4) the surplus wealth for the common good.'

The principle of the national minimum, it is claimed, contrasts sharply with the principle of the capitalist system, expressed either by Liberal or Conservative policy. By the national minimum is meant the assurance for every member of the community of a standard of life conferring a reasonable minimum of health, education, leisure, and subsistence. One chief element is a legal minimum wage, to be revised according to the level of current prices. As part of this national minimum, the principle of equal pay for equal work is postulated in all occupations in which both sexes are engaged. The Party also insists that Government must prevent unemployment by arranging the execution of public works and the orders of Government Departments and local authorities so as to maintain the aggregate demand for labour at a uniform level from year to year; where that is not wholly effective, then to reduce the supply of labour by raising the school-leaving age to 16, and by substantially shortening the hours of labour of young people. Should the Government fail to

secure for every willing worker a suitable situation at the standard rate of wages, then it must provide that worker with adequate maintenance in the form of out-of-work benefit paid through his Trade Union. The State Unemployment Insurance should, it is insisted, be extended, on a non-contributory basis, to every occupation. What is affirmed as fundamental is that 'in one way or another remunerative employment or honourable maintenance must be found for every willing worker by hand or by brain in bad times as well as in good.' Therefore, complete provision against involuntary destitution in sickness and in health, in good times and in bad, is demanded for every member of the community.

Democracy, the Labour Party asserts, implies effective personal freedom, and involves the complete removal of all war-time restrictions on liberty of speech, publication, press, travel, choice of residence, kind of employment, and especially of any obligation for military service. On the same principle, complete political rights are claimed for every adult irrespective of sex; and for every minority, the right to full proportionate representation in Parliament. The abolition of the House of Lords is demanded, with the elimination from any new second Chamber of any qualification based on heredity. Home Rule is claimed for Ireland; separate statutory legislative assemblies for Scotland, Wales, and England, with autonomous administration in local matters; Parliament at Westminster to be merely a Federal Assembly for the United Kingdom, controlling the Ministers responsible for departments of central Government; these Ministers, with others representing the Dominions, to form the Cabinet for federal affairs of the Commonwealth.

The Labour Party stands for the progressive elimination from industry of the private capitalist, whether individuals or Joint Stock Companies, and the freeing of all who work by hand or brain so that they may labour only for the community. Its intention is to initiate a new 'scientific re-organisation of the national industries,' purged from the degradation of individual profiteering, and regenerated on the basis of the common ownership of the means of production, the equitable sharing of the output among all who assist in any capacity in production, and the adoption in particular services and

occupations of such systems and methods of administration and control as may be found in practice best calculated to promote the public interest.

Accordingly, the Labour Party would immediately establish the common ownership of land, the common ownership and administration of railways and canals and their consolidation with harbours, roads, posts, telegraphs, and the ocean-going steamer lines into a national service of Communication and Transport to be worked 'unhampered by capitalist, private or purely local interests, and with a steadily increasing participation of the organised workers in the management, both central and local, exclusively for the common good.' So also it would erect a score of national central electrical generating stations, with which all municipal electrical plants would be connected for distribution purposes. For similar reasons, the Party demands the immediate nationalisation of coal-mines, with steadily increasing participation in the management, both central and local, of the various grades of persons employed; and insists that the retail distribution of household coal should be undertaken by the Municipal Authorities or County Councils, the purpose to be achieved being the distribution in every local district of household coal of standard quality at a fixed and uniform price 'as unalterable as the penny postage stamp.' The State expropriation of profit-making industrial insurance companies is urged, also the assumption by Government of the whole business of life insurance. Much stress is likewise laid upon the alleged necessity that Government should take out of the hands of persons 'who find profit in promoting the utmost possible consumption' the manufacture and retailing of intoxicants, and that each local authority should deal with the trade within its district on the basis of local veto or limitation of licences or other system of regulation.

Admittedly alive to the evils of centralisation and the restrictions of bureaucracy, the Party claims a free hand for local authorities, assisted by grants in aid from Government sources, to extend widely the scope of municipal enterprise. Local authorities should, it is asserted, not only retail coal, but supply milk, and engage in other similar spheres of trade. All members of local

bodies ought, it is said, to receive their necessary travelling expenses, and also be paid for time spent by them on the public service.

The Labour Party would re-organise the whole educational system from the nursery school to the University 'on the basis of social equality'; 'each educational institution, irrespective of social class or wealth, to be open to every member of the community on terms within his reach'; everything in the nature of military training being absolutely prohibited. In regard to public health, the Labour Party holds that Government should build at the national expense the requisite number of dwelling-houses, spacious and healthy, each having four or five rooms, larder, scullery, cupboards, and fitted bath, spaced not more than ten or twelve to the acre, and provided with a garden. National provision for the prevention and treatment of disease, and the care of orphans, infirm, incapacitated, and aged persons is also included as an indispensable part of Labour's policy.

In regard to agriculture and rural life, the Party has formulated a number of proposals based on the Government's immediately assuming control of the nation's agricultural land, and

'ensuring its utilisation, not for rent, nor for game, nor for the social amenity of a small social class, not even for obtaining the largest percentage on the capital employed, but solely with a view to the production of the largest proportion of the food-stuffs required by the population of these islands under conditions allowing of a good life to the rural population with complete security for the farmers' enterprise, yet not requiring the consumer to pay a price exceeding that for which food-stuffs can be brought from other lands.'

The means proposed to attain this end are large national farms, small holdings made accessible to practical agriculturists, municipal agricultural enterprises, and farms let to co-operative societies and other approved tenants, under a national guarantee against losses due to bad seasons. All distribution of agricultural food-stuffs from milk and vegetables up to bread and meat is to be taken out of the hands of dealers and shopkeepers, and to be effected by co-operative societies and local authorities 'with equitable compensation for all interests expropriated or displaced.'

The Labour Party also advocates Government importation of raw materials and food commodities, and Government control of the shipping, woollen, clothing, milling, and other similar industries; the rationing both of raw material and of food commodities, and the fixing of all prices on the basis of accurate costing, so as to eliminate profiteering. It is, the Labour Party says,

‘just as much the function of Government, and just as necessary a part of the democratic regulation of industry to safeguard the interests of the community as a whole and those of grades and classes of private consumers in the matter of prices, as it is by the Factory and Trade Boards Acts to protect the rights of the wage-earning producers in the matter of wages, hours of labour and sanitation, or by the organised police force to protect the householder from the burglar.’

A complete revolution in National Finance is overdue, in the opinion of the Labour Party. Too long, it says, has our national finance been regulated on a basis opposed to the teaching of political economy, according to the views of the possessing classes and the desire for profits of the financiers. There ought to be such a system of taxation ‘as will secure all the necessary revenue to the Government without encroaching on the prescribed national minimum standard of life of any family, without hampering production or discouraging any useful personal effort and with the closest possible approximation to equality of sacrifice.’ The Labour Party accordingly would institute direct taxation of all incomes exceeding the necessary cost of family maintenance; and the direct taxation of private fortunes both during life and at death for the redemption of the National Debt. It opposes taxation calculated to increase the price of food or necessities of life, and holds that indirect taxation of commodities, whether by customs or excise, should be limited to luxuries. It would retain and increase the excess-profits tax, and, until nationalisation of minerals, the mineral-rights duty. The unearned increment of urban and mineral land values it would divert by taxation wholly into the public exchequer. Death duties would be regraduated and heavily increased, so as to turn into the national coffers all the wealth of every person deceased in excess of a quite moderate

amount to be left for family provision. In addition, the Labour Party stands for 'conscription of wealth,' described as 'a capital levy chargeable, like death duties, on all property with exemption of the smallest savings up to 1000*l.*, but rising rapidly in percentage with the value of the property, for the purpose of freeing the nation of as large an amount as possible of its present load of interest-bearing debt.' Co-operative Societies would be left entirely free from this levy and also from 'the most unfair exaction from them' of the excess-profits tax.

The fourth principle of the Labour Party's policy of social reconstruction is 'the diversion of the surplus over the expenditure required for the maintenance of the national minimum of life to the common good.' This surplus is said to be embodied in the riches of the mines, the rental value of lands superior to the margin of cultivation, the extra profits of fortunate capitalists, now alleged to be absorbed by individual proprietors, and devoted to the senseless luxury of the idle rich. This surplus is to be secured by nationalisation and municipalisation and by steeply graduated taxation of private income and riches. From this surplus is to be drawn the new capital which the community day by day will require for the perpetual improvement and increase of its various enterprises and for which it is said to be dependent now on the usury-exacting financier.

'It is in this proposal for the appropriation of every surplus for the common good, in the vision of its resolute use for the building-up of the community as a whole, instead of for the magnification of individual fortunes, that the Labour Party, as the party of the producers by hand or by brain, most distinctively marks itself off from the older political parties, standing as these do essentially for the maintenance unimpaired of the perpetual private mortgage upon the annual product of the nation that is involved in the individual ownership of land and capital.'

From Labour's home policy we turn to foreign affairs. Its international aims are 'peace and co-operation between nations; the avoidance of anything making for international hostility; the development of international co-operation in the League of Nations,' and 'an ever-increasing intercourse, a constantly developing exchange

of commodities, a steadily growing mutual understanding, a continually expanding friendly co-operation among all the peoples of the world.' 'Imperialism,' defined to mean extension of empire over countries without reference to the wishes of the inhabitants of those countries, is repudiated as rooted in capitalism and springing only from a desire for profits and for selfish exploitation of the natural resources belonging solely to those inhabitants. 'Protectionism' in any form, whether by prohibitions on imports, embargoes, tariffs, differential shipping or railway rates, for the purpose of limiting the amount, or restricting the free flow, of foreign commodities into this country is unreservedly condemned. Protection for the benefit of a particular trade, or all trades, while it may conduce to the advantage of labour, is presumed to operate to the greater advantage of the capitalist, and to strengthen his position. Anything tending to such a result is 'contrary to the interests of Labour.' Protection is said to lead to capitalistic rings, combinations, and trusts, higher prices, diminished consumption, reduced employment. This being so, Labour favours the free importation of all foreign goods, and their sale at rates as low as are consistent with their manufacture under unsweated labour conditions in their land of origin.

All tariffs, especially if differential, must, so Labour contends, inevitably create international friction, retaliation, enmity, and ultimately active hostilities, and are to be more especially discarded inasmuch as they are the favourite instrument of capitalist groups out to make profits from international ruptures.

Labour accordingly objects to the protection of key industries for purposes of national safety. It is impossible, according to it, to make either the British Empire or the British Isles self-contained or self-supporting; even if practicable, the policy of self-sufficiency would indicate a provocative intention to maintain a national condition of perpetual preparation for war. Therefore, except so far as is necessary to avoid the spread of disease or prevention of accidents, there must be no restriction on the transit or importation of any commodity. Imperial Preference is likewise rejected as a selfish attempt to reserve for the inhabitants of the

British Empire the raw materials and markets of the Empire, a course incompatible with any kind of lasting peace, having regard to the resentment it would provoke amongst the nations excluded from participating in these raw materials or from supplying these markets. Labour calls for 'the open door' in all our Colonies and Dependencies and in 'non-adult countries,' meaning by this term 'exploitable countries' like China and Africa. The position of the capitalist has been so undermined by Labour's attack at home that capital, in Labour's opinion, is now making its real profits and consolidating its power by expropriating natives, and compelling them to work for low wages.

In order to free Europe from 'the rivalries of Capitalism—Imperialism—Protectionism which poisoned international relations between 1880–1914,' Labour desires to see an economic side of the League of Nations developed so as to secure the removal of all economic barriers and to maintain equality of trade conditions. The World Economic Council of the League ought to apportion the supplies of food commodities and raw materials and maintain credit in the various countries so as to ensure fair allocation of raw materials, the furtherance of production, the development of international lines of communication, and the prevention of exploitation by trusts. As an alternative to 'the present profit-making capitalistic economic system,' Labour proposes, for purposes of international trade, an organisation of the different co-operative movements on a world-wide basis. So long as foreign trade remains under the control of the competitive and capitalistic system, Labour asserts that its general international aims can never be attained.

The connexion between the Labour Movement and Socialism is important. Since this article was originally written, the second volume of Mr Beer's 'History of British Socialism' has appeared, where the question is most lucidly and exhaustively treated. The Socialist policy of the Labour Party speaks for itself. There are, as previously explained, certain Socialist Societies affiliated to the Labour Party; others are unofficially recognised, and there are yet others not officially or

unofficially recognised, which comprise numerous persons who through their trade union or local organisations, or individually, are members of the Labour Party. These advocate brands of Socialism ranging from Collectivist Socialism to Revolutionary Syndicalism.

The Democratic Federation, founded in 1881 by Mr H. M. Hyndman, mainly as a federation of Radical clubs, with a veiled Socialist programme embracing land nationalisation, was the first attempt at a political Socialist organisation. In 1889 it became the Social Democratic Federation, avowedly Socialistic. Late in 1884, it split into the Socialist League, under Mr William Morris, pledged to a revolutionary, anti-parliamentary programme; and the Social Democratic Federation, led by Mr Hyndman. But, captured by anarchists, the Socialist League broke up, many of its leaders rejoining the Social Democratic Federation. The Federation was affiliated to the Labour Representation Committee on the formation of the latter in 1900, but soon withdrew, and in 1908 called itself the Social Democratic Party. It amalgamated in 1911 with a number of local Socialist bodies and changed its name to the British Socialist Party; in 1916 it was affiliated with the Labour Party. Later in 1916, it declared against the war and pursued a disloyal policy. This attitude, mainly exhibited through its weekly newspaper, 'The Call,' led to considerable secessions from the British Socialist Party and to the foundation by Mr H. M. Hyndman of the National Socialist Party with its weekly newspaper, 'Justice,' which, while advocating the establishment of a Socialist Commonwealth on a democratic basis, actively supported the war. On July 31, 1920, the British Socialist Party merged its identity in the new National Communist Party, pledged to establish Sovietism and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and to seek affiliation with the Labour Party.

The well-known Fabian Society was founded in January 1884, and has been affiliated to the Labour Party from its inception. It aims at reorganising society by emancipating land and industrial capital from individual or class ownership and vesting them in the State. It advocates the transfer to the community of the administration of such industrial capital as can conveniently be

managed socially, and by this transfer without compensation, 'though not without such relief to expropriated individuals as may seem fit to the community,' rent and interest will be added to the reward of labour, and the idle class now living on the labour of others will necessarily disappear. The Society specially tries to influence local authorities so as to impart a socialistic tendency to their administration. The Fabian Research Department has conducted many valuable investigations into industrial questions; since October 1918, it has been known as the Labour Research Department under half-control by labour; affiliation with it is open to Trade Unions, Socialist Societies, Co-operative Organisations, Trades Councils, Labour parties, and private individuals. Its object is to co-operate with the Labour Socialist and Co-operative Movements in supplying information upon all questions relating to labour, and it does so most efficiently.

In 1893, the Independent Labour Party was formed. It owes its origin, as has been stated, to the energy of Mr Keir Hardie. The 'I.L.P.' was established 'to secure the collective ownership of all the means of production, distribution, and exchange,' and 'independent Labour representation on all legislative governing and administrative bodies.' Its constitution states

'that the object of the Party is to establish the Socialist State, when land and capital will be held by the community and used for the well-being of the community and when the exchange of commodities will be organised also by the community, so as to secure the highest possible standard of life for the individual. In giving effect to this object, it will work as part of the International Socialist Movement.'

The I.L.P. and its weekly paper 'The Labour Leader' took up a persistently pacifist attitude throughout the war, especially in regard to compulsory military service. It is represented by five members in the present House of Commons.

In 1903, the Socialist Labour Party was established in Glasgow by secessionists from the Social Democratic Federation, on the lines of the revolutionary American Socialist Party led by Daniel de Leon. It is in close affiliation with the *Industrial* Independent Workers of the World,

and actively agitates to further the syndicalist conception of industrial Unionism. All candidates for membership must subscribe to 'class-war'; no Trade Union official is eligible. The Party propagates revolutionary political action, and also revolutionary industrial action of the extreme Syndicalist type. The Party has between thirty and forty branches throughout the country, owns the Socialist Labour Press, and publishes a monthly paper called 'The Socialist.' Although the majority of its members are Trade Unionists, the party refuses to affiliate with the Labour Party. Throughout the recent conflict it carried out an implacable campaign against the war, and impeded in every way possible its successful prosecution.

In 1905, other extreme Socialists broke away from the Social Democratic Federation and formed the Socialist Party of Great Britain. Its declared object is to wage war against all other political parties, either Labour or Capitalist. It advocates the institution of the most extreme Marxian regime, by means of such revolutionary political action as will secure the 'capture' of all the machinery of government whether national or local. It publishes monthly the 'Socialist Standard,' and is not affiliated to the Labour Party, though it comprises many Trade Unionists.

In 1915, the National Guilds League was founded. According to its 'intellectual' conception of industrial organisation, the State is to acquire all means of production for a nominal payment; and the wage system is to be abolished by the State handing over the management of each industry to a guild embracing all workers in the industry, manual, clerical, technical, administrative. The State would control prices, and raise the national revenue by taxing the guilds. There are two schools of thought, one which hopes to secure National Guildism by evolving industrial unionism out of craft-unionism coupled with the Unions securing an ever-increasing control over industry; the other by militant or revolutionary tactics. The National Guilds League has twelve branches throughout the country.

One may now make some broad criticisms upon the principles and policy of the Labour Party. Whatever

may be thought of the reasonableness, practicability, or expediency of the methods proposed to achieve its ends, its policy is undoubtedly distinguished by high idealism, a wide humanitarian outlook, sincere conviction, and a genuine desire to improve the welfare of the community. In its effect upon the nation as a whole, the dominating characteristic is the Party's unlimited commitment to Socialism. As to what Socialism means or involves, few sections of Labour agree; most, however, regard it as a regime designed to alleviate, and capable of alleviating, almost automatically, all ills under which society or industry labours.

On the measures by which industry and society are to be remodelled, many divergent views prevail within the Party. There is, however, this much in common: each and all imply the elimination of the private capitalist. In this process of evacuating the capitalist, moderate labour is inclined to feel its way, and root him pacifically first out of important national industries, so as to gain experience. The extremists would straightway lay the savage Syndicalist axe to the capitalistic root of every industry. And in regard to the means to be adopted for getting rid of the capitalist, there is similarly strong diversity of opinion. Moderate Labour would have the State compulsorily acquire the means of production and institute State or Municipal distribution of the product; but, while some sections are willing to compensate the capitalist, by making over to him such a sum of State stock as would bring him in the same average maintainable income, others, while allowing such compensation at first, would subsequently mulct the compensatee by taxation on unearned income and death duties so as to recover for the State all or the greater part of the compensation so paid. Other sections, again, contend that the capitalist should not on principle be indemnified but merely paid *ex gratia* a nominal sum, e.g. three years' purchase only of his income; while the more extreme members say the capitalist should receive no compensation at all.

Having acquired the means of production, what is the State to do with them? Again there is a medley of conflicting proposals. The old State Socialist would have the State step into the shoes of the private employer.

That does not, however, confer what many sections of Labour call for—'the democratic control of industry.' Accordingly, some sections advocate the management of an industry by means of a conglomerate council, on which the workmen are to have either a preponderating or a one-half representation, the balance being shared between the Government Department responsible for the industry and the consuming public. Other sections advocate the management of each industry by a guild of all the workers engaged in it, manual, clerical, technical, supervisory, administrative, the Government regulating the prices for the product; but the most advanced left wing of Labour insist upon each industry being managed wholly by and wholly for the benefit of the manual workers. While moderate Labour desires the State to take the initiative in nationalising industry, advanced and extreme Labour has no wish for State intervention. The former counts on things becoming so difficult for the private employer by Labour's continual acquisition of increased powers of control, and by increased friction, that the capitalist will retire from business in despair; the latter hopes to secure 'the communisation of industry,' which, in their view, means its appropriation by the manual worker, through the Marxian 'class-war' and the 'social revolution' to be precipitated by the general strike. This much is certainly clear: the Labour Party has not yet, except perhaps in regard to the coal industry, reduced its general principles to any definite concrete scheme. It has officially adopted the ambiguous formula of 'nationalisation and democratic control.' One of Labour's devices is ever to secure temporary solidarity by elastic and vague general principles.

Amid such a conflict of adverse and, in many cases, mutually destructive views, a Labour Government in power would be blown hither and thither by every momentarily prevalent breeze of doctrine. Stable industrial administration there could not be. This is a fair view, if one considers the extreme difficulty, in some cases the complete inability, of the Trade Unions to keep industrial discipline within their own ranks. Time after time is the spectacle seen of the rank and file throwing over their leaders, and of leaders following in the rear. Where a Government would be, as is inevitable with

a Labour Government, so largely under the economic power of organised Trade Unions, it must be obvious that the latter could call the tune.

The second broad and common-sense criticism upon Labour's home policy is that an immense official programme for the amelioration of society and industry has been launched without any serious attempt to count or meet the cost. Many reforms are admittedly overdue; their successful inception will need far-sighted statesmanship, if a crushing burden of expense is not to be placed on industry, society, or the nation. Yet without any vindication of practicability, the Labour Party asserts that the whole of its social programme can be financed out of the 'surplus,' that is, what remains over after every member of the community is provided with an income sufficient for a full standard of life. There is no real insistence on the vital urgency of production. Surely the practical thing is to repair the collier's cottage before constructing a 'chateau en Espagne' for his delectation.

In regard to the Labour Party's foreign policy, two main criticisms at once arise on what is said, as compared with what is not said. The first is that, without disparaging the value to civilisation of the League of Nations, it surely savours of undue credulity to hazard, as the Labour Party would do, our national safety and defence upon its efficacy. Under its programme we are to look to the League for safety against the aggressor, and only when that fails take voluntary steps to repel attacks. The second criticism is, that Labour sets up an ideal of an international confederation of labour—'the International' in the vernacular—and frames its foreign policy on the theory that whatever is most conducive to the agglutination of that assemblage of strangely assorted and, in many cases, mutually hostile ingredients, must therefore be in the interests of British labour and, *a fortiori*, of the British nation. If any of the statements of foreign policy published under the auspices of the Labour Party are examined, that is the major premiss of every argument. That the sectional interests of Labour are neither nationally nor internationally coincident with the general interests of a country or the

combined interests of all countries is too obvious to stand in need of refutation. Is the welfare of Britain synonymous with the interests of Soviet Russia?

The first 'International,' founded in 1862, came to an untimely end immediately after the Franco-German war of 1870. A second was founded in 1882; it became Germanised and was suspended by the Great War of 1914. The Labour Party is now trying to revive it. The Labour Party's preamble to the draft constitution states that the object is:

'The political and economic organisation of the working classes for the purpose of abolishing the capitalistic form of society, and achieving complete freedom for humanity through the conquest of political power and the socialisation of the means of production and exchange, that is to say, the transformation of capitalistic society into a collectivist or communist society.'

Lenin proposes yet another 'International,' the qualification for membership being belief in Soviets, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the arming of the proletariat for the forcible expropriation of the bourgeoisie.

How comes it then that Labour is making such headway in the constituencies? It is due largely to the humanistic ideals which underlie its social policy. It would be too much to say that the Labour Party was first in the field in urging these ideals on Parliament, or that social reform was left on the shelf till Labour representatives took it up. The whole series of Factory Acts, the Education Act of 1870, and many other measures designed to ameliorate the conditions of manual labour, are sufficient evidence to the contrary. But it is probably true to say that in quite recent years, owing to a variety of causes, social reform somewhat retreated into the background; and that the Labour Party, since it became effective in the House, has taken the leading part in bringing such questions into prominence. Another factor has contributed to Labour's recent political successes. The Coalition Government promised large measures of social reform, and has had to lay its foundation first and deal with fundamentals; while obviously progress would be slow, many fantastic promises were unfortunately made by enthusiastic but

irresponsible Coalitionists at the last election. As a consequence, the Labour Party has been able to compare wild promises with sober performance, and has not hesitated to say that the disparity measured the Government's betrayal of the confidence reposed in it by the electors. High prices and profiteering, which the Labour Party said they easily could, while the Government would not, put an end to, have also assisted Labour at bye-elections. But where, at bye-elections, the Labour Party has been definitely pinned down to its Socialistic programme, it has not gone ahead.

While I suggest that, were a Labour Government in power, the extreme sections of Labour would govern their leaders, I am far from suggesting that Labour has no leaders fit to govern. It possesses outstanding men of tried experience, ability, and judgment, and others, untried as yet, but of equal capacity and ability. I had the good fortune during the war of serving at different times directly under the Right Hon. Arthur Henderson, the Right Hon. G. N. Barnes, the Right Hon. John Hodge, and the Right Hon. G. H. Roberts. I had also the opportunity of comparing their ministerial gifts with those of other Cabinet Ministers and Ministers of State. The Labour Ministers do not suffer from the comparison; their respective records are unsurpassed for foresight, decision, balance of judgment, statesmanship, organising and administrative ability, power of evoking the loyalty of their Departments and commanding the confidence of the public. The weakness of a Labour Government will assuredly not lie in the personnel of its Ministers—if they lead.

When fully developed, the Labour Party's local machinery will be the most powerful party organisation in the country. There is no space at the moment in which to describe it. But notwithstanding that, I believe that Labour will not come into office, or, if it does succeed in climbing into power, will not be able to form a stable administration unless it makes up its mind to do certain things. First to eschew its present ideal of hybrid Syndicalism and Collectivist Socialism, which is alienating its best friends. The country distrusts it and will never vote for it. No more will the ordinary British working man; the choice for the Labour Party

is undoubtedly between it and the fruits of office. To jettison this mongrel conception involves in no way the abandonment of a sane, solvent, and humanitarian industrial and social policy.

Secondly, the Labour Party will have to dissolve the Council of Action and excommunicate inexorably its extremists. What it would lose in industrial strength it would gain in public support. The pruning process involves conjoint action by each individual Trade Union, and, where the latter is recalcitrant, by the Trade Union Congress, and also by the Labour Party. Not merely is the Labour Party's accession to power hindered by official adherence to the policy of direct action, but the whole existing organisation of Trade Unionism is threatened. Labour thinks that these revolutionaries, with their threats of direct action, help to haul the coach along the rough road of opposition, and that a sense of responsibility will supervene when Labour has come into power. But those who thus extenuate this anti-social policy have no conception of the extent to which support is being withdrawn from the Labour Party because of this 'insurrectionism' and the Party's complacency towards the attacks, whether covert or open, upon the Constitution. Quite recently, indeed, Mr J. H. Thomas acknowledged that the threat of a general strike to influence the policy of the Government towards Russia was both unconstitutional and dangerous, but declared it to be necessary. It is the old plea, Necessity knows no law. If organised Labour may thus override the will of the nation expressed in Parliament, what is to prevent any other organised body—say, the army—from seizing power?

Thirdly, Labour must purge itself of that insensate jealousy of its own leaders which in the Labour Movement more than in any other movement, social or political, seems to fetter the leadership of the most prominent members. No Labour administration of a solid kind is practicable if accredited Labour Ministers are always to be liable to intriguing envy within their own party.

LYNDEN MACASSEY.

Art. 7.—GERMAN PUBLICATIONS ON THE POLITICAL
CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

1. (a) *Stenographische Bericht über die öffentlichen Verhandlungen des Untersuchungsausschusses.* (b) *Beilagen: Aktenstücke zur Friedensaktion Wilsons*, 1916, 1917. Berlin: Norddeutsche Buchdruckerei, 1920.
 2. *Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege.* Von Th. von Bethmann-Hollweg. Two vols. Berlin: Hobbing, 1919.
 3. *Vom Kriegausbruch bis zum uneingeschränkten U-Bootkrieg.* Von Karl Helfferich. Berlin: Ullstein, 1919.
 4. *My Memoirs.* By Grand-Admiral Von Tirpitz. Two vols. Hurst & Blackett, 1920.
 5. *My Three Years in America.* By Count Bernstorff. Skeffington, 1920.
 6. *In the World War.* By Count Ottokar Czernin. Cassell, 1919.
 7. *Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges.* Von G. von Jagow. Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1919.
- And other works.

PREVIOUS articles in this Review have briefly examined some of the most important works which have appeared in Germany on the military conduct of the war. We propose now to supplement these by some comment on the political and diplomatic disclosures of which we have had so many. As the list of books at the head of this article will show, the material already available is very large; and on the present occasion all that we can do is to indicate the chief points of interest, the more thorough investigation of which will occupy historians for many years.

It is a sign of the new world in which we live that we have not had to wait, as has previously been the case, for at least a generation until the secrets of the war are disclosed. It has indeed always been characteristic of Germany that things cannot be kept secret. German statesmen and officials have never shown that appreciation of the deeper requirements of loyalty which, at any rate in the past, was so characteristic of English public life; they have always hastened to inform the world of what they themselves have done, and have never scrupled to attempt to clear themselves of charges publicly made

against them, even at the cost of the welfare of their own country. In this Bismarck set a very bad example. As his whole treatment of the press did more than anything else to demoralise Germany, so also, both before and after his retirement, he never had any hesitation in taking the world into his confidence when by so doing he thought he could justify his own actions; and, when this was at stake, he seems to have cared little for the larger interests of Germany. Prince Bülow's well-known volume on German Policy is another illustration of this characteristic. Bülow was too anxious to show the world how astute and clever a statesman he had been; and so he divulged the 'Arcana Imperii.' The note of personal vanity is apparent in all he said and did; and personal vanity is the most dangerous quality that a statesman can possess. To do the best one can in a difficult position, to accept in silence the rebuffs and injustices which must befall every man who holds high office, whether under a monarchy or a democracy, and to leave one's reputation for future generations to discuss—this is the highest test of the moral qualities of the statesman, and it is one in which the Germans, with one conspicuous exception—Caprivi—have failed.

Quite apart from this, however, it was inevitable that the Revolution should throw open all the most secret records. One of the first acts of the new Government was to appoint a Commission to inquire not only into the origins but also into the conduct of the war; and it is owing to their work that we have had what is apparently a complete record, for instance, of the interchange of telegrams with America with regard to the very difficult questions which arose about both submarine warfare and peace offers. In addition to these official documents we have also the evidence, given before the Commission, of those who took a chief part in the negotiations. Side by side with this official material there are the Memoirs issued by most of the men who held important posts. These vary much in value. Herr von Jagow confines himself to the origins of the war; and he, as well as Bethmann-Hollweg, tell us little that was not already known. Far more valuable are the books of those who, while closely connected with affairs,

were not themselves immediately responsible for the conduct of foreign policy, and therefore, as must inevitably result, were pressing upon the Chancellor their own points of view. Of these, two deserve special attention, namely, the Memoirs of Herr Helfferich and Admiral Tirpitz, which supplement one another just because their authors were most opposed to one another. They are supplemented by the works which come, on the one side, from the military chiefs, on the other side from Austria. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, though primarily concerned with the military conduct of the war, came more and more, as years went on, into a position of the highest political importance; while the Austrian revelations, and especially those of Count Czernin, give us a valuable criticism of German conditions from well-informed external points of view.

To all who are interested in political affairs a study of Germany during the war will always remain profoundly instructive; and we believe that the final verdict will be that we find here displayed in the clearest manner the procedure to be followed in order to lose a war. We have during the war precisely the same characteristic which we find in the preceding period—a curious blend of weakness and violence, indecision and recklessness. It is becoming more and more apparent that Germany plunged deliberately into the great field of what the Germans call *Weltpolitik* without any conception of the qualities which were necessary to secure success. She had wide and vague ambitions with no clearly thought-out plan for securing them; opposing parties, each maintaining that their plan was the only one by which success could be obtained, and each of them, with a grave disregard of the precepts of loyalty to their own Government, using every method of public agitation to secure the suffrages of the nation; and, at the top, a Chancellor and an Emperor quite incapable of controlling their own subordinates. The two high officials, different in everything else, had this in common, that they never could make up their mind precisely what they wanted.

The Emperor, sympathising now with one, now with the other of the extreme parties, reminds us of his uncle, Frederick William IV, of whom, during the crisis of the

Crimean War, Bismarck said, 'He goes to bed a Russian and he gets up an Englishman.' William II wanted to do everything at once; the Chancellor wanted to do nothing; and they had to choose between the several lines of conduct suggested to them. First and foremost among their advisers we have the military chiefs, whose gaze was inevitably concentrated upon the war on land, who saw nothing but the armies, and whose duty rightly was to win battles. But these were nearly all old or middle-aged men; and they had been brought up in the ideas of the time when the interests of Germany were limited to the Continent of Europe. War with England, the relations with America, even the problems of the East, had never been fully thought out by them, and they never learned to understand them. On the other side, we have the new school, represented above all by Tirpitz. His book is of profound and lasting interest. He was above all a confirmed advocate of the new naval policy; he regarded the navy as the instrument which was to educate the Germans to take their place among the great nations of the world, and looked to the time when it would be the bond between the Germans at home and the Germans overseas. He had himself travelled in many lands; from his earliest years he had been a constant observer of the British fleet; he had visited the Far East; and, though he did not know the United States well himself, he had devoted much thought and study to American problems. Thirdly, we have—represented especially by Helfferich—a group of men who, chiefly occupied with the internal problems of finance, commerce, production, and feeding of the people, learned at first-hand to appreciate at their full value the dangers which would arise from a conflict with Great Britain.

Each of these groups had its own conception of the general principles in accordance with which the war should be carried on. Throughout the war, as before it, the main subject of controversy was whether the chief efforts of Germany should be directed against Russia or against England; and it was this which above all affected the diplomacy of the war. Helfferich, who in this was supported by the Chancellor, was always searching for some means to mitigate the extreme animosity felt in Germany against Great Britain. In a

document quoted by Tirpitz (II, 303), after referring to England's longing to crush Germany, Helfferich says:

'It is in this abyss of mutual mistrust, which an unscrupulous demagogy has stirred up and which the Governments have not been able to check, but which has no foundation in the actual political conditions, i.e. in the conditions of the existence of both countries, that the tragedy of the situation lies. It is only the higher wisdom of the statesman, combined with a will capable of controlling everything and equally strong on both sides, that can drag the chariot which has lost its way out of this swamp of demagogy. This hope is not so vain as it might appear to be; the demagogic Ministry of Asquith will not last for ever. The wish of the English to destroy us may to some extent exclude the possibility of an understanding; it does not in any way force us to take up the conflict where they are possibly superior in strength to us, that is on sea and in Egypt.'

What in fact Helfferich and his party wished was, while of course using every effort to crush the British army on land, to avoid measures which would convince England that the very safety and existence of the Empire was at stake, and so always to keep open the possibility of a reconciliation with England. In this aim they had an ally in the Chancellor. In August 1914 he said to Tirpitz: 'The war with England is merely a thunderstorm which will soon pass over. Afterwards the relationship will be better than ever.' On the other hand, Tirpitz, both before and after the war, looked on England as the one enemy. He says (II, 292):

'Who was our chief opponent? For me it was undoubtedly that country which had the greatest resources and the most intense will to war. The political brain of the Entente had always been London. It constantly became stronger even as the military brain. In accordance with this we must regard all victories over Russia as partial victories which should serve to free our strength against the chief enemy by opening the way to a speedy separate peace with the Tsar.'

Here then we get the fundamental antithesis. Germany was not strong enough to carry on the war to complete victory against her combined enemies; her object therefore must be to concentrate her efforts against one and use every means to detach the other.

Tirpitz always kept his eye on Russia, and would have used every effort to bring about a separate understanding with her, while, in the conduct of the operations, he would have sacrificed everything to crushing England. This he would have done by establishing a much closer *liaison* between the army and the navy; he would have used the navy to support the efforts of the army, and taught the Germans to learn from England how to use the two arms of the service under one common control. The specific object which he set before him was to seize the Channel ports, and then, having obtained control over the coast-line opposite England, to throw the navy into the war with greater energy than was in fact ever done. He was naturally, from the beginning, an advocate of the most ruthless use of the submarine; and to carry out this purpose he would have fought Russia with his left hand. As he says, the whole war with Russia merely resulted in using up the German army, which might have been employed upon the western front; and in his view it was apparently indifferent to the English whether the Germans won victories or not upon the eastern front. To them every man used in Poland or East Prussia or Galicia was a man drawn off from the chief conflict—that against England. He complains that in this attempt to establish what he calls a great political object, on which all the military and political resources might have concentrated, he found no support in the army leaders. ‘After the battle of the Marne (he says) our army had to learn new lessons. In the Supreme Command at that time we find no search after great final objects.’

Now the Tirpitz policy—the building of a German fleet—was sure to bring with it unfriendly relations towards England. If it was to be adopted, then there must come as a corollary the establishment of friendship with Russia. The simplest considerations of common sense required this. What the Germans did was to embark on their naval policy, and to build a fleet avowedly against this country, shouting to the world all the time to pay attention to what they were doing; while at the same time, by their alliance with Austria, they found themselves inevitably driven into hostile relations with Russia. This is the situation out of which

the war arose; and the same contradiction was evident throughout the war itself. German public opinion has been taught to regard Russia as mostly responsible for the war. Even if this were the case, it would be no excuse for the German diplomacy; for, if they were to carry out their naval policy, everything else ought to have been sacrificed in order to avoid the Russian danger. There is one great rule in these matters: limit your objects at each moment to what can practicably be obtained; do not dissipate your strength; if the pursuit of an object of great importance necessarily leads to antagonism with another nation, do not make additional enmities at the same time. This principle has been generally adopted by England throughout the whole of her history; this was the source of Bismarck's success. Both had patience, both knew that you could not do everything at once; but this principle was consistently violated by the Emperor and by Bülow.

Tirpitz (I, 173) considers that war with Russia could have been avoided, and also that a separate peace with Russia could have been arranged:

'Nicholas II, who, in one of the last conversations which I had with him, said, "I give you my assurance that I will never make war against Germany," in 1914 did not want war with us. I will not discuss how far, by a cleverer handling of the Tsar and the Serbian question in July 1914, we might have checked the interest of those parties in Petersburg which were pressing for war. The war with Russia was the cardinal failure of our policy. A quick conclusion of peace with the Tsar was the unconditional object of a policy which aimed at victory. This peace was undeniably made more difficult by the accession of Turkey to our side and by not carrying out Hindenburg's plan of campaign for 1915. Nevertheless, an acceptable peace could have been concluded in 1916, when the Tsar, who felt his throne shaking, nominated Stürmer with the object of making peace with us.

'It is characteristic of the efforts of Bethmann-Hollweg to attribute his political blunders to the military departments, that the blame for the most incredible of these blunders, the Poland proclamation of November 1916, has so far as possible been transferred from the Wilhelmstrasse to Ludendorff. . . . Bethmann himself, even before the Poland proclamation, could not have got a separate peace with Russia, for Russia would have believed that he would still sell her to the

English. It was a catastrophe that the Emperor did not find the strength in 1916 to complete a change of front in our policy, and did not, with this object in view, bring about a change in the person of the Chancellor.'

A close study of Tirpitz's book will, however, make the reader very sceptical as to his wisdom as a political adviser. On one essential matter he shows an extraordinary power of self-deception and misapprehension. It closely concerned himself and his reputation that there should not be affixed to his naval policy the responsibility of having brought about the war. He tries therefore (I, 199) to show that the building of the German fleet did not increase but rather diminished the danger of war with Great Britain:

'The building of the German fleet improved from year to year the conditions for a German-British understanding, inasmuch as it kept in check the definite desire for war in England and gave the upper hand to the more moderate politicians. . . . As a result of the fleet, the fundamental differences between Germany and England, while they were not altered, became less dangerous.'

He seems in fact to think that the successful building of the fleet really intimidated this country, and made it reluctant to go to war with Germany because the German fleet had reached such a size that it could no longer be ignored. Could we have any more flagrant illustration of political incompetence? Any one with the slightest insight into the considerations by which we are governed must know that precisely the opposite is true. It was the building of the German fleet which more than anything else awoke, not a particular school of politicians, but the whole country, to a recognition that Germany might become a real danger. It was this which made the whole nation recognise that the maintenance of the Entente with France was essential, and reconciled them even to the Entente with Russia. It was this that produced the situation out of which the war arose, a situation in which every one could see that the result of a weakening of the Entente would be to leave Germany predominant on the Continent; and the Germans themselves had spared no trouble to tell us that they would use every increase in strength which

came to them to strengthen their naval position and use it as a challenge to this country.

Tirpitz seems to have been misled by the endeavours of this country to come to some understanding with Germany. He appears to suppose that these endeavours were the result of fear, of fear caused by the fleet which he had built. He cannot see that the real cause of these endeavours was the general recognition of the profound seriousness of the situation. So long as no definite challenge to this country came from Germany, no one really anticipated a war. There might quite easily be, as there often were, periods of comparative estrangement; there might be friction on individual matters such as the colonies. But misunderstandings of this kind are the commonplace of international relations; very tiresome for the moment, they do no serious harm. It was the building of the German fleet which completely changed the situation. People in England, not the leaders alone, but the whole nation, gradually recognised that Germany was becoming really dangerous. For this reason they insisted on the maintenance of the Entente, but at the same time, just because the situation was becoming dangerous, they used every effort to discover some way of preserving peace.

So much for the origins of the war. It was in the winter of 1916-17 that the importance of diplomacy began to equal that of the fighting. We get the two great episodes of the German peace offer followed by President Wilson's Peace Note, and, side by side with them, the discussions about the opening of unrestricted submarine warfare. The discussions on the two matters were closely interwoven. Both moves had the same origin, and both brought the United States into the front of the picture. They had the same origin, for it is quite clear that they sprang from the despondency of the German General Staff. So early as January 1916, we find Falkenhayn saying that he could not bring the war to an end by military action of the land armies; and again, in March, that the war must be finished before the winter of 1916-17, because of the diminished power of resistance, not only of Germany itself but still more of its Allies. The successes which might be

anticipated in the land spheres of operations would not be sufficient. The summer of 1916 had seen the attack on Verdun and the Somme offensive. The first was in fact a disastrous failure; by it a large part of the German field army and reserves was destroyed; and, undertaken when it was, it frustrated the plans which Hindenburg and Ludendorff were preparing on the eastern front, and also the separate schemes for delivering a decisive blow at Italy. In fact, the Central Powers were not strong enough to carry through to an end the many different campaigns in which they were engaged; they concentrated their efforts on one and failed. It is characteristic of the relations between Germany and her Allies that the Verdun offensive, which was prepared in the greatest secrecy, was adopted without the Austrians being consulted.

The Somme offensive had been withstood, but it had inflicted enormous losses upon the Germans, and they were clearly very apprehensive as to the effect of a new attack in the following year.

'The losses (says Helfferich) on both sides had been enormous. Our Army Command tried to console themselves and others by saying that the French losses were considerably greater than ours, indeed that the bleeding to death of the French in the pit of Verdun was more important than the possession of the fortress itself. Nobody was really consoled by this.'

They dreaded asking the German soldiers to meet a renewed attack the next summer unless at any rate something was done to raise their spirits. In an important meeting which took place at Pless in January 1917, Hindenburg and Ludendorff pressed in the most urgent manner that the land army, which was exposed on all fronts to bitter conflicts, should be morally and materially supported by unlimited submarine war. In the West a new offensive of the French, English, and Belgians must be anticipated, which in its violence would surpass even the Somme offensive. Every possibility of limiting the enemy's resources in material and men must be used. There was no time to lose. If unlimited submarine warfare were not opened before Feb. 1, they (the two Generals) could not undertake the responsibility

for conducting the military operations. On the other hand, they were ready to support the responsibility for all the military consequences of unlimited submarine war, even if it resulted in intervention of the European neutrals and America. In fact, they attached very little importance to the coming-in of the United States.

This language, which was very similar to that used by Ludendorff when, in the autumn of 1918, he pressed for an immediate armistice, is characteristic of Ludendorff's attitude throughout the war. On the one hand, he publicly encouraged the nation to believe that they could win a victory by their own military superiority, and thereby raised their confidence to a dangerous point. On the other hand, he was always coming to the Government and demanding the immediate adoption of measures which were politically most dangerous, on the ground that, if there was any delay, a military disaster might follow. Characteristic also is the attitude towards America. These men knew nothing of the United States; they saw only what was immediately before their eyes. They knew only that the States had no great standing army, and, with misplaced confidence, they treated the danger from that quarter with a contempt equal to that with which, at the beginning of the war, they had treated the danger from England.

This being the opinion of the military leaders, there was imposed upon those responsible for directing the policy of the Empire a very great responsibility. Clearly they must do one of two things. Either they must by diplomatic means bring the war to an end during the winter of 1916-17, or they would be driven, contrary to their better judgment, to the measure from which they had always shrunk, coupled as this would certainly be with war against the United States. The army leaders professed to have little apprehension of the effect of America coming into the war; the civilians knew better. They were able to appreciate, first of all, the enormous moral influence which this event would have, and the growth of confidence in all the enemy countries; moreover, not only abroad, but in Germany itself, it would increase the feeling that Germany was at enmity with the whole of the civilised world. The effect of this on public *moral* could not be neglected. Besides that, they

saw truly how important would be the increase in financial and material support which would come to the Entente as soon as the United States entered the war.

Let us confess that the decision which rested with the Chancellor and the Emperor on these two points was a very difficult one; let us also recognise that it is not entirely just after the event to blame them for their failure. Nevertheless, looking back, we can see how very unsatisfactory were the measures which they adopted. Let us take first the Peace Offer. The time was wisely chosen. The failure of the Allied forces to break through on the Somme and the complete collapse of Rumania might justify them in the eyes of their own people when they declared that the peace offer was not the result of weakness. The true state of things was carefully kept secret; the German nation was never allowed to know the real extent of the danger in which it was placed. But, if an offer were to be made, it was essential, in order that it should attain its object, that it should be so framed as to call out a response both among the neutrals and in the enemy countries. It must have the hall-mark of a genuine desire for peace and not that of a mere peace offensive.

Any one could foresee that the offer would be most carefully scrutinised. What people would look for was an indication of whether the terms suggested were such as would be compatible with a free Europe, or not. Now there was at that time one question which above all held public attention—that of Belgium. This must be the test which would be applied. Did Germany propose to use her temporary successes to perpetuate, in any way, the control over Belgium which she had won by the illegitimate act with which the war began? Every one knew—or any one with the slightest political insight must have known—that this was a cardinal point for England; no terms could possibly be accepted which meant, in any form whatever, Belgian subjection to Germany. It was equally cardinal for France; and what is very important, it was a matter on which the pacifists in both countries would agree with the military parties. The one group would repudiate any German control over Belgium because it would permanently destroy the principle of the Balance of Power; the other because it

would show that Germany intended to keep her ill-gotten gains. No offer, therefore, was of the slightest use unless it began with a frank and unequivocal statement that Germany would be prepared to restore Belgium to the position of complete independence which she held before the war, and unless there was added the offer of physical restoration. Germany had in her hands a most admirable card to play; she could have made it a condition of doing this that her colonial possessions should be restored to her.

It shows the extraordinary folly of German statesmanship that to the end they never perceived this fact. Never once, either in public or in confidential documents, did they make a frank and open offer of this kind. Whatever was said, whether by Bethmann-Hollweg, or Kuhlmann, or Michaelis, or Hertling, we always find the same thing: Germany will restore Belgian independence, but the restoration must be accompanied by certain guarantees, and every one knew what these guarantees were; they must mean the political, economic, and military subjection of Belgium to Germany. In the 'Aktenstücke' (p. 25) we have a very important document, a confidential intimation to America, sent in January 1917, stating what the German conditions of peace would be. They contain the following:

'Restoration of Belgium under definite guarantees for the security of Germany which would have to be arranged by negotiation with the Belgian Government.'

Negotiations with Belgium therefore are to be separated from the general peace conditions; and Belgium is to be allowed to enter by herself into a special relation with Germany. This was sufficient, or would have been sufficient had it been published, at once to condemn the whole proposal.

Why was this done? It was ultimately because the Chancellor was afraid of his military and naval advisers, who were at one in this, that Germany could not give up completely the control over Belgium which she had secured. They were so blind, so much occupied with the immediate military position, that they could not see that, if Germany came out of the war with her own territory untouched, she would, even if she gained

nothing more, become permanently the predominant Power in Europe, by the mere fact that she had defended herself successfully against so great a coalition.

At the very moment when they declared to the world that their victories enabled them to make an offer of peace, they excused the deportations in Belgium on the ground that they were fighting for their existence; is it strange that they were told that no one in America would believe them?

'At the conclusion of our conversation, the Ambassador [Gerard] observed that the deportation of the Belgians had a very unfavourable influence on the feeling for Germany. Something must be done in order to counteract this; Cardinal Farley had spoken to him with the greatest excitement about it; the Americans believed that they were being set back to the times of ancient history, when prisoners of war were sold as slaves. On my sharp rejoinder that it was very easy to look on and to criticise from outside the manner in which we are fighting for our existence, moreover that it produced a very remarkable effect when neutrals set themselves up as moral critics and wished to prescribe international rules of procedure for a nation which was struggling for its life, Mr Gerard answered that no one in America believed that Germany was fighting for her existence, for it could not be denied that she had obtained military successes upon the Continent' ('Aktenstücke,' p. 105).

And Bernstorff remarks (p. 258):

'If the unhappy measure of the Belgian deportations had not been adopted, and particularly just as we had informed the President that we did not want to annex Belgium, the history of the world would probably have taken a different course.'

But the German peace offer was very ill-advised for another reason; by issuing it when they did they interfered with the project of President Wilson to offer his mediation, and they lost the advantage which they might have got from this.

Among all the new publications there is none that has greater value and interest than Count Bernstorff's account of his three years in America, which contains numerous important telegrams and dispatches exchanged between him and Berlin. His view of the conduct of

German policy is, like that of all his colleagues, most unfavourable; nothing is more unjust than to attribute either the war, or the bad conduct of the war, to the members of the Diplomatic Service. It was not they who were at fault; it was the central authorities in Berlin. Bernstorff believed throughout that it would have been possible to win the help of President Wilson, and thus to bring the war to an end by means of American mediation. 'He could have obliged England to conclude a peace by arrangement with us; not only because in so doing he would have had the support of American public opinion, but also because such a policy was in keeping with the best political interests of the United States' (p. 9). As Bernstorff saw the situation, throughout the whole of 1916, it was the fixed determination of the President to keep the States out of the war, and with this object to bring the war to a conclusion as quickly as possible. He writes on May 28: 'Mr Wilson's peace plans are becoming more and more tangible. The only question is whether he possesses sufficient authority to force our enemies to agree to negotiations. Colonel House is convinced that he will succeed' (p. 234).

It was, however, impossible for the President to take any active steps until the autumn elections were over; and during the intervening period Bernstorff used all his efforts to prevent his own Government from taking any hasty steps which would interfere with the President's plan. This plan included two items. First of all, there was the ending of the war; in this his duty would be limited to serving as a mediator in order to bring the parties together; he had, it is reported, no special interest or policy in such matters as the territorial terms of the settlement. The second item, which in his mind was of much greater importance, was the possibility of a general settlement afterwards by which peace would be guaranteed, and to which the neutrals would be parties.

'The President is considering the plan of calling together a Conference at the Hague in which the neutrals will only participate so far as the freedom of the seas is concerned. . . . He [Mr Wilson] is still of opinion that the United States should in no circumstances take part in the actual settlement of the peace conditions' (p. 234).

'As a necessary result of the development of the laws of naval warfare, Mr Wilson hoped to bring about general naval disarmament, since navies would lose their *raison d'être* if they could only be used against each other and no longer against commerce and for purposes of blockade' (p. 249).

This attitude of mind might obviously have become very favourable to Germany, if, with reasonable skill, the German Government had played into the President's hands, by allowing him to have the credit of bringing about a discussion which might possibly end the war, and at the same time giving him full and unreserved support on the question of naval warfare. The efforts of Count Bernstorff were therefore concentrated on trying to prevent Germany from taking hasty action, the result of which must be to affront the President and eventually to force him into the war on the Entente side. Germany, however, was throughout the autumn of 1916 very impatient. As we have seen, the Supreme Command was always urging the adoption of unlimited submarine war, or, as the only alternative, the speedy conclusion of peace. In the end, they neglected Bernstorff's advice, and made the error of putting forward their own peace offer instead of waiting for the move which the President was preparing.

'The President himself (says Bernstorff), as Colonel House told me, was very much disappointed when he received the news of our peace offer. Colonel House told me that he would naturally have liked to take the first step himself. Apart from this, he had always warned us against mentioning peace, because this would be interpreted by the Entente as weakness. He therefore regarded our peace offer as an obstacle to action on his part, as it was bound to diminish the enemy's readiness to enter into negotiations' (p. 270).

As we have already pointed out, the fact that the peace offer was not accompanied by the statement of any conditions seriously diminished its effect; and, when at a later date the conditions were stated, they were in many ways unsatisfactory. What the President wanted was to be informed of the peace conditions on both sides; 'This was just what the Berlin Government did not want, because it would have aroused a bitter struggle between the different shades of public opinion as to war

aims' (p. 274). Mr Lansing, in conversation, expressed the same wish, saying that he could not understand why the Germans refused to state their conditions. Bernstorff, however, still pressed the point that there should be two Conferences: one, confined to the belligerent Powers, to deal with the settlement of territorial questions; the other, a World Conference under American presidency, to deal with the League of Nations.

Nevertheless the President ultimately, at the end of December 1916, issued his own peace note. It was very cautiously drafted. The positive proposals were indeed ineffective and tentative, but the information given by Mr Lansing seemed to show that what he really wanted was 'to act as a clearing-house for the further steps towards peace.' This, however, would have involved a procedure by which the belligerents on both sides would have begun by communicating terms to the President. This suggestion the Berlin Government would not accept. What they proposed was an immediate conference of delegates of the belligerent States in a neutral place; after this, and after peace had been secured, then they would be prepared to co-operate in the task of preventing future wars. It will be noted, however, that this attitude really eliminated the President from the peace negotiations, and left that which stood first in his mind to a rather vague and uncertain future. Its real effect was that of a rebuff. But, if Bernstorff's reading of the President's mind is correct, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that, by exercising greater skill and patience, the Germans might have involved the President personally in the preliminary discussions to such a degree that the whole of his weight and influence must inevitably have been used to overcome obstacles to peace. Germany, that is, would have got the advantage of entering on peace negotiations in such a way that it would not have appeared to be an outcome of their own weakness; and, if they broke down owing to the difficulties raised by the Entente, American sympathies and interests would, at least to a large extent, have been diverted to Germany.

This was a view, however, which the German Government would not take. They were entirely dominated, first by German public opinion and the necessity of

satisfying it, and secondly by the pressure to begin at once the extended submarine warfare. Herr Zimmermann telegraphed on Jan. 7, 1917:

'American intervention for definite peace negotiations is entirely undesirable to us owing to public opinion here. Also at the present moment we must avoid anything that might deepen the impression among our enemies that our peace offer is in any way the result of our finding ourselves in a desperate position. That is not the case. We are convinced that, economically and from a military point of view, we can bring the war to a victorious conclusion. The question of stating our conditions, therefore, your Excellency will handle dilatorily' (p. 281).

This telegram is most instructive; in reality, the Germans lost the advantage of American support simply because they were afraid of facing the outcry which would probably have been raised in Germany, where there was a strong anti-American feeling. The statement that they could bring the war to a victorious conclusion is directly contrary to all the other evidence that we have, except in so far as the use of unrestricted submarine war might have led to such a result. The pressure to avail themselves of this weapon came from the military authorities, and was supported on the ground that, unless it was used, a German defeat was ultimately unavoidable. Bernstorff's comment (p. 282) is interesting:

'Later, when I returned from America to Germany, I was struck by the small number of my countrymen who privately favoured the submarine war. I therefore still think that German public opinion could easily have been persuaded to accept Mr Wilson's mediation, if the terrorism of the supporters of submarine war had been dealt with in time.'

In fact, at the beginning of January 1917, the German Government were confronted by the fatal decision. They must take one course or the other. They must either accept the President's offer of mediation—in which case they must direct their whole policy and all their actions towards making mediation easy for him and meeting all his wishes, even though they might appear in some cases to be unreasonable; or they must determine on the unrestricted use of submarines—which would

inevitably bring about war with the United States. The decision which they made was taken in open opposition to the advice of their own representative in America, and it is to this that the ultimate defeat of Germany is due. Bernstorff's comment and conclusions, as given in his introduction, looking back on the whole transaction, are as follows :

'To this day I believe the policy of peace to have been the only right policy. A thorough prosecution of the U-boat campaign was also a feasible scheme. But the worst thing we could possibly do was to steer the zigzag course; for by so doing we were certain not only to cause constant vexations to America, but by our half-measures and partial pliancy also to drive Mr Wilson further and further into the inflexible attitude of a policy of prestige. Unfortunately, however, it was precisely this zigzag policy that we adopted; and thus, in addition to destroying the prospects which my policy had offered, we also, according to the view of the naval people, crippled the effects of the U-boat campaign' (p. 9).

The real fault, he declares, goes back to the first year of the war :

'After the first battle of the Marne we ought to have recognised in our heart of hearts that victory was out of the question, and consequently we should have striven to conclude a peace, the relatively unfavourable terms of which might perhaps have temporarily staggered public opinion in Germany and created some indignation' (p. 9).

For this, however, the rulers of the German Empire had not the requisite moral courage, and they were always impeded by the interference of the Military Command in political affairs; the soldiers ought to have been kept 'more thoroughly within bounds, just as they were by Bismarck.' They would, as Bernstorff adds, have been able to perform their own duties quite as well if they had not exercised excessive influence on policy. Always we reach the same conclusion :

'The era of William II perished owing to the fact that no definite objects were either selected or pursued in good time, and above all because, both before and during the war, two systems in the Government of the country were constantly at variance with each other and mutually destructive' (p. 10).

Count Czernin takes precisely the same view. 'The misfortunes of Germany and Austria (he says) arose from the acts which the military party imposed upon the Government.' The greatest disaster was the German entry into Belgium. This was 'a stroke of the Bismarckian policy of violence not carried out by politicians but by generals who were devoid of Bismarck's power of calculating the devastating consequences.' And he continues (p. 17):

'It will always be particularly difficult, during a war, to define the limits of military and political spheres of action. These activities encroach to so great an extent on each other as to form one whole; and, very naturally, in a war precedence is given to military needs. Nevertheless, the complete degradation of politicians to subordinate positions, which was effected in Germany and thereby made manifest the fact that the Supreme Military Command had possessed itself of all State control, was a misfortune. Had the politicians at Berlin obtained a hearing, there would have been no invasion of Belgium, no ruthless U-boat warfare; and an abstention from these two courses would have saved the life of the Central Powers. But from the very first day the Emperor William resembled a prisoner in the hands of his generals.'

We have not left ourselves space for any examination of Count Czernin's book. It must suffice to point out here that it throws a flood of light on the relations between Austria and Germany, both political and military. The important subjects discussed by the author—the relations with Italy, the various proposals for a separate peace with Austria, the whole Polish problem and the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk—belong to a separate chapter and must be reserved for a later occasion.

Art. 8.—A STRATEGICAL RETROSPECT.

PART II.*

EVENTS in the western theatre during 1915 had little immediate influence on the general course of the war. The limited success of the French and British attacks in the winter and early spring appears to have given Falkenhayn the assurance, without which he would not have ventured to embark upon the offensive campaign in Russia, that the German front in France could, for the time being, be held by reduced forces. Thus, in the period April—June 1915, he transferred 11½ divisions from the western to the eastern front. Although the Allies were far from abandoning their belief in the possibility of breaking through the enemy's defensive zone, the operations had, in effect, already assumed the character of a war of attrition, which, except for the heavy losses incurred by both sides, had no definite result. It was not till after the fall of Lemberg (June 1915), when the Allies had exhausted their efforts, that Falkenhayn returned two divisions from the Galician front; and the balance was restored a month later by the counter-movement of an equivalent force from France to reinforce Gallwitz' army on the Narew. As Mackensen's advance in the railless region between the Vistula and the Bug was impeded rather than assisted by the unwieldy size of his army-group, while it lay with Gallwitz to intercept the retreat of the Russian armies in Poland, these moves cannot be held to have prejudiced the German operations as a whole. The Allies' autumn offensive in Artois and Champagne (Sept. 25) affected neither the Russian campaign, which was already concluded, nor the invasion of Serbia.

The intervention of Italy (May 24, 1915), which the Germans had anticipated with grave anxiety, was too long deferred to be effective. Until Russia's offensive power was crippled it would have been 'scarcely possible (so Falkenhayn confesses) to hold another enemy at bay'; an admission which justifies the conclusion that, if Italy had declared war a month earlier, Germany would have had to abandon the campaign in Russia,

* Part I was published in the 'Quarterly Review' for April 1920.

and resort to the defensive on all fronts. The moral effect of such a confession of failure may be imagined. In its purely strategical aspect the situation would probably have obliged the Central Powers soon to abandon a contest which it would have been useless, if not impossible, to prolong unless one of their principal adversaries were put out of action before their own resources were seriously diminished. The Germans, alive to the impending danger, induced Austria, after prolonged negotiation, to offer territorial concessions in exchange for Italy's neutrality, in the hope that, at least, time might be gained. Ultimately, the break-through on the Dunajetz enabled the Austrian Command to release forces in time to confront the new menace, without detriment to the campaign in Russia.

Although Italy let slip the opportunity which might have proved decisive, her belated action had a greater influence on the course of the war than might have been expected to result from any merely military effort of which her resources, and the strategical disadvantages of her frontier, would admit. Whereas Falkenhayn saw clearly that the war with Italy was of secondary importance, and that it should be conducted defensively in order to husband the resources of the Alliance for decisive operations, Austria appears to have become obsessed by the idea of recovering Venetia. Thus, while Germany avoided becoming overtly implicated, Austria regarded Italy as her principal enemy—an attitude incompatible with Falkenhayn's designs for the conduct of the war. For the moment, the Austrian Command, acceding to the 'peremptory advice' of the German General Staff, abstained from offensive action against Italy; but an element of discord was introduced into the relations of the two Commands, which, as will be seen later, led to disastrous results.

With the close of the year 1915 the war entered upon a new phase. The campaigns in Russia and in the Near East had determined the main lines on which it was destined to run its course. The division of the theatre of war into a number of independent spheres of operation allowed the Allies little latitude in its conduct, which was sometimes determined less by their own

volition than by the necessity of countering the activities of their adversaries. The Germans, on the other hand, having opened up communication throughout the entire theatre of war, and gained a certain degree of security on the eastern front, had increased their freedom of action, and were able to revert to their original design of seeking a decision on the western front. There remained serious causes of anxiety—the uncertain attitude of Rumania, on whose neutrality the position in Galicia depended; the increasing unreliability of the Austrian troops, which occasioned frequent demands for German assistance; the difficulty of maintaining the Turkish armies in the field, on account of the imperfect communications with Syria and Mesopotamia; and the wastage, in men and material, of the 1915 campaigns, which was difficult to replace. The Allies, indeed, had suffered more heavily. In England voluntary recruiting had found its limit; Russia's huge losses could not quickly and effectively be made good; and the resources of France (so Falkenhayn believed) had been strained almost to the breaking-point. But in a war of attrition the superior resources of the Allies, if allowed time for development, would prove decisive. The adoption of universal service in England was believed to be imminent; Russia was raising large, if inefficient, levies, and, thanks to the efforts of her allies, was accumulating material; while Austria had to confront a new foe in Italy. The unrestricted submarine war—the only weapon likely to be effective against England—was in abeyance on account of America's menacing attitude.

Falkenhayn had already abandoned the hope of ending the war by decisive victory in the field; but he was confident that Germany would win if the Allies could be deprived of the prospect of reducing her to exhaustion. This belief was the foundation of his military policy at this stage, which may be described as offensive action with a limited scope, combined with a ruthless submarine campaign. To stand on the defensive would mean ultimate defeat, because the Allies could expand their resources more rapidly than could the Central Powers. The offensive must aim at a limited objective, because men and material were short, while new formations could not be created at the moment on account of the

dearth of trained officers and the pressing needs of industry. Hence he resolutely declined to be led, by the less clear-sighted and more impetuous Ludendorff, into enterprises which might assume unforeseen dimensions. He entertained no illusions as to the possibility of breaking through the front in France; the failure of the French and British attempts having convinced him that the enterprise, 'even with an extreme accumulation of men and material, cannot be regarded as holding out prospects of success against a well-armed enemy, whose *moral* is sound and who is not seriously inferior in numbers.* His design, then, was to strike in some quarter where a comparatively small force might achieve a success great enough to 'dispel the illusion' that Germany could be defeated by the process of attrition. The project was discussed in a memorandum drafted for submission to the Emperor, which is of great interest as it discloses in detail his view of the situation at the time; but the process of reasoning which he followed in search of a suitable objective is too lengthy for analysis. It led to the conclusion that England, whom he regarded as the mainstay of the Entente, could not be reduced to submission by any direct military effort within the capacity of the means at his disposal; but that, if the French army were put out of action, England would probably abandon the struggle. It remained to choose the point of attack; the conditions being that the objective should be within easy reach and assailable on a narrow front (to economise force), and of such importance that the French army would either have to bleed to death in its defence, or to admit a defeat the moral effect of which would be decisive. Of the two points which satisfied these conditions—Verdun and Belfort—Falkenhayn chose Verdun.†

It appears from the memorandum referred to above that Falkenhayn believed, at this period, that Russia's collapse from internal causes would not long be delayed. The German Government, indeed, had looked

* His reasons are almost identical with those on which a similar conclusion was based, after the first battle of Ypres, in the 'Quarterly Review,' January 1915, pp. 99-100.

† That the German reserves were running short was deduced, by an inverse process of reasoning, in the 'Quarterly Review,' April 1916.

for speedier results from the revolutionary intrigues of Lenin and his associates, who, as Mr Gerard records in his diary, had been dispatched to Russia in July 1915. Meanwhile, he counted on Austria to bear her full share in the defence of the eastern front, as to the safety of which he had no misgivings; and he deemed his reserves in France sufficient to deal with any 'relief offensive' which the British army might attempt. But Austria failed to play her part. The conflict of opinion which had arisen on Italy's entry into the war had again become acute in December 1915, when the Austrian Command proposed to withdraw troops from the front south of the Pripet for an offensive between the Astico and the Piave. Falkenhayn urged conclusive reasons against this project, which he saw could not succeed, while it would make fatal inroads on Austria's slender resources. The Austrian Command, however, began, in March 1916, to concentrate in the Trentino, and, on May 15, launched the ill-fated attack on the Asiago Plateau, having given the German Staff only one day's notice of their intention. It is hard to credit Falkenhayn's assertion that the preparations escaped the notice of his liaison officers; but he admits that he had heard rumours of the proceeding, and attempted to frustrate it by indirect means. On the whole, it is evident that the fear of aggravating the existing tension deterred him from adopting a resolute attitude—a want of firmness which, together with his remissness in asserting the authority of the General Staff in connexion with Hindenburg's operations in the summer of 1915, indicates a defect of character which detracted from his undoubted military abilities.

The Entente, meanwhile, had designed a combined offensive on the western and eastern fronts, in which Russia's part was to attack the German front north of the Pripet, where three-fourths of the Russian army was assembled, a subsidiary attack being first delivered by Brusiloff in the Lutszk sector (June 1916), with the object, apparently, of drawing German forces from the principal scene of action. Brusiloff's startling success was undoubtedly due to the defence having been weakened by the withdrawal of the best Austrian divisions to take part in the Trentino adventure; and it would have been

more decisive had adequate reserves been at hand for its consummation. Reinforcements sent from the sector north of the Pripet, where the intended attack was abandoned, arrived too late, the Germans, with their usual promptitude, having filled the gap. Brusiloff's advance was checked; but so momentous were the material and moral effects of the double defeat in Italy and Volhynia that the military and political breakdown of the Dual Monarchy became imminent. The whole situation had been unexpectedly and fundamentally changed. Troops had to be sent from France, just as they were needed to meet the impending British offensive on the Somme (July 1), which Falkenhayn had intended to 'nip in the bud by a heavy counter-attack'; and such prospect as remained of a successful issue to the battle of Verdun, where the situation of the French was admittedly critical, may be said to have vanished. The general situation was analogous to that of September 1914, but far more unfavourable to the Central Powers, because they were everywhere reduced to the defensive. But the mischief did not end here. The loss of Gorizia in August, and the Archduke's reverses in the Bukowina, may be added to a series of disasters, attributable to the headstrong action of the Austrian Command, which had a decisive influence on Rumania's attitude.

The Verdun offensive (February–September 1916) had the effect of compelling the Allies to employ imperfectly trained troops in operations of a magnitude which they had not intended to attempt until the following year; but one can hardly doubt which side benefited by this result. Falkenhayn, with questionable sincerity, refers to the Somme battle as the 'long-expected and wished-for offensive.' That the results of Brusiloff's attack were calamitous he does not try to conceal. Apart from any question of relieving Verdun, the Allies found in their adversaries' commitments in France and Italy an opportunity too good to lose. In the result, the Austrians were so severely shaken that only the Russian revolution averted their collapse in 1917; so great was the strain on the German armies that their *moral* was affected; and, despite Russia's default, the more impetuous Ludendorff had to content himself, for more than a year, with an attitude in the main defensive.

Early in Brusiloff's offensive, Falkenhayn, seeing that Rumania's intervention would not much longer be delayed, arranged the plan of campaign, and prescribed special training and equipment for the troops. The resources of the Central Empires did not admit of the menace being met in the best way—by seizing the initiative—or of the concentration being effected until hostilities should become imminent. Ultimately the attack (Aug. 27, 1916), which had not been expected to take place till after the harvest, came as a surprise. At this juncture Falkenhayn was removed from his position as Chief of the General Staff, Hindenburg, with Ludendorff as Second Chief, being appointed in his stead—a change which, though of doubtful military expediency, seemed to restore public confidence, shaken by the disasters of the preceding four months.

The Rumanian effort failed because the three essentials of success—clear conviction, will, and energy—were wanting, and because the Russians were remiss to a degree suggestive of bad faith. The invasion of Transylvania could not succeed without close co-operation between the Russian and Rumanian armies; and Russian aid was necessary to hold the Dobrudja. If there was any well-considered plan for combined action, the operations did not disclose it. Russia stood by while her ally was being defeated—an attitude which can hardly be explained on military grounds. Later, when, as Ludendorff remarks, 'they seemed to fear for their own flank,' the Russians found troops readily enough; but it was then too late to save Wallachia. He admits that 'it was only because the Russians were not there that we were successful.'

The Rumanians, at the outset, made two mistakes which had a decisive effect on the issue. Instead of advancing swiftly to the Maros, and seizing the Hatszeg—Toplitza railway (the importance of which was discussed in the 'Quarterly Review,' October 1916) they 'moved forward at a snail's pace. . . . The [German] deployment was not completed till the end of September. A rapid advance would have utterly upset it.' Again, they were turned from their purpose by Mackensen's attack in the Dobrudja, a front of secondary importance. Mackensen could not, without risking defeat, have

crossed the Danube before the Transylvanian passes had been secured; on this point Falkenhayn and Ludendorff agree. The failure of the Austrians to force the passes leading into Moldavia probably saved the Russian army from destruction; but the results of the campaign, though short of German expectations, were important. Wallachia provided corn and oil, without which, Ludendorff confesses, the Germans would not have been able to exist, much less to carry on the war. The flank of the armies in the East found a secure position on the Black Sea, and submarines a safe route to the Mediterranean. But the lengthened line absorbed troops needed on the main fronts. Germany, says Ludendorff, was 'definitely weaker as regards the war-position as a whole.'

Hindenburg's accession to the chief command resulted in the adoption of Ludendorff's military policy, which may be described as a complete reversal of Falkenhayn's system of conducting the war. The careful husbanding of Germany's resources, and the avoidance of any measure which, by imposing an excessive strain on the German people, would weaken their resolution, were principles which Falkenhayn considered axiomatic. We have seen by what method he hoped to break the Allies' 'will to war' without contravening these principles. Ludendorff proposed the 'ruthless requisition' of Germany's whole man-power between the ages of fifteen and sixty. At once pessimistic and adventurous, he cherished visions of ending the war by a great victory—visions which the military and political situation, which he treats at great length almost in a despondent vein, held out little hope of realising. The army had been fought to a stand-still, and was utterly worn out. The warlike ardour of the nation was on the wane. Recruiting was at a low ebb; the system of exemptions was abused, and there were many shirkers. The Auxiliary Service Law, passed on Dec. 2, 1916, was 'neither flesh nor fowl.' War industries competed with the army, to the detriment of both. Ludendorff bewails the inertia of the German and Austrian Chancellors, their absorption in domestic politics, and their obsession by dreams of a peace of reconciliation. He was strangely wanting in

political instinct. His one idea was to carry through with a high hand such measures as he deemed necessary; and he was as reckless in his demands as Falkenhayn had been circumspect. It was the Chancellor's affair to counteract any evil consequences that might ensue, by sternly repressing revolutionary tendencies, and stimulating the failing national spirit by propaganda.

Various expedients were tried for carrying on the war with a prospect of success. An abortive attempt was made to raise a Polish army. The divisional establishment, already reduced, in April 1915, from twelve to nine battalions, was further weakened by lowering battalion strengths. A shorter line was prepared between Arras and the Aisne; and the army was trained for defensive war. But such measures, though they might suffice to postpone the decision, could not lead to victory; so recourse was had to unrestricted submarine warfare, combined with a defensive campaign in France, forces being held in readiness in case Holland and Denmark should prove hostile. America was regarded as a certain enemy; but the U-boats were expected to obtain a decision before she could take the field in appreciable force.

The German Naval Staff was confident that the 'war-zone campaign' would prove decisive within six months. Ludendorff was sceptical, as Falkenhayn had been, about this forecast, doubting, it would seem, the possibility of reducing England to starvation; but they believed that the transport of troops and munitions by sea would be so hindered that in time (Ludendorff thought in twelve months) the armies would be paralysed. They differed, however, in one respect. Falkenhayn had considered offensive action in France the indispensable complement of the submarine campaign; but Ludendorff, believing that the latter could, of itself, bring about a decision, thought it would suffice to gain time for its consummation. With this object the retreat to the new Arras—Aisne ('Hindenburg') line was ordered (March 1917), with the view of eluding the impending Allied offensive, and freeing reserves for the defensive campaign. The project of delivering a general counter-attack from the new positions was considered; but it was given up on account of the shortage of reserves, and the uncertainty

of winning 'a real victory on a battlefield rendered impassable.'

Ludendorff, however, was not long in coming round to his predecessor's way of thinking. He found that the waiting game did not pay, although the Allies did not make the most of their opportunities. The break-through on the Vimy ridge (April 9, 1917), might have had, he says, 'far-reaching and serious consequences if the enemy had pushed further forward'; at Messines, also (June 7), 'it was many days before the front was again secure.' Lack of concert between the Allies on the western and eastern fronts enabled him to send six divisions from France to stiffen the Austrians when the Russians attacked in July. But the Austrian troops 'showed a diminution of fighting power which was in the highest degree alarming'; and the moral resolution of the German people was disintegrating. 'It must be revived,' Hindenburg wrote to the Emperor on June 27, 1917, 'or we shall lose the war.' After the Reichstag 'peace-resolution' (July 19, 1917), Bulgaria and Turkey 'began to doubt' whether Germany would be victorious; so also, it appears, did 'several chiefs of staff of very cool judgment,' under the strain of the campaign in France and Flanders, which disclosed an ominous decline in the *moral* of the troops.

In fact, the submarine war was not acting quickly enough. After six months' experience Ludendorff began to have misgivings as to its success, unless supplemented by an offensive in France; but this could not be attempted while large forces were locked up on the eastern front. So he returned to his original thesis, that Russia must first be disposed of. To this end he resolved to carry out two offensive measures; the forcing of the Dwina, as a threat to Petrograd, and an advance from the Bukowina into Moldavia. The latter, delayed by the defective condition of the railways, ultimately fell through because troops had to be sent to Italy, to save Austria from collapse in consequence of the double defeat in the Carso and on the Bainsizza Plateau in August and September.

Thus we find that the offensive in Venetia, in October 1917, was an emergency measure, which had not been in the programme. Ludendorff, evidently bent on heroic

exploits, adopted it in preference to providing a stiffening for the Austrian defence. Indeed, he seems to have burned to take the offensive, always and everywhere, if the situation held out any promise of local success. Falkenhayn, with a more consistent and far-seeing policy, had adhered, as closely as possible, to the defensive on fronts which offered no tangible objective important enough to justify the expenditure of resources already unequal to forcing a decision on the western front. Ludendorff's aim, on this occasion, was to re-animate the languishing Austrians, and to relieve the pressure in France. More than this, he says, was not expected—a statement of doubtful sincerity, in view of the desperate and costly efforts to press the advance beyond the Piave, the failure of which discouraged the Austrians.

Ludendorff seems to have realised that the situation prescribed simultaneous attacks on the Isonzo and Trentino fronts;* but enough troops were not available for both. As a partial remedy he urged the Austrian Command, after Caporetto, to reinforce Conrad von Hötzendorff (commanding in the Trentino) from Boroëvic's army, with a view to the attack being launched between the Brenta and the Adige; but the movement was delayed, as might have been foreseen, by bad railway communications. Even had this delay not occurred, the decisive moment was lost. To be fully effective, the attack should have synchronised with the main offensive, so that it might both enhance and profit by the first alarm; otherwise the comparatively small force which could be maintained by the Trentino railway could not hope to reach the Italian communications through Vicenza and Padua, and so cause the fall of Venice, and, possibly, force the Italian army to retreat behind the Adige. The loss of Venice would, of itself, have been a severe blow to Italy; its salvation, in the critical situation which had arisen, was acclaimed almost as a triumph. In fact, we may pronounce the campaign ill-judged. Like the Allies at the Dardanelles, Ludendorff thought to reduce the sphere of operations to the measure of his forces by cutting off an essential part. The offensive spent itself on the Piave because the Italians, with

* For a discussion of the strategical aspect of the Italian frontier *vide* 'Quarterly Review,' July 1915.

their allies, stopped Hötendorff's advance, which would have made the river untenable; while the main armies could not prosecute the frontal attack without awaiting the repair of the communications—a delay which would have enabled the Italians to reorganise their forces and strengthen their defences.

Negotiations having, in the meantime, begun (December 1917) at Brest-Litovsk, it was possible to withdraw troops from Russia. We need not discuss Ludendorff's decision to stake all his resources on one throw. It was the outcome of his military policy; and he disarms criticism to some extent by declaring that there was no alternative, the Quadruple Alliance being 'held together only by the hope of a German victory.' By transferring from other fronts all the troops that could be spared, he expected to gain a superiority of some 20 or 30 divisions in France. Only 'a few hundred thousand' recruits being available, wastage would have to be made good chiefly by drafts from the eastern front as conditions there should become more settled. The Allies, however, were in no better case, their hopes being based on America. The American troops would be of little value; and their arrival in strength might be forestalled by a German victory. Such, broadly, was Ludendorff's view of the situation.

It remained to choose the objective. From 50 to 60 divisions would be available, sufficing for a frontage of 50 kilometres, with some 20 or 30 batteries per kilometre. Three sectors were considered: Ypres—Arras, Arras—La Fère, and the region of Verdun. Tactical reasons caused the choice to fall upon the centre sector; for, as Ludendorff remarks, it is futile to pursue strategical objects unless tactical success is possible. There the Allied line was, at the moment, weak; and the country was easy, and little liable to be affected by bad weather. The design was, first, to cut off the force in the Cambrai salient; ultimately, to separate the French and British armies, and to throw the latter back on the sea.

The heroic resistance of the British troops between Croisilles and Moeuvres, where the main attack was directed (March 21, 1918), enabled the force in the Cambrai sector to extricate itself, and to close the gap which the Germans had evidently expected to find

between Arras and the Somme. The failure of the main attack was fatal to the success of the German plan; for, although the breach in the St Quentin sector necessitated the withdrawal of the entire British line, the advance came to a standstill before Amiens, where a new defensive front was formed, too strong to be attacked without awaiting the repair of the communications for the transport of heavy artillery and supplies. The resulting situation was unfavourable alike for defence and for a resumption of the attack, the front having assumed the form of a wedge with the apex precariously situated beyond the Avre. Attempts to gain elbow-room on either flank proved ineffective. Ludendorff had to confess that the offensive, though a 'brilliant feat,' was a strategical failure. The miscarriage of the main attack had left him no option but to exploit the success in the St Quentin sector, though he probably realised that, in the light of experience, the offensive was likely to lose its impetus before Amiens could be reached. North of the Somme, where the result amounted, roughly, to the recovery of the territory abandoned in 1917, the troops were encumbered by the craters of the Somme battlefield; and, on the whole front, the devastated area afforded no resting-place for those taken out of the line. In fact, the retreat to the Hindenburg line, whatever advantage it may have conferred at the moment, marred the prospects of an offensive in that region.

Finding that the battle threatened to become one of attrition, Ludendorff turned quickly to the northern sector, where everything was ready for the final blow which had been designed to throw the British army back on the sea, but with no better success (April 9). He gives various reasons, which, no doubt, contributed to the failure, but the plain truth is that the German army was out-fought; it was unequal to its task. At the end of April the operation was broken off, but it was not abandoned. The attack on the Aisne front was meant as a diversion, to draw the Allies' reserves from Flanders; but, as no preparations had been made, it could not take place until the end of May, when, by agreement, the Austrians were to take the offensive on the Piave, with the object of again drawing allied troops from France. Ludendorff did not expect to carry

the offensive beyond Soissons and Fismes. Ultimately it reached the Marne, but, as at Amiens, in a wedge-shaped form, with the western flank exposed to attack from the ample recesses of Villiers-Cotterets forest; while, on the east, Reims barred the railway needed for the supply of the forces within the salient. Unexpected success only made the situation more difficult, because of the lengthening of the front and its unsuitability for defence. More might, perhaps, have been accomplished had larger forces been employed at the outset. This, however, would have entailed abandoning the offensive in Flanders, to which the operation was subsidiary. Having conceived the idea of defeating the British army, Ludendorff clung to it tenaciously. The capture of Calais and Boulogne would, at the least, effect a material shortening of the front. This was 'the great, though limited, objective' of the northern offensive.

If we admit that a great victory was essential, and that this project was as reasonable as any offered by the situation in France, we can hardly blame Ludendorff because single-minded devotion to it resulted in unreadiness to follow up an unexpected success in a subsidiary operation. Moreover, the Aisne offensive offered no tangible objective. The French had ample space for retreat in case of a break-through. In Flanders, on the other hand, the Allies' hold on the line of the Yser was already precarious. The loss of Kemmel Hill had caused them to draw their line closer to Ypres—the first step (so Ludendorff believed) to the abandonment of the Yser line, which would have followed had the Germans won the remainder of the Kemmel—Cassel heights, twelve miles in length. Thus the return to the attack in Flanders offered some prospect of a success at once spectacular and important; but, before it could be attempted, the French break-through south-west of Soissons, on July 18, necessitated its final abandonment. The Germans had to evacuate the salient south of the Marne, and to revert to a general defensive. Ludendorff, who had anticipated and provided against attack in this quarter, ascribes the defeat to the failure of a division on which he had placed special reliance; but he had yet to realise the extent to which demoralisation had invaded the ranks of the German army.

The moral and numerical superiority which the Allies had by this time established over their adversaries in every quarter enabled them to ensure the disintegration of the hostile combination by maintaining continuous pressure on all fronts, without the need for any special co-ordination or central direction of the operations. It mattered little whether the decisive breach should occur in France, Italy, or Macedonia—Turkey had ceased to be of much importance when she had fulfilled the task of keeping the Dardanelles closed while Russia was in the field. The material factor in the situation, in this, as in previous crises, was that the existence of the Quadruple Alliance depended on Germany's ability to avert, or retrieve, disaster on whatever part of the European front it might threaten or occur—an effort of which Germany was no longer capable. Where, and when, the catastrophe would happen was uncertain down to the moment when the sudden dissolution of the Bulgarian army laid Hungary open to flank attack from the Balkans. Ludendorff attempted, but vainly, to fill the breach with eight divisions, six of which had been detailed for the western front.

In France, meanwhile, the Allies had followed up their initial success of July 18, by a general offensive, the strategical conception of which was similar to that which had characterised their combined operations since the spring of 1915—namely, pressure on both flanks of the salient formed by the German front, combined with attempts at local envelopment. There is little to add to the review of the operations contained in previous articles,* except in regard to the moral factor in the situation, to which, in the absence of specific evidence, sufficient weight was not attached at the time. Ludendorff, although he realised that it was no longer possible to 'incline the Entente to peace by means of German victories,' hoped, at first, to establish a firm line of defence by local readjustments of the front. The Allied attack astride of the Somme, on Aug. 8, brought disillusion. Although most of the troops in the line fought well, the behaviour of others made it plain that the German army, as a whole, could not be relied upon

* See 'Quarterly Review' for October 1918 and January 1919.

to give effect to the plans of the General Staff. Divisions which had been deemed battle-worthy gave way; others which, on account of exhaustion, had been sent back to rest, responded to the call to fill the gap, and acquitted themselves well. Thus failure might occur at any moment in quarters where it was least expected. 'Leadership,' as Ludendorff observes, 'assumed the character of an irresponsible game of chance.' Moreover, the losses of the offensive campaign having seriously reduced the effective strength of units, many divisions had to be broken up to fill the ranks. Such meagre drafts as came from Germany proved but a source of weakness, as they brought the infection of revolutionary principles. In short Ludendorff's method of conducting the war led, as Falkenhayn had predicted, to the premature exhaustion of Germany's military resources; and the strain which it imposed on the nation doubtless stimulated the growth of the revolutionary movement, which in its turn, accelerated the decline of the fighting spirit of the army.

In these circumstances there is little of strategical interest to be deduced from a broad survey of the last phase of the war, except in so far as it illustrates, on a scale of unprecedented magnitude, the profound influence of *moral*—especially of the *moral* of the nation, which, under the system of universal service, is seen to dominate that of the army. Her military machine having broken down beyond repair, Germany hastened to bring hostilities to a close while she could still retain some semblance of strength in the field. With the negotiations which led to the attainment of this end we are not concerned; nor need we explore the political situation which caused the Allies to grant an armistice at a moment when the concession can hardly have been deemed expedient on purely military grounds.

Perhaps the most salient feature in the conduct of the war, when we look at it from a general point of view, is the persistence with which the Germans pursued a pre-determined line of policy. Methods changed with the change in the Supreme Command, but the policy remained unaltered, its object being to obtain a decision in the West. To this object all operations on other

fronts, in so far as Germany could control them, were preparatory. When it was lost sight of, misfortune followed. Moltke made the first serious mistake when, alarmed by the unexpected reverses on the eastern front (August 1914), he withdrew troops from the army-group charged with playing the decisive rôle in France, and thus lost the best opportunity the Germans had, in the whole course of the war, of achieving their object. The campaigns of 1915 in Russia and in the Near East did not imply a change of policy; their purpose being to prepare the way for the resumption of the operations in France with the maximum forces, by temporarily breaking Russia's offensive power, and preventing or delaying its revival by ensuring her isolation. The policy was again interrupted when Austria, ignoring the principal object, embarked on her private adventure in the Trentino (May 1916), but it was resumed so soon as the situation in the East had been re-established. The Germans had no 'side-shows,' no 'war-gambles'; each of their minor campaigns had its place in the general scheme of war, and was prosecuted with all the means available. It was largely because of their consistency in this respect that our enemies were able to continue the war, and to come so near to winning it, with numerically inferior forces, and with losses, in killed and wounded, one-third less than those of the Allies. The latter, having no settled policy to guide them, were at a serious disadvantage when the gradual extension of the war called for the solution of new problems and involved divergent interests. Yet these various causes of embarrassment—except the deadlock in France, which, though equally unexpected by the Germans, was by them turned to advantage—had doubtless been foreseen by the General Staffs of the Allied Powers when studying the possible situations in the impending war; and they might have been provided for if the Allies had come to a timely agreement upon a general line of policy. Agreement in this respect might have gone far towards remedying the want of central control during the earlier stages of the war, when the inter-Allied situation was not ripe for such an institution.

W. P. BLOOD.

Art. 9.—LAY CRITICISM OF ART.

WE have been told that M. Matisse may now be praised because he heads the reaction against Cubism, and we may at any moment find that Mr Wyndham Lewis is trying to return to Nature. The consternation of the student of art movements on hearing this is comparable with that which an observer of politics would have felt if in 1906 he had been told to praise Joseph Chamberlain for heading a reaction against Protection. Our student, moreover, has probably not failed to note another equally unsettling thing. Ten years ago a wave of young men's work broke over his accepted convictions. When the foam and uproar had subsided, authoritative prophets were discovered explaining that all was well; that what was drowned deserved its fate, and that the triumphant art had come to stay. Believing that these prophets really knew, by inspiration, the ins and outs of their perplexing business, the aforesaid student doubtless set to work to bury his unregenerate ideas of art and devoutly prepare his mind to be a decent receptacle for the swiftly successive revelations of Cubism, Futurism, Vorticism, Spheroidism and the rest. Let us suppose, then, that earnest seekers after the true art had brought themselves, by December 1919, to accept the principle that representation of things seen was about as bad as art could be. Then let us suppose that this public, visiting the War Paintings Exhibition at Burlington House, discovered there and in the eulogistic Press that the young men of to-day are seriously returning to Nature, and to an intensified kind of the representation which a few years ago was said to have been swept away for good. Lastly, let us wonder what are the ripe conclusions of this docile, puzzled public about the whole business of Art. In its most charitable mood, it may decide that the ways of Art are too difficult and high for ordinary folk; when most disgusted, that the entire affair is nothing but a senseless game for rival charlatans.

Indeed, it is time that we attempted to arrive at some fairly working standard for ourselves, so that when fresh upheavals occur, we can keep our heads and form our own judgments. For Art should not be a thing of mystery and jargon and secret significance, nor the

preserve of an inner ring of priests. We are, at least, intelligent enough to apply sound tests, that guide our lay opinion, for the theories of Einstein or Bergson, for the qualities of literature and, to a considerable extent, of music. Without being deep and technical, our judgment is adequate to save us from blind acceptance of charlatanry and contradictions. Towards the more obscurantist rigmaroles of philosophy we are healthily indifferent, believing that, if their shades are so very fine and their application and meaning so infinitesimal and dark, they cannot be looked to when practical needs are in question, then they are no real concern of ours. In part we owe this capacity for avoiding superstition and credulity to our general common sense and education; in part to qualified expositors of the higher technicalities, who interpret for our lower comprehension the special learning of the great. But in Art the interpreters on whom we rely for intermediary guidance are apt to darken counsel; and we are too diffident, or too much taken aback, to use our common sense. But is it not possible that by deduction, by the development of our own perception and the application of our common sense, we should be able to distinguish between revelation and misconception, between what succeeds in Art and what fails?

Sharing the excitement caused by factions who have successively assailed Pre-Impressionism, Impressionism, Post-Impressionism and Cubism, we possibly do not bear in mind that fifty years hence the movements of 1912-1920 will be telescoped by art-historians into a short paragraph or two. Nor do we always keep in view the fact that the relatively permanent importance of any master depends entirely on his power of interesting a remote posterity. Human æsthetic interest, so far as one can tell, has altered very little in the last twenty thousand years or so. No doubt the capacity of this interest has expanded, so that we are moved by a greater number of artistic qualities than were the Magdalenian Reindeer men. But it appears that, so far as drawings, paintings and sculpture are concerned, man to-day is chiefly interested by the same qualities that held the attention of his ancestors in the earliest ages. That the nature of æsthetic interest has altered

so little, in so long a period, seems to warrant the assumption that it will not radically change within the next thousand years. If this be conceded, exception will not be taken to an attempt to deduce from the past history of Art some reliable information as to its future.

The course of Art, from the Aurignacian era (circa 35,000 B.C.) till to-day, has been curiously consistent; so that the record of one period can be fitted almost exactly to any other, given the necessary change of names and material. For example, the history of Palæolithic art is one of very slow perception of life, and an equally slow understanding of how to express it. After centuries of experiment and discovery the artists of the Magdalenian age had arrived at remarkable vision and skill. Probably they had reached the limit to which artistic perception could go in their environment. At any rate, their skill in drawing animals in good proportion, with good action and masterly line, was followed by a period of ingenious schematisation. Apparently the latest Palæolithic artists, and such as survived in Neolithic times, were absorbed in the pastime of reducing Nature to design. They used natural forms as the basis of conventional pattern, distorting and debasing them out of all recognition. This schematic art, succeeding a period of masterly representation, faded into nothingness. What it was called by the controversialists of the Chelseas and Quartiers Latins of those days, we do not know, but we may suppose it was some '-ism' or other.

The history of Egyptian, Greek and Byzantine art is in fundamentals almost identical. Each began with painful stammering; each attained its golden age of highly sensitive perception and expression of what we call life—form, character and movement; each sank to mannerism and derivation, which Vasari in his life of Cimabue, so well described. He says that Cimabue

'swept away that ancient manner, making . . . everything a little more lively and more natural and softer than the manner of these Greeks [Cimabue's Byzantine-Roman predecessors and contemporaries], all full of lines and profiles both in mosaic and painting; which manner . . . the painters of those times, not by means of study, but by a certain convention, had taught one another for many and many a year,

without ever thinking of bettering their draughtsmanship, of beauty of colouring, or of any invention that might be good.'

Cimabue made the stammering effort at perceiving and expressing life. Giotto, still stammering a little, developed artistic perception and expression as far as it could go in that early Florentine environment. His art fell a victim to the schematisers, the '-ists' of that time, known to us as the Giotteschi. After a hundred years a new generation swept away their ancient manner. Masaccio is the greatest name of that return to Nature; and of him one of the first intellects of all time—Leonardo—said that 'he showed by his perfect works how those who take for their standard any one but Nature—the mistress of all masters—wear themselves in vain.'

We should but weary the reader if we deployed further schools and movements to illustrate this well-known feature of Art history—the cycle of growth, high prime and decay. But we may emphasise that without exception posterity has always taken Nature, or Life, as its standard of excellence wherewith to test a school or master. In no single instance has human æsthetic interest been retained by any painter or sculptor who lagged in the expression of life, or who in contemplating life evinced no deep emotion and no rare sense of its human significance or application.

Perhaps we should set out here what in this context we mean by life. By life we mean character and truth. In portraiture life is revealed by insight into character rather than by a study of complexion. Life is given to historical painting by those artists who through the virtue of imagination and invention have personally and vitally realised the actual humanity and spirit of their characters. They can paint St Sebastian as he was and as he bore his agony, where those lacking this personal comprehension paint him as a languid elegant, with several unnoticed arrows protruding from his well-groomed body. Millet knew that peasants were harsh and angular, and that the iron was deep in their souls; he knew by physical and mental experience what they really were. His etchings and pictures are true, whereas the paintings that counterfeit peasants with artists' models, who have never spoiled their hands, never faced

storms, nor ached with fatigue, are false to life. And as regards landscape, *genre* and still life, the quality that distinguishes real perception of life from the false or superficial is the expression of true light and air, growth, the movement of out-of-doors, and subtle truth of relation—in short, the fluid qualities of Nature as opposed to the metallic, airless petrification of late Dutch still-life painters and most popular academicians.

In no case, we repeat, have painters who consistently fall short of the highest level of their time in the expression of life or Nature, spiritual and material, retained the interest of posterity. Never yet has any substitute for this expression proved interesting enough to withstand the return to Nature which has always succeeded periods of mannerism, abstract schematisation or intellectual formulæ. It would not be far-fetched to suppose that the late Byzantines, the Giotteschi and the Eclectics, like the French Classicists of 1790, bristled with impeccable arguments for their conception of ideal art. But they went down like a pack of cards, each in turn, at the breath of a return to Nature.

It may bring the matter to a more immediate issue if we consider in this light various recent art movements, and try to analyse the cause of their success or failure. For they bear upon the question which we are attempting to answer, and are sufficiently far back to be seen in perspective. First we will take the Pre-Raphaelites of 1848. Like most new movements, theirs was bitterly attacked before it found wide favour. In time it became the object of a cult; by those who neglected Constable's new standard it was accepted as a great return to Nature, and a great salvation. It would be extravagant to say that already the Pre-Raphaelite movement is discredited; but those who watch the signs know that its reputation is seriously impaired. A few works only are now pointed to as explaining the enthusiasm which we used to feel about the P.R.B. Why have we lost interest? For one thing, we recognise that, when a balance is cast, the actual results of that movement were not beneficial; for another, we find that only exceptionally did the genuine brethren express life fully enough to interest us. The inherent weakness of the school was that their

attention was focussed on a method of expression to the prejudice of life itself. What mattered to them was, so to speak, the accent with which they spoke, or the sign they used, rather than the essential truth of the thing signified. The result is that, in perception of life, Millais and Holman Hunt do not differ fundamentally from Leslie, Dyce or Frith. What difference there is is merely one of surface—better drawing, a gayer colour, a higher key.

Millais in his most typical Pre-Raphaelite pictures, for instance in 'Lorenzo and Isabella,' 'Ophelia,' 'Apple Blossom,' 'Order of Release,' or 'Autumn Leaves,' is at heart an Early Victorian, exceptionally gifted, it is true, but confined within his period. Once out of his Pre-Raphaelite phase, he naturally settled down into a confirmed Mid-Victorian and all that that implies. He created no serious type, he laid bare no unsuspected truth, he remained parochial. If he had taken up truth to Nature where Constable had left it in 1837, instead of going back to pre-Constable standards, we might have skipped Birket Foster and anticipated the French Impressionists. But his pictures on the whole have lost interest, because they have stopped in their period, whereas we have passed on into another. The Jews of Rembrandt and the peasants of Millet are not confined to any period; the life they show us is not local, for it means as much to us as to their compatriots or the Japanese. And it will stimulate and extend our descendants' perception of humanity as it does our own.

Rossetti, who was not really a Pre-Raphaelite at all, for a while concerned himself with a less locally centred life, for the interest he tapped is sensuous if not sensual. The human passion of love found in him an ardent and poetical exponent. At first this passion burned with a spiritual keen flame, that later became thick and clouded. At last it sank to facile mannerism and insistent repetition. The first rapturous spirit could not be repeated, for that may be expressed for only a brief while. What can be dwelt upon is of more material consistency, a gross and rather cloying stimulant to which young and eager spirits do not react.

In other words, the life which the Pre-Raphaelites expressed did not matter enough to impress very deeply

the æsthetic interest of their posterity. Nor could their mere technical innovations and their revolution of style hope to last as innovation or revolution. To things like that our eyes are rapidly acclimatised; and at the end we search a picture for a significance that satisfies our desire for knowledge, and ministers to our discontent with the banal. It is inevitable, then, that we get satisfaction only from such artists as have been inspired to reveal the sort of life that excites some lasting interest and answers to enduring needs. For art which is thin and dreamy, or what is meant by the common use of the word 'imaginative,' never long survives its first romantic appeal.

Burne-Jones is a primary example of an artist who has paid heavily in swift depreciation for immediate popularity, gained by excursions into the dreamland of old romances. To us who remember the enthusiasm and reverence with which we viewed his memorial exhibition, only some twenty years ago, it would be bewildering to face the unaffected indifference of the younger generation towards his art, if we did not understand the cause. In every fibre of his sentiment Burne-Jones was Mid-Victorian; and the strings he touched could not resound outside the circle which shared this special local sentiment. 'Love among the Ruins,' the 'Mirror of Venus,' 'Circe,' 'Danae,' are all mild poetic wraiths, sexless angels who come in contact with our human life at no point. It is not altogether that Circes, Nimues and Sir Degrevants are, in themselves, exploded, nor that allegories are irreparably out of fashion. It is that in his conception of these characters Burne-Jones was not enabled by imagination and invention vitally to experience their actual humanity and universal spirit. Bloodless, ideal Mid-Victorian types, dressed in mediæval costumes, lay but a light hold on the imagination of a very human non-Victorian world.

A far greater artist—Puvis de Chavannes—seems to share some of the indifference in which the younger generation holds Burne-Jones. This is interesting, because in style and temper Puvis has a noble quality of design and dignity. But he was hit in his weakest spot by Degas' shaft; the part-truth in the venomous remark that he was a 'provincial Raphael' cannot be denied;

and the young realists, in their own phrase, have little use for that. If we would seriously attempt to account for this loss of reputation, dispassionately facing facts, we must conclude that Puvis has lost ground by some lack of accent or character in the life that he depicted. His case goes to prove that design and placid dignity of contour are not enough; and that, if an artist would sustain his level of interest, he must reveal more than gracious suavity and rely on more than serene repose or the large placidity of massive figures. Puvis seems to prove that the figures themselves must have a more arresting and baffling personality and an ampler suggestion of individual character than he was prepared to give them. For here again, once we have become used to the impersonal qualities of silhouette, balance of shape and colour, colour contrast and co-operation of line, our incurable tendency is to inquire what the characters within these contours and technical devices can tell us of life itself. The infinity, or depths of impression, that we want does not ultimately lodge in externals, in design and rhythm, colour and line, however noble and stimulating. It is looked for at last in the living humanity of characters depicted.

We said just now that the fugitive reputation of Burne-Jones could not be satisfactorily explained by the statement that allegories and old tales have lost their power of appeal. For it is quite likely—indeed Mestrovic has proved it—that a big enough artist could to-day recreate the living value of old banners to which man's æsthetic interest rallied centuries ago. But only that artist who could show the living application of the old idea, and translate its meaning into the speech of to-day, would succeed. Mere costumes, attributes and trappings, pulled out from antique property chests, do not make alive ideas of Justice, the Virtues, Nausicaa or ancient Rome. The pictures of Leighton, Alma Tadema and more recent costumiers within the Royal Academy prove by their rapid obsolescence how vainly artists labour who cannot recreate the human nature of a costume period, nor reveal anew the universal significance of our conceptions.

Turning now to recent movements in landscape, we see that, so far at least, the first French Impressionists

have retained a large measure of their interest. This is attributable to their having dedicated themselves to the expression of fundamental things in Nature. For this reason Constable, too, seems to be more interesting than Turner to the young men of to-day. For they suspect confection in the latter, whereas in Constable they recognise direct contact with actual events. Constable certainly saw, with the shock of discovery, the true quality of out-of-door light and colour. Even now, after a hundred years, his pictures have the zest and unprecedented freshness that an early summer landscape has for the convalescent who takes his first outing after months in a sick room. Turner, on the other hand, who is not judged on his relatively few direct-from-Nature pictures, seems to our young men 'romantic' and even sentimental. The best of the Post-Impressionists, before Post-Impressionism was stereotyped, went directly to the life of Nature, as we have defined it; they tried to see the truth of sunlight, to analyse its nature as none before had tried, and to understand how the light-filled air circulates round everything. They brought the same enthusiastic science to the study of light as the early Florentines brought to perspective and the human figure.

Thus we must draw a clear distinction between their aim and that of the Pre-Raphaelites, who did not seek to read the universal heart of life nor to see the humanity they shared, as none before had seen it, so much as to present an outward aspect, a complexion, in a new style, consciously based upon an older. It is hardly true, in fact, to say that Pre-Raphaelism was a return to Nature; rather it was a hark-back to a convention which they mistook for Nature. For it is manifest that, so far as truth to Nature in landscape or indoor lighting are concerned, Constable, Vermeer and Hogarth were truer than Millais or Holman Hunt. Even the delightful and sensitive detail in 'Ophelia' is true only in particulars and not in general relation. It is truth as focussed at a series of disconnected points rather than taken in as a whole. Constable had shifted the horizon line for ever, so that what was 'true,' before his revelations, had to be revised in the new light they shed. And, as regards subject, Romance more than actuality was the occupation of Pre-Raphaelism. The Impressionists, on the other

hand, seeing the life of Nature for themselves, with new eyes, detected in her a wonder that had not been seen in just that way before, and learned to express something of their discovery so truly that we are still interested. For, as sunlight itself has magic fascination for us, it is natural that pictures which render a measure of its magic are wonderful. We rapidly grow used to crude or empty statement; but statement that contains hints of subtlety and change and fluid movement, retains in some degree the interest that life itself has for us.

This summary review of certain periods indicates, we think, clear characteristics, constant enough to warrant deduction and even generalisation. First and last we have to recognise that what we mean by good art is the art which makes the widest and longest appeal. Considering how slight has been the change in man's æsthetic interest, ever since Art became recognisable, we are presumably justified in assuming that for a long time yet we shall apply the same tests to Art as always have been hitherto applied. Surely, then, it should be possible to estimate for ourselves, at once, the relative durability of any art with which we are confronted, and so to some extent anticipate the judgment of posterity. Thus we shall cease to be the victims of deluding prophets, and no longer drift about at the mercy of opposing currents.

Cubism and allied movements are already waning in practice and popularity. Ten years have not passed since Post-Impressionism became known in England. It originated, apparently, with Cézanne, who almost unconsciously developed a style whose accidental and unintentional mannerisms were seized on as mystically significant. A French writer some years ago stated as a fact that these adventitious and unconscious peculiarities of Cézanne were chiefly the result of some special astigmatism. There is probably a good deal of truth in this contention, so that the asymmetry of Cézanne's people and houses was due as much to defective sight as to wilful distortion.

Van Gogh was another prophet to the Post-Impressionists, who did for his and Cézanne's art what the Giotteschi did for Giotto's. But he is a weapon that

cuts both ways, not only because of his diseased mind but also because he always believed that he was expressing Nature as he saw her. The abnormal and strangely suggestive forms of Van Gogh's trees must be accepted as the straining effort to express an abnormal perception of shape and movement, an effort akin to El Greco's or William Blake's. It was not that Van Gogh turned away from visible Nature, but that he was aware of, and tried to convey, qualities in Nature unperceived by normal vision. For this reason he retains our interest; not because he is abstract, but because he offers clues to what we apprehend is vitally true in Nature.

This is wholly different from schematisation or 'synthetic' symbolism, which pointedly ignores Nature as she is seen, and substitutes for life an arbitrary and abstract convention and a set of intellectual concepts designed to indicate states of mind or emotion. The things painted do not represent things seen, they are hieroglyphics for things physically felt. As a bar of written music is to the sound of the notes, so, with important differences, Post-Impressionist and 'Expressionist' diagrams are to things seen. They are more remote from actuality than is the ground-plan of a house, and more comparable to temperature charts or the meteorological maps in our daily papers, though these of course are scientifically verifiable. So remote, indeed, from general experience are they, and so incapable of authentication, so esoteric and, as we shall see, so founded on misconception, that to the general they are unintelligible. Thus they are practically useless, for it can be of no help or lasting interest to us to be informed that sensations experienced in a railway-station may be expressed by blue triangles.

We know that, at best, this sort of thing is not only a *façon de parler*, but also a far-fetched, false symbolism for a sphere of experience which must be inexpressible in Art. Such alleged experience fails to hold our interest, because it can no more be put to the test of life than can the so-called revelations of a spiritualistic *séance*. It seems to us, indeed, to have less bearing on life than Burne-Jones' dreamy romanticism. We feel that, though Burne-Jones' mermaids may be charming, they come in contact at no point with the life that we are striving

with; we disbelieve their actuality; we know they are but tales for children. In the same way we know that the painters who claim that, by painting a head in countless imaginary facets, they 'reconstitute it in time,' are only indulging an infinite capacity for solemn make-believe. They cannot have seen the object, thus, in countless facets. They are, therefore, drawing upon some alien association, some source other than visible life, and, infatuated by a little knowledge, are confusing distinct ideas. Burne-Jones offers us only images of people whose lives are passed in extra-mundane conditions, and the Vorticists offer us not life but supposititious diagrams of invisible emotions.

The entire conception of Cubist and Futurist painting was in fact based on a confusion of ideas. A smattering of psychological philosophy was fatal to those movements. In the first place, the *raison d'être* of pictorial art is the interpretation of qualities visually apprehended. We should no more expect to benefit from listening to a painting than from staring, with stopped ears, at a violin. We do not extract the stimulus of colour through our finger-tips, nor can we form any real conception of nervous and mental reactions by the use of visible formulæ. It is quite true that the greatest pictorial or sculptural art renders 'palpable the impalpable,' but only so far as the impalpable may be visually apprehended. A portrait by Rembrandt, that is to say, will lay open to our minds, through our eyes, the soul of his sitter, so far only as the soul appears through visible form. But that is not to say that it will tell us the sound of his voice, or the number of his heart-beats. The portrait can approach us only through our eyes, and can suggest nothing in the man that had not impressed his outward aspect. But to appeal to our eyes pictorially, by seeking to depict what in itself is either formless and colourless or impossible of visibility—for example, the vibrations of the ganglionic system, or a simultaneous view of a man's full face and the back of his head—is as good as asking us to sample a glass of port with a thermometer.

If we seem to have digressed, we can but plead that, if we would understand why Cubism and its allied movements, such as Futurism, so swiftly ceased to satisfy, it

is important to realise that they were more obviously handicapped in the race for immortality than even the schematisers of Palæolithic or trecento Byzantine decadence. For the Cubists and Futurists were not content with reducing Nature to a bald pattern, but also complicated the situation by claiming to give shape and colour to essentially formless and non-visible qualities, and by setting out in diagram on a flat surface the front and back and sides of a round object. They tried to put painting to a use for which it must be useless, and by painting 'mental states' deceived themselves into the belief that an intellectual and almost medical *façon de parler* is identical with reality. But after our first bewilderment we turned away dissatisfied because our insatiable curiosity about life met with no response from these diversions. Our early credulity turned to mild amusement, and we came to view these agile groups much as an earnest motorist regards trick cyclists at the Coliseum.

Posterity will perhaps regard Cubism and Vorticism as an echo in Art of rudimentary psychology or optics, and as an attempt to incorporate in painting a branch of science that is wholly outside the function of Art. They will not be impressed by the oft-advanced argument that painting should correspond with music. Music, it was said, is creative and non-representative; it does not reproduce natural sounds, but moves us by an abstract art of sound and rhythm. A sect of Futurists or Vorticists, therefore, claimed that painting should be 'musical' and non-representative; a corresponding pictorial art of abstract rhythm, form and colour. But posterity will see that, however logical this argument might appear in print, in practice it produced no paintings that gave commensurate results. Unimpressed by theory, posterity will be severely pragmatical in this, simply saying that the proof of the pudding is the eating. Nor is posterity likely to be at a loss to put its finger on the false premiss of this theory. It will see that the analogy between music and painting is invalid, and that therefore it was hopeless to try to enlist human æsthetic interest by 'musical' painting. For, as it happens, man has found that Nature provides him with far more wonderful stimuli in the way of colour, rhythm and pure form

than ever Art could. Indeed, the artist with his box of paints and his little stock of designs and rhythms, ultimately derived from Nature's patterns, is hopelessly out-matched by Nature, who has this great Globe for her canvas, and, for her materials, light itself and the inexhaustible designs and forms of living growth and natural law.

The case, of course, is different as regards music, for in Nature there is nothing comparable with man-made harmonies and rhythms. Nor in this combat is man the worse armed; for he is using sound itself, whereas the painter cannot use light. This explains, well enough, why so-called 'musical,' abstract art seems to us uninspired and limited in comparison with what we see all round us, and as clearly indicates that, if Art would survive in the struggle for existence, it must develop in a direction where Nature cannot lead; that is in the interpretation to man of the human significance of visible life.

We hinted that, unless Art be intelligible and verifiable by the standard and test of life, it is useless to us mortals, and therefore, if we stand to our definition, bad art. For we postulated that good art is that which long retains human æsthetic interest. Here, probably, some will protest, contending that this is nothing but a plea for popularity. They will say, in effect, that, if we are to take votes as a standard of quality in painting or literature, then we must concede that the best sellers among books and the favourite pictures in the Royal Academy Summer Exhibitions are the greatest art. They will also proceed to remind us of the commonplace that good art is unappreciated in its own age, citing Millet, Blake, Whistler, the first Pre-Raphaelite pictures and many other classic instances of scorned and rejected genius. But if they imply that posterity will vindicate the value of abstract 'expressionism' to which we are blind, we must beg them to remember the unvarying condition for permanent æsthetic interest, as proved by past experience. For in no single instance has human interest been retained by Art which does not profoundly express the human significance of life, nor has any theoretical or technical substitute for truth to Nature succeeded. What, then, will induce posterity to make an exception in favour of

this modern schematisation? Or in what way is our contention that life must be the standard and the gauge, and that permanence depends entirely on truth to life, adversely affected by the case of Whistler, the Impressionists and Millais's 'Carpenter's Shop'? The trouble in those cases was that the hostile critics took, not life, but a canon of ideal art for their touchstone. They scorned Millet's peasants, and Millais's Mary, not because they were abstract or false to life, but because they seemed ugly, inartistic and undignified, compared with the pleasant fictions of conventional painters. The dislike of Whistler's critics for his Nocturnes was in part due to the same cause—inability to perceive truth to Nature when it was presented to them. It is not that Whistler's values were wilfully at variance with life, nor that Monet's tireless research in the quality of sunlight and shadow was a deliberate denial of Art's concern with life. It simply was that Monet and Whistler saw fresh truths, which are now precious in our sight because they remain true to our perception of life and to the fluid quality of Nature. But to the imperceptive and startled eyes of their contemporaries their revelations seemed absurd.

In the same way a colour-blind person, unaware of his disability, would scout assurances that what he saw as red was really green, or one who could hear only whole tones would doubt whether semi-tones are audible. But we should hardly take deficient perceptions such as these as valid precedents. We should not say that, because the stone-deaf man turned out to be wrong, therefore the man who claims that B flat is D sharp is a sound musician. Therefore we should not be deterred, by the reminder that Monet's critics could not understand him, from asserting with conviction that those who claim that schematic, abstract or 'musical' painting is great art, deceive themselves. If we would learn to form our own judgment and to be independent of the shifting dogmas of our higher critics and artistic medicine-men, we must nail down the illogicalness of the argument that, because Monet and Millet were misjudged, therefore Messrs Metzinger, Wyndham Lewis and Roberts must be right. We should distinguish between the aim and performance of the first, who revealed new truths in

visible life, and the aim and performance of the last, who advance intellectual substitutes for truth to visible nature and prefer abstract diagrams of physical sensations to the interpretation of qualities apprehended by vision.

If this disposes reasonably of the customary appeal to past misunderstanding as a warrant for swallowing whatever is now presented, we will ask those who fear that our demand for intelligibility is but a plea for gross popularity, if in their experience this fear is realised as regards literature. We are not thinking of the uneducated mass but of the thoughtful and perceptive, who, as we began by saying, can form working judgments on current thought and literature. We do not find that the higher level of lay perception of quality in prose and poetry has resulted in the depression of current poetry and prose. Sixth-form boys at all good schools have become adequate critics of literary style and matter; so have most girls whose education has been correspondingly intelligent. But the boy or undergraduate with a sound conception of the principles underlying painting, architecture or sculpture is as rare as a hansom-cab. We believe that even as regards music the educated lay public is in better case. But we would maintain that just as the undergraduate can learn to understand the principles of architecture, so that he will know what is honest and fit in a building, what is a reasonable treatment of stone and what is beautiful in proportion and silhouette, so he and his class can for themselves judge truly what in painting is true interpretation of life.

It may be that the next generation but one, understanding that a working knowledge of the principles of Art is essential to citizenship, will educate its children accordingly. But we need not wait till then for a general capacity to tell a true picture from a false one. For the only test and standard—life itself—is common property. If we will rely on our own judgment of the picture's correspondence with life, brushing on one side the subtlety of those who allege that truth to Nature is a vice, we shall be in the way of wisdom. For life is the only standard; and, if our view be justly perceptive, posterity will endorse it. Naturally, if we would be just

judges, we must ourselves see life truly, not sentimentally nor 'like a picture.' After all, we do not find it impossible, even though we be not authors, to discriminate between truth and falsity in books. If, from excess of superstition or diffidence, we assume that Art is a mystery and that our blindness or philistinism is to blame for our lack of understanding, then we must despair of ever knowing whether Art is good or bad, and must go on as we are. On the other hand, if we will confidently and honestly take life for our standard, not demanding that a picture shall be pretty or narcotic, but that it shall be true, we shall at least equip ourselves to form judgments as sound and practical as those we form on literature and life itself. We may be sure, of course, that the great seers will see further than we, and that their visions will not invariably be palatable. But we shall clearly apprehend that they see not less but more truth to Nature. More than half of our past misunderstandings and rejections have been based on dislike. Millet's peasants were hated because they were ugly, Degas' courtesans because they were not alluring when they had their baths. But if their critics had done their duty and asked themselves if they were not really truer to life than the conventional merry peasant and the popular conception of a *fille de joie*, then there would have been less confusion.

Let us then try to judge, in one concrete and typical case, the prospects of the young artists whose war pictures at Burlington House last winter were by some acclaimed as the long-expected Messianic movement, and by others uncompromisingly attacked. We must content ourselves with taking one of the most immediately striking and discussed pictures, Mr Stanley Spencer's 'Macedonian Dressing Station,' as our text. By honest consideration of this and similar pictures we ought to be able to discern what qualities in them are of relatively permanent, what of relatively transient, concern for human æsthetic interest. If we find in these pictures a profound intuition of life, and a new way of seeing truth and human significance, then we may be reasonably certain that here we have work that posterity will hail as inspired. If they reveal only what

we all had thought or seen, lacking the refinements and the dimly apprehended wonders, we may be sure that they will not long engage posterity's interest. And if they touch life so lightly as not to matter, even though their design were that of angels and their rhythm that of all the masters, we shall not be far wrong in concluding that posterity will tire of them and turn away. Driven by its ineradicable curiosity in life, posterity will seek the society of artists who, themselves consumed by the same curiosity, had seen and rendered life profoundly.

Mr Spencer, then, shall serve as a test case and occasion for our just discernment. He is said to be returning to Nature, and is clearly influenced by primitive Florentines. This alone should sound a warning note, recalling the fate of other revivalists who returned to Nature *via* the Pre-Raphael painters. But we should be wrong to conclude that deliberate archaism is necessarily fatal; it is not, if it become the medium for new vision. Mantegna is a great artist, but his duller following, to whom archaism was an end, only strike us as tedious. J. L. David, the perfect archaist, now seems to us, save as regards his portraiture, a deplorable reincarnation of the worst characteristics of Greco-Roman art. It is clear, therefore, that Mantegna's rank as a great artist—an artist who retains human æsthetic interest—depends chiefly on qualities over and above the classical tags, which he was pleased to drag in somewhat pedantically if impressively. If they gave an air of solid culture to his style, they contributed nothing to those superior qualities of thought and perception on which his position depends. To David human actuality—what men really felt in given situations—was nothing in comparison with the antiquarian problem of how to recreate the aspect of a Greco-Roman frieze.

Therefore, while we should welcome the interest shown by our young artists in Uccello and Piero della Francesca, we must bear in mind that, unless they also evince a very strong perception of universal life, as it is significant to 20th-century intuition, independently of Uccello-like perspective and detail drawing, they will not retain our interest long. In other words, they must animate the technical formula they adopt with life which is important to us. No better design could be studied

than Uccello's, no colour is more stimulating than Piero's. But, unless young scholars recognise that these masters were more engrossed in representing subtleties and refinements of Nature and humanity than in the routine of decoration, they will weary themselves in vain. Only casual students of these artists think that they deliberately sacrificed truth to Nature to abstract principles of design. Only those obsessed with theory, largely invented by themselves, suppose that Raphael or El Greco, first planned out a geometrical design or system of baroque units, and then in cold blood fitted their subject into this mechanical frame. Considerable artists do not work like that. As well might we say that, because we see that a tree's branches make geometrical shapes or baroque swirls, therefore the tree had carried out its growth by geometrical calculations.

Judged by his 'Macedonian Dressing Station' Mr Spencer perceives no subtlety and refinement comparable with that in Uccello or Piero. Nor in this picture, of which the interest (excepting the mules) consists entirely of technical problems, has he attempted to express the human significance of the subject. An art-student from Mars, untouched by Earth emotion, would not have seen less human concern in it. We may, then, anticipate that when its technical novelty has worn off, and its time has come, as come it must, to be judged on larger issues, Mr Spencer's picture will fare less fortunately than Puvis de Chavanne's large decorations, which in their day were just as novel and more humanly significant. For, as we have suggested, the 'infinity' that we incurably crave in Art does not ultimately lodge in pictorial problems of design and rhythm, but in the living humanity of the subject depicted.

In a case like this, then, it would seem possible that the educated public should effectively make up its own mind on the chances of a picture's immortality. For we all know that what ultimately mattered at a dressing station was the real business of life and death, and the actual, uncoloured way in which that business was performed. We see at a glance that a mere photograph would have told us more of these than Mr Spencer has. His technique was the end of all his efforts, not the means whereby the vital human content of the subject

might be most pregnantly and truly staged. Not forgetful of the invariable attitude of man towards Art, we can foresee that in a little time a picture of this sort will have no currency wherewith to buy man's interest. Tendering its design, its colour scheme, its profession of the principles of Uccello, it will learn that man's interest is not bought by them alone. For, as deep calls to deep, so life magnetically attracts the living. Designs and rhythms, abstract theories and schematics, come and go like spring and autumn fashions. Without a painful wrench we detach ourselves from last year's mode in favour of the new 'creation.' Nor, after we have got to know them well, do they retain their stimulant challenge. But life remains our principal affair and the quarry we never overtake.

It seems, when all is said, so simple, that the hesitation and perplexity in which we have stood for these ten years appear inexplicable. For, as we are reasonably competent to see what is genuine in our fellow-creatures, and what is true interpretation in books or on the stage, so one would have thought that we could detect the truth and false ring in pictures, and recognise what really matters. As for refinements of technique, the balance of masses, proportion of spaces and cunning interplay of colour, let us rest assured that we shall pick up all that we can assimilate of that as we proceed. For landscape a keener perception than we usually give to it will be needed, but the essential thing is that we gain our standard from Nature rather than from untrue pictures. For the rest, and when we are face to face with pictures which set up a standard other than Nature, alleging that abstract cosmic rhythm can be expressed by synthetic symbolism, we can refer to past experience and the desuetude of all schematic systems that were based on the belief that things made up out of one's own head can stand comparison with things inspired by life.

C. H. COLLINS BAKER.

Art. 10.—JAPAN AND THE WAR. *not ✓*

Is Japan, as the wording of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would have us believe, a surety for the general peace in Eastern Asia and India, a champion of the independence and integrity of the Chinese dominions, and a sponsor for the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China? Or is she the Prussia of the Orient, the last and most inaccessible stronghold of aggressive militarism? Is she our true and faithful ally? Or is she a secret, powerful and malevolent menace to the whole fabric of our Empire in Asia and in the Pacific? Thirty years ago such questions did not exist; even six years ago they seemed fantastic and remote. For, however surprising might be the extent of Japan's ambitions, the poverty of the country and the weight of national indebtedness clearly made their realisation impossible. But to-day the position is very different. It is the countries of Europe, including our own, which are fettered by debt, and impotent from poverty. Japan and the United States, from a material point of view, are the only victors in the War of the German Supremacy.

Japan has shaken off her fetters. She has become in her turn a creditor nation. Since 1914, she has doubled her mercantile marine; and now she holds the third, instead of the seventh, place in the carrying trade of the world. She has doubled and trebled her industrial capital at home in the shape of banks, factories and equipment of all kinds. She has made extensive investments abroad, and has established a commanding position for herself in international commerce and finance. She has more than doubled her trade with China, and is now that vast country's leading customer. She has quadrupled her trade with the United States. During 1918 she exported about ten times her average annual pre-war value of goods to British India, the Dutch Indies, Australia, New Zealand, South America, Egypt and Cape Colony. Much of this trade may be abnormal, but much will be retained. Thanks to her geographical position, to the energy and intelligence of her people, and to the unremitting support and guidance of her Government, this profiteer among nations has, during the days of Europe's calamity, won an incalculably vast reward. There is no

longer, as there was in 1914, that deep gulf between the ambitions of Japan and the possibility of their realisation. Much indeed has already been realised; and her first post-war budget contained large appropriations and extensive schemes for doubling her naval power and for remodelling her army. Assurances are given that these projects constitute the minimum essential for the defence of the country. And so we return to our question, Is Japan the last stronghold of militarism, or is she a bulwark of peace in the Far East?

It may be said that in no country is there a more distinct cleavage between a militarist and a pacificist tradition. Japan has been actively militarist only during the last sixty years. Before that time, she was so intensely pacificist in her foreign relations, that she closed the doors of her empire against all strangers for very fear of war. A well-known story is told about the three famous Japanese leaders of the late 16th century. Once upon a time there was a nightingale which refused to sing. So Nobunaga cried, 'If you don't sing, I will kill you'; and Hideyoshi threatened, 'If you don't sing, I will make you'; but Tokugawa observed, 'If you don't sing, I shall wait until you do.' Now, Hideyoshi is the hero of Japanese militarism, the Napoleon of the East, who conquered Korea, who threatened China and the Philippines, and whose corsairs made the name of 'Japonians' a terror as far south as Borneo and the Singapore Strait. But it was Tokugawa who won out waiting, and who saved the empire from Hideyoshi's able heir. He founded that line of Tokugawa dictators, who closed the country against all foreign contact for two hundred and fifty years, and who resigned the dream of glory for the reality of peace. These two men are types of Japanese statesmanship as it exists to-day: Hideyoshi, swash-buckling and overbold; Tokugawa, diffident, insular and over-cautious.

The revolution which destroyed the Tokugawa dictatorship in 1868, and restored, in name, the autocratic rule of the Emperor, was a reaction against these centuries of pacificism. It was the victory of the spirit of Hideyoshi, of military adventure, and, in Japanese eyes, the prologue to an epic of conquests abroad. The new statesmen were, many of them, pupils of a remarkable

teacher, named Yoshida Shoin, who was executed at the age of twenty-nine for a fanatical murder. He had foretold that the new order would lead on to the making of a 'Great Japan,' who would conquer the Kurile Islands, Saghalien, Kamchatka, Formosa, Korea, Manchuria and a large part of Eastern Siberia, and who would eventually become the leading power in Asia. This 'Great Imperial Policy,' to which popular orators so often refer, places Japan as leader of the tide of anti-European feeling, which is rising with ever vaster volume and swifter impetus, wherever the white man rules the native, from Morocco to the Dutch East Indies. Nearer to Europe, this great upheaval is called 'Pan-Islam'; in India, it is alluded to as 'unrest'; further East again, it is styled 'the Pan-Asiatic Principle.'

Some years ago, an eloquent member of the Japanese Parliament, Oshikawa Hogi, declared, 'With the most beautiful virtues, which we have inherited from our forefathers, and splendid traditions, which no other nation in the world has ever enjoyed, I conclude without hesitation that we Japanese are the nation which has the responsibility of instructing and teaching the rest of the world, and is finally destined to become its dominant factor.' The 'Niroku' newspaper of May 8, 1919, remarks that the League of Nations proposes to save mankind from the horrors of war, but that it can only attain its real object by placing the Imperial Family of Japan at its head. To us in Europe this language sounds like delirium; but there are nearly sixty million energetic and patriotic Japanese to whom it is the ordinary language of national pride. For the cleavage between militarists and pacifists does not affect this creed, which is held equally by both parties. The militarists, however, look to its realisation in the near future and by aid of arms, if necessary. The pacifists, like Tokugawa, are content to wait until the nightingale sings.

The divergence between these two schools of thought showed itself immediately after the restoration of the Imperial rule in 1868. The military party wished at once to make war on Korea. Under their leader, Saigo, they tried to force the hand of the Government, but were defeated in the Satsuma Rebellion, which, on the part of the Government, was a war to prevent war.

Ito and the new pacifists believed that it was Japan's first interest to develop her commercial and industrial strength before embarking on military enterprises. However, in 1894 Ito's Government, like the Hara Government in February 1920, was being harassed by a democratic outcry in the Diet. Ito sacrificed his ideals, capitulated to the military party led by Yamagata, and, against his own better judgment, consented to the declaration of war on China.

Japan's unexpected success in the Chinese War secured a recognition from the European Powers, which years of peaceful progress had been unable to obtain. This lesson was not lost on the Japanese. From the Chinese War onwards, the baleful influence of militarism has been uppermost in Japan; and its policy has had noteworthy successes and hardly one serious check. The Kurile Islands, to the north of Japan, had been acquired in 1875; the Loochoo Islands, to the south, in 1876. The island of Formosa, the southern gateway of the Japanese Empire, was annexed in 1895. The victory in the Russian War gained the Port Arthur Peninsula and South Saghalien, and made Japan commercially and politically supreme in Korea and South Manchuria. Under the shelter of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Korea was definitely annexed in 1910. So one half of the ambitious programme of Yoshida Shoin has already been realised. With the collapse of Russia, it seems as if North Manchuria, Eastern Siberia, North Saghalien and Kamchatka may also pass under the control of Japan. By the conquest of Tsingtao from Germany, and by the Treaty of 1915, forced upon China by means of an ultimatum, Japan has become, in fact, the leading power in Eastern Asia, and the virtual director of China's foreign policy. This control of China by Japan is the meaning of 'the Monroe Doctrine for the Far East.' The steady whittling away of all European influence out of that enormous country is a policy upon which Japan has unquestionably embarked.

Such is the remarkable crescendo of expansion, which the militarist party in Japan has achieved in twenty-five years. No wonder that the mass of the nation is intoxicated by the glamour of arms, and is proud to style the land '*gunkoku*,' or 'war country.' But the wiser heads

in Japan are not to be deceived by this dizzy progress. 'I am glad that there are an increasing number of men who think that all these Chinese and Korean troubles are the results of a mistaken policy pursued in the past, and that nothing short of a fundamental reversal of that policy will be of any avail in solving the difficulty.' So writes Dr Yoshino Sakuzo, a leader of the Tokyo intellectuals, in January 1920. The old pacifist opposition has by no means faded away; and the defeat of Germany has strengthened the hands of the moderates. They doubt whether a vast land empire is really an advantage to an island realm. They doubt whether, economically and politically, Japan is mature enough to shoulder such immense responsibilities. Is Japan the frog of the fable, which, after trying to inflate itself to bull's dimensions, burst?

However that may be, Japan, at the beginning of the greatest war in history, was one of the most martial-spirited nations in the whole world, and was governed by a militarist oligarchy. Yet the part she played in the war was smaller than that of any of the belligerents, except the South American Republics and China; and the interest taken by Japanese in the great events of Europe was so detached, that it became a commonplace to brand them as pro-German. But apart from her obligation to the Alliance, there was one reason why Japan could not possibly stand aside altogether from the conflict. That reason was China. China is almost always the reason for any move in Japan's foreign policy. Japan, like a bustling energetic planet, swings in a constant orbit round that inert, incongruous luminary which is China with its riches, its treasures, its huge population and its immense possibilities. A strong policy for Japan means a strong policy in China. Militarism in Japan means aggression against China. The large and well-equipped Japanese army is maintained to overawe China; and the admirable and growing navy exists to keep communications with the continent intact. China supplies iron in a quantity essential for Japan's existence, and an increasing provision of cotton and wool; and she is the principal market for Japanese manufactures.

Without any doubt the more enterprising statesmen

of Japan believe that the future of their country is a future of domination in China, that Japan will one day control China's armies, arsenals, railways, mineral resources, police, finance and customs administration; that she is called upon to play in this huge country the rôle which England has played in India; and that in the liberation of Asia from the white oppression China will be her 'splendid second.' The European war meant to Japan her first opportunity to play a lone hand in China. To Japan, this was not the War of the German Supremacy, but a third chapter in the war for Japanese Supremacy in Asia. The Chinese War of 1894 was the first chapter; the Russian War of 1904 was the second; and the war of 1914 was to Japan merely a sequel to the struggle for Port Arthur. China, not Europe, was her battlefield. Yuan-Shi-Kai, the President of the Chinese Republic, was her enemy, not William the Second. The fortunes of war in Flanders and in Poland were a secondary matter to her politicians. Peking, not Berlin, was their objective; and it is the Chinese people who have had to pay for Japan's victory over Germany.

First, Japan was prompt in her declaration of war, lest China might recover Tsingtao by her own action or by agreement with the Germans. Then, after she had seized Tsingtao, she set herself to complete in 1915 that victory over China which had been interrupted by the intervention of the Great Powers twenty years before. The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915 (commonly alluded to as the Twenty-One Demands) locked the Japanese hold on South Manchuria and the Port Arthur Peninsula, secured the German reversion, extorted important railway and mining concessions, and provided against alienation of Chinese ports in Shantung province to any foreign power. It was intended to go still further, and by a system of advisers to bind in eternal vassalage the direction of finances and of foreign affairs, and the naval and military equipment of China. But these clauses of the original demands, known as Group Five, were suspended, and have in fact been allowed to lapse, at least for the present.

After this success, as her Prime Minister complacently remarked, the attitude of Japan became 'semi-neutral.' Although there was little or no enthusiasm for the

Allied cause, although Japan's position as 'Britain's watch-dog' was often contemptuously criticised by Japanese, although Japan was slow in enforcing an Enemy Trading Act, although a policy of neutrality was sometimes advocated, and although in 1915 and 1916 there was a general opinion that Germany would win or draw the war, yet there was never any serious question of Japan's transferring her alliance or actively helping Germany in any way. On the contrary, there were times when a Japanese expedition on the Allies' behalf would have been popular in the country. It would certainly have been popular, if it could have achieved a spectacular success and a brilliant reward. But there was no front available where the Japanese could operate single-handed. They would have had to merge their effort with that of their allies, and to share their fortunes. Nothing very immediate or theatrical could have been expected. The expedition might even have ended in defeat and failure. Such an outcome would have been disastrous to the prestige of the militarists at home. All plans for intervention on a large scale were, therefore, abandoned early in the war; and the nation's military pride had to be content with the capture of Tsingtao. This one-sided campaign is dignified in Japan by the name of the 'Japanese-German War.' It has satisfied the Japanese public by proving incontestably that they could have beaten the greatest military nation of Europe with ease, and that the flabby armies of the Allies only needed stiffening with a few divisions of the dauntless sons of Nippon to have swept all before them during the first months of the war. This misconception unfortunately remains.

Ideals which roused the whole British Empire, and which acted so powerfully on public opinion in America, ideals couched in watchwords such as 'the Justice of our Cause,' 'the Fight for Right,' and 'the Struggle for Democracy,' conveyed very little meaning even to educated Japan. In fact, the Japanese seemed to consider our reiteration of such phrases to be unsoldierly and tedious. The wrongs of Belgium roused no special indignation among people who had twice turned Korea's helpless neutrality into a battlefield. The question as to who was responsible for the war did not interest them.

On the whole, they conceived the struggle as being the natural outcome of competition between England and Germany; nor did they regard one side as being more to blame than the other. Stories of outrage left them unmoved. Similar tales had been deliberately coined and put into currency before the Russian War in order to inflame the national temper. General opinion considered that they were exaggerated. Cruelties perpetrated on women and children, though regrettable, have not that heinousness according to the rules of *bushido*, which stamps them in the codes of chivalry; for the weak must always suffer. The ingenuity of aeroplane and submarine, and the intrepidity of their commanders, impressed the Japanese far more than did the wanton destruction, suffering and slaughter which they caused. Even when their own ships were sunk, there was little popular outcry.

X The words 'justice' and 'right' cannot be translated into Japanese, so as to preserve their original force. The word *giri*, which every Japanese salutes with respect and which is his supreme ethical conception, connotes rather the idea of 'duty.' According to *giri*, it was the duty of both British and Germans alike to fight when and as their rulers directed them; and it was the duty of the rulers to make war, whenever they judged it essential to do so for national preservation or advantage. Only one form of propaganda influenced Japanese opinion; and that was material success. From this point of view, the Germans had an apparent advantage right up to the final months. So, the Japanese were utterly at a loss to understand the moral significance of America's entry into the war, and the popularity of the war in the United States. A frequent explanation was that America had joined the Allies so as to have an excuse for building up big armaments against Japan.

It is absurd to speak of sacrifices made by Japan in the cause of the Allies. The gambler's stake of five pounds, when he wins five hundred in return for it, can hardly be called a sacrifice. Japan's services to the Allies were almost entirely negative. Her great service was that she remained faithful to the terms of her alliance with England, that she did not join Germany, and that she did not haggle for neutrality, in spite of

many temptations from within and without. Japan's attitude towards us throughout the great struggle may be summed up as having been a reassuring disappointment. Japan seemed Gallionic all the time; but, in her very aloofness, she was true to the letter of her bond.

A Japanese publicist, in an article on his country's war effort, entitled 'How Japan helped to Victory,' gives an account so naive and typical that it must be quoted with gratitude.

'Shortly after hostilities began, the Minister in charge of our agriculture and commerce ordered his department to make as complete a list as possible of the articles that Germany and Austria supplied to Asia, Australasia and the South Sea Islands. The items numbered 500. They were duly classified and sent to the various Chambers of Commerce, which were too wide-awake to need to be reminded that Japan could have this trade if she had the enterprise to manufacture these articles. We encountered no end of difficulties in expanding our industrial resources to meet a situation for which we were utterly unprepared. The war orders from Russia simply overwhelmed us. For instance, the Russian Government asked us to supply 250,000 tons of beef. We found that we had but 1,400,000 head of cattle, and that two animals would make but one ton. Since it was impossible for us to kill all our cattle, we had to pass the order on to Australia and America, and content ourselves with a small commission. But we are not the nation to let a chance slip through our fingers. We left no stone unturned to overcome the difficulties that faced us. And we did overcome them! Let me give you an instance. Russia ordered 50,000,000 tins of food. On inquiry, our Minister found that it would take something like three months to turn out the order. But we so accelerated the process of manufacture that it took nothing like that length of time to fill that order. And we got many repeat orders. It pains me greatly to note that many Englishmen seem to feel that we were out for trade, and not at all interested in the prosecution of the war. Such an impression is entirely due to ignorance of our war effort' ('Pall Mall Gazette,' Jan. 28, 1919).

It only need be added that the gold reserve in Japan has risen from 35,000,000*l.* in 1914 to 200,000,000*l.* in 1919, and that the *yen*, which at the outbreak of war was worth about 2*s.* 0½*d.*, was worth 2*s.* 9*d.* at the end of 1919.

The ordinary thoughts of the ordinary Japanese do

not travel far abroad. The Japanese are an extremely insular people, far more insular than the British. Their preoccupations during war-time were with the business boom, the immense quantities of money which were flooding the country, the doings of the *narikin* ('profiteers'), the rise in the cost of living, the rice scarcity, as well as the old topics of pump politics, wrestlers' contests, bribery scandals, *geisha*, eating, drinking and dressing. Everybody was busy. New enterprises were springing up everywhere. Old companies were paying fabulous dividends. The stock market was booming. But business in Japan was as selfish as business usually is elsewhere. It was catering for the most profitable markets. It cared nothing for Belgium or Alsace-Lorraine. Why should it? All that it asked of Great Britain and Germany was that they should continue fighting for ever. It protested angrily against any interference in the interests of the Allied policy; against the British restrictions on unessential imports; against plans for the subordination of Japanese merchant-shipping to the general needs of the Allies; against the control of Australian wool; against the non-delivery of British spinning machinery; against America's veto on the export of gold and silver; and, most of all, against her refusal to supply Japan with iron and steel for her shipyards. All these incidents were made into occasions for outcry against the envy of the foreign Powers, their intrigues to ruin Japan's prosperity, and the uselessness of the British alliance. Peace came too soon for Japan. The dramatic collapse of Germany did not strike the imaginations of the Japanese. They felt little or no enthusiasm for the overwhelming victory. Had we captured some two million German soldiers in one tremendous *coup*, they might have been thrilled. But the great evaporation of Germany and her allies presented no picture to their eyes. This was not war as they knew it on the stage and on the cinema screen, with its encounters of champions and its theatrical attitudes. There were peace rejoicings in Japan because the Government ordered them, and a special postage stamp was issued in commemoration. But spontaneity was conspicuous by its absence.

A wave of unnatural prosperity has passed over the

country. Rich men have become millionaires. Poor men have become rich overnight. The cost of living has increased enormously, so that Japan is no longer a cheap country to live in. The rate of wages has also increased, but not proportionately. Generally speaking, it may be said that money was easily made in Japan during the war boom, and ignobly spent. Restaurants and *geisha* consumed a large proportion of the *narikins'* winnings. The new rich are a vulgar, arrogant and unpopular set of men. Only the Government officials, the salaried classes, find themselves worse off. But the Government Ironworks scandal showed how easy it was for officials in privileged positions to reimburse themselves by taking bribes from the *narikin*. The condition of the country became increasingly feverish and unhealthy; and the symptoms came to a head in the rice riots of 1918, which appear to have been a general and spontaneous movement all over the country of the hitherto inarticulate lower classes, exasperated, not only by the high prices, but still more by the profiteering methods and the ostentatious lavishness of the *narikin*. The legend of the Imperial Sanctity was invoked, as it always is in moments of crisis. The Emperor was recalled to Tokyo from his holiday in the mountains; and the nation was shamed into obedience. The Imperial Bounty gave a large sum to relieve distress. Rich companies and individuals also contributed large gifts. For a short time the price of rice was lowered. The remedy was superficial; it was the ransom paid by the exploiters to their victims. But it served its turn; and the riots ceased.

So the war period closed for Japan, leaving the country enriched beyond imagining in wealth and prestige, but profoundly discontented as never before; discontented with what she had done and with what she had not done; discontented with her fallacious prosperity and with her national isolation; discontented with the limitations of a narrow and corrupt political system, with the stifling of originality and talent, and with the ruthless industrialism, which prosperity had but served to extend. This discontent is a disquieting revelation of the great peril which besets the Japanese State in the fictitious nature of its present polity. The

divinity of the Emperor, which is its corner-stone, is a fiction. The show of democratic institutions is illusory. The implicit obedience of sons and daughters towards their parents, that Juggernaut of filial piety, is spontaneous and unreal. The charming family relationship supposed to exist between capital and labour is a myth. The devotion to military service is an imposition. The legendary efficiency is undermined by corruption. Education is a bed of Procrustes; progress means sweated labour; civilisation is imitation; and religion is a poem, a dream or a memory.

The Japanese, like a child, has lived in a dream-world, fashioned by his governors in their own interests. He believed what he was told to believe; and his first duty was to obey. But sooner or later children grow to manhood. Recent events indicate that a period of drastic political evolution has commenced in Japan. The German ideal of bureaucratic government and military leadership has been discredited by the collapse of Germany. The young intellectuals, of whom the University students are representative, resent being gulled by the pretence of democratic institutions. Labour is beginning to understand the power of organised numbers and the use of catchwords. Karl Marx is appearing in translation, and is in great demand. Adroit politicians have been studying at home and abroad the dangers and advantages towards which they veer before the wind of Democracy. Universal suffrage is the first plank in the new platform; and the fight for universal suffrage has already begun. We are assured that anything like Bolshevism is inconceivable in a country so fervently patriotic as Japan. But, if so, then the Japanese police are unnecessarily nervous of *kikenshiso* (dangerous thoughts) and *chui-jimbutsu* (suspicious persons).

Those who foretell disaster for the Rising Sun—and there are many—are apt to overlook the solid foundation which is hidden beneath the florid architecture of the modern state. They fail to take into full account the strength of character and the will to govern, which a French writer has called 'la force romaine du peuple japonais.' For fifteen hundred years, at least, Japan, alone of non-European nations, has been consistently enamoured of government, not merely for the

profit of the rulers, but for love of order for order's sake, for the sweet fruits of self-discipline. This discipline, it is true, differs from the Roman conception. Justice is the foundation of Roman law; Custom is the discipline of the East, including Japan. But, whereas other oriental states, except during rare periods of enlightened rule, have been at the mercy of tyranny or stagnation, Japan has steadily followed the ideal of a *respublica*, a commonwealth, in which every man should be content and free to do his duty and enjoy his reward in the sphere allotted to him. This *force romaine* has distinguished the race among the sad records of oriental degeneracy, has saved its independence from the crushing superiority of Europe, and will probably preserve Japan from ruin, when nemesis overtakes her exaggerated prosperity.

Meanwhile the military bureaucrats are fighting desperately to maintain their order, without which they honestly, and perhaps justly, believe that the country would fall to pieces. Their propaganda is to be found in the elaborate Emperor-worship, which clothes their own deeds in religious sanctity, but which was unknown in the Japan of sixty years ago; in the reiterated claim to a superhuman patriotism, which has been used abroad to impress and frighten Western nations, but which at home is a political drug, brewed out of the froth of the true elixir; in the history and literature of the country, which have been carefully adapted to suit the ends of Mikadoism and war-worship; in a popular theatre, whose *beau idéal* is still the loyal *samurai*; in a public education which inculcates obedience as the first virtue and observes originality with suspicion. The military regime in Japan is as obnoxious as ever it was in Germany; and, unless the pacifist party finds more solid principles and more authoritative leadership, the military politicians may yet disregard the warning of recent history in Europe, and may ruin the whole national fabric in a last desperate attempt to preserve their own power.

Four years of the European War have made an immense change in the Far East. The influence of the white nations seems to be tottering into bankruptcy. Their hold over China, which they have often so shamefully abused, is seriously shaken. The positions held by Germany and Russia have escheated to Japan. Japan

has asserted her right to prior consultation in all matters concerning China; and no Power as yet has taken up the challenge. The Chinese people have seen their railways, mines, industries and territory mortgaged to Japan by a gang of corrupt statesmen. They have seen the white Powers unable or unwilling to protect China's rights at the Peace Conference. They have concluded that, in spite of any Wilsonian idealism and in spite of any Leagues of Nations, Might is still Right, and Might is on the side of Japan. This is a critical moment in Eastern Asia. The Chinese nightingale is dumb. 'If she will not sing my tune, I will make her,' threatens Japan the Warlike. 'Until she sings my tune, I wait,' observes Japan the Peaceable.

But it is not merely a question of the future of China. 'Asia is one,' wrote Okakura Kakuzo, one of the first and the most gifted of the Japanese propagandists; and he quoted the Japanese tale of the three travellers who met at Loyang—the Indian, the Chinaman and the Japanese. 'We three form a fan,' said the Chinaman; 'my country represents the paper, India supplies the radiating sticks, and our friend from Japan is the small but necessary pivot.' 'It is the mission of Japan,' wrote Professor Ukita, editor of a leading monthly review, 'to present to the various Asiatic populations an example of a national, civilised and independent state, and then to form a confederation of all the Asiatic nations.' The liberal encouragement given to Indian revolutionaries in Japan indicates that no British Alliance is of any avail to check this natural sympathy for fellow-Asiatics, which appeals alike to the advantage and to the chivalrous instinct of the Japanese.

'The responsibility for the maintenance of security in the Far East rests entirely upon Japan,' declared the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Viscount Motono, when the Russian Empire had collapsed, and the danger of a German attack threatened from Siberia. And indeed, until the entry of the United States into the war, Japan had actually realised her ambition of becoming mistress of the Pacific and paramount power in Eastern Asia. China lay at her feet, helpless. Her navies patrolled all the oceans east of Suez. There even seemed a possibility that Holland might be drawn into the war on the side

of Germany, in which case Japan would have taken her share of the rich prize of the Dutch Indies. The power of Russia was obliterated; and a revolution in India was believed to be certain. The fall of the British Empire in India would be a victory for Japan; for then no doubt of her priority in Asia would remain. Hongkong, the greatest port in the East, and Singapore, the strategic gate of the Pacific, would fall naturally into her keeping; and these would be so many stepping-stones to Australia, that vast uninhabited continent, weakly held by the pretensions of a mere handful of white people, and waiting for the coming flood of Asiatic immigration under the leadership of the Mikado.

These dreams were shattered by the decisive victory of the Allies. The ambitions of the Japanese once more appear to be exaggerated and absurd. But beyond the vapourings of publicists, beyond even the domestic strife of militarist and pacifist factions, we can perceive the movement of two dynamic forces, which no policy can check—the Japanese birthrate and the Asiatic upheaval. The Japanese increase at a rate of some 750,000 a year in their own overcrowded islands. Native industries and agriculture cannot absorb this enormous surplus. North America, New Zealand and Australasia are barred to Japanese immigration. South America is beginning to shut its gates. For not only does cheap oriental labour threaten the existence of the European workman, but the Japanese always form a nucleus of their own, which does not easily assimilate with other immigrants. There are some 100,000 Japanese in Hawaii, about 80,000 in California, 13,000 in Canada, 20,000 in Brazil, 6,000 in Peru, 15,000 in the Philippine Islands, 10,000 in the Malay Peninsula, 160,000 in China (including Manchuria and the Port Arthur Peninsula), and 300,000 in Korea. But the cold climate of Manchuria and Siberia, and the eternal summer of the South Seas, are alike unsuited for Japanese colonists. The Japanese are forced to be expansionists. The question remains as to where and how they should expand.

In a very striking book, 'Il Giappone: nel presente e nell'avvenire' (Milan, Fratelli Treves, 1919), an Italian writer, E. Spagnolo, reminds his readers of Leroy Beaulieu's warning that one day the balance of power

between the European and the Asiatic races might be upset to our disadvantage.

'This possibility,' comments Signor Spagnolo, 'renders the responsibility of Germany still more great and more terrible for having impelled a whole race and a whole civilisation to such a formidable attrition of their own strength, just at the moment when that race and that civilisation had need of their most fertile vigour, if they did not wish to be condemned to that state of immobility which is the origin of national decadence.'

Twenty-seven years ago, Prof. C. H. Pearson, in his book on 'National Life and Character,' made a forecast of the world-future which it is well to bear in mind.

'The day will come (he wrote), and perhaps is not far distant, when the European observer will look round to see the globe girdled with a continuous zone of the black and yellow races, no longer too weak for aggression or under tutelage, but independent, or practically so, in government, monopolising the trade of their own regions, and circumscribing the industry of the European; when Chinamen and the nations of Hindustan, the States of Central and South America, by that time predominantly Indian, and it may be African nations of the Congo and the Zambesi, under a dominant caste of foreign rulers, are represented by fleets in the European seas, invited to international conferences, and welcomed as allies in the quarrels of the civilised world. . . .

'It is idle to say that, if all this should come to pass, our pride of place will not be humiliated. We have been struggling among ourselves for supremacy in a world which we thought of as destined to belong to the Aryan races and to the Christian faith, to the letters and arts and charm of social manners which we have inherited from the best times of the past. We shall wake to find ourselves elbowed and hustled, and perhaps even thrust aside by peoples whom we looked down upon as servile, and thought of as bound always to minister to our needs. The solitary consolation will be, that the changes have been inevitable. It has been our work to organise and create, to carry peace and law and order over the world, that others may enter in and enjoy.'

Art. 11.—PRESENT DISCONTENTS IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST. ✓

HUSEIN, king of Hejaz, whose sincere belief in the identity of Arab and British interests does not preclude him from criticising British statesmanship now and then, pulled up short in a conversation with our representative at Jiddah in 1917. 'You speak to me continually,' said he, 'of the British Government and British Policy. But I see five Governments where you see one, and the same number of policies. There is a policy, first, of your Foreign Office; second, of your Army; third, of your Navy; fourth, of your Protectorate in Egypt; fifth, of your Government in India. Each of these British Governments seems to me to act upon an Arab policy of its own. What are the Arabs to do now, and what are they to expect of you after the War?' The old man was right enough at the moment from his own point of view. His people were being dealt with by several British authorities on several divergent lines. But his analysis ignored distinction of genus and species. Four of the 'Governments' of his classification had enough community of idea to form essentially one genus; and their differences of expression were due in the main to accidents of war—to imperfect co-ordination and control following on difficulties of communication, departmental overpressure, and temporary failures of single direction. But the fifth, the Government of India, for all practical purposes in relation to the Near and Middle East, functioned as a genus apart.

This generic distinction is primarily responsible for our actual situation in the Arab countries. In a secondary degree the distinction of species within the first genus—Home Government—has contributed to bring it about. There are also independent causes, possibly more blame-worthy; and behind all, of course, stands a first cause, the responsibility for which need not be discussed here—the entry of the Ottoman Empire into war against us and our Allies. This last made it incumbent upon us to operate in and through the Arab peoples in such a way that, if successful, we must destroy in the process all general government of them, and be faced with the obligation to construct a fresh government. Obvious as

this sentence must sound now, it is not superfluous to utter any part of it. When Turkey threw in her lot with the Central Powers in 1914, she created a danger to our power hardly less grave than that created by the German invasion of Belgium and France—one so grave, indeed, and patent that many have said, with some exaggeration perhaps, that from that moment our war was for the control of Constantinople and the East.

Involved inextricably, as we were, in Egypt, India and the way between, the great block of Arab territories, which fill all the south-west of Asia, became at once the vital area of our defence. We might indeed strike at the head of Ottoman power, that is at Constantinople itself, through Turkish-speaking territories—though we must remember that, since in 1914 the attitude of neither Greece nor Bulgaria was sufficiently defined to open a way through the Balkans, such an attack could start only from the region of the Dardanelles—but our defence was in the Arab-speaking provinces. And, if our military policy there was to be offensive-defensive, the operations, if they were to reach vital points of the enemy's defence, must be pushed so far forward that the liberation, disintegration and reorganisation of the majority of the Arab subjects of Turkey would be imposed on us as an inevitable consequence.

The inevitable was recognised and accepted in the original plan of British action. Our Eastern Empire was to be defended by two correlated offensives, conducted upon both flanks of the Arab provinces of Turkey, i.e. in Syria-Arabia and in Mesopotamia. But geographical conditions dictated a difference of offensive methods. On the west, i.e. in Syria and Arabia, we could—or our strategic authorities thought we could—throw a force directly on the northern fringe of the Arabs, into immediate contact with the Turkish home-land in Asia Minor, and cut the one from the other. Consequent operations would be conducted mainly by the Arabs themselves, rising against the isolated enemy garrisons, until, by success, a clean sweep should be made of Turks, Turkish government and Turko-German influence. Thus, Arab co-operation was to be an essential factor—the most essential—from the first; and the Syrian people was to take so large a part in working out its own

salvation that an Arab autonomy, which we could recognise, might be expected to come into being without any considerable stage of British occupation, and without the obligations or the difficulties of subsequent withdrawal which that would entail. On this side, then, a policy of Arabia for the Arabs promised such speedy realisation that its ideal inspired the plan first conceived and remained the principle of all subsequent plans.

On the eastern side, however—in Mesopotamia—access to the Ottomanised-Arab area could be gained only through its southern fringe. The Turkish occupation would have to be forced inland by British arms, and British occupation must replace it step by step until the former should be driven out of the Arab provinces altogether—a consummation likely to be delayed in any case by the traditional stubbornness of the enemy, and not to be fully achieved in reasonable time unless quick success ensued in the west. In the east, therefore, since British military action not only was to be the primary means, but must continue to be the only effective means for an indefinite period, the guiding principle of the western plan—Arabia for the Arabs—did not assume the same insistent importance. Nor could it have done so, even had it inspired equally those who had to give first effect to the eastern scheme of operations. But, as the sequel was to show quickly, it did not inspire them at all; or, at the best, it was accepted by them with such reservations and modified so greatly by contamination with another principle, that it could exert little or no immediate influence on action. Thus, to put it plainly, we started on a common plan of defending our Eastern Empire against Germanophil Turkey by liberation of the Arabs, with two distinct ideals of their future relation to ourselves: on the west, we looked to make them independent allies; on the east, obedient subjects.

This initial inconsistency of ideals has never been harmonised; and some mutual contamination of one ideal by the other has only increased the detrimental effect of the dualism on a single race, which had, and has, one, and only one common desire—to be freed from all government but its own, which it expects to be the minimum of all government whatever. Read the history of the Arabs since the birth of their Prophet, and you will find

that desire its single key. Good, bad or indifferent, the alien has ever been to them equally alien. They have accepted one alien in order to expel another, and a third to expel the second; but they have neither desired nor acquiesced in the rule of any. What gifts of wealth or civilised appliances or peace their liberators may bring leave them fundamentally cold. Aliens may be as far apart in capacity for, and practice of, administration as the Turk and the Briton, but the heart of the Arab remains as aloof from the last as from the first.

A British administrator of India can hardly see himself as the Arabs see him. He would have little heart in his work if he did. He is the Protector of the Poor, and his view is apt to be bounded by the material well-being of those he protects. So long as he is spending the best of his bodily and mental vigour on his people, he feels no need to justify his own superior position, being, by force of tradition, training and function, an Imperial Whig. He is the Father, they are the Children. He labours, fights and dies for them, grateful or ungrateful, because he never doubts that both his authority and his obligations are as well founded on the nature of things as a father's on the nature of man. In the particular he assumes the universal. The British *raj* is the best form of human government; and the best government makes for the happiness of the greatest number. Therefore to fail to impose it wherever possible is to fail in one's duty to mankind.

Our Eastern offensive—that in Mesopotamia—as every one knows, was originally organised, manned and directed, by the Government of India. Starting before the other, our Mesopotamian force was sent up the Gulf inspired by British-Indian policy and British-Indian administrative ideals. It went whole-heartedly to seize a long-desired opportunity of confirming British-Indian power in the Gulf and securing, for the advantage of India, possible railheads and actual navigable waterways in lower Iraq; less than half-heartedly to accomplish anything which, though of advantage to the Empire in general, might be to the disadvantage of India in particular; not at all to call Arabs to freedom and help them to that end. Our authorities in India, civilian and

military alike, almost unanimously preferred the Turk. Turco-British friendship had long been a trump-card in their game of government. To take action against an Ottoman Caliph was a very grievous necessity, imperilling an important *arcanum imperii*. Therefore the view was propagated that we were at war not with the Ottoman nation but with usurpers of its power—much the same plea as Husein of Mecca was to advance in self-justification at a later date, but unlikely to be very efficacious in India, where those same usurpers, the Young Turks, had largely controlled Moslem feeling for years. In any case it was hoped that the necessary campaign would be short and its scope restricted, and that we should soon be better friends with the Turk than ever.

Begun with an eastern offensive, the prosecution of our Arab policy found no other way for a long time. The western plan for raising Syria had to be postponed *sine die* in deference to emphatic Allied objections to its indispensable preliminary operation—a British landing in the Gulf of Alexandretta. France, whose hands were all too full at the beginning of 1915, was prepared neither to co-operate therein nor to delegate execution to us or anyone else. Hands off Syria! was the first principle of her Colonial Party, of her Clerical Party, and of those powerful agents in her politics, the international financiers. Cost us what it might—it was, in fact, to cost the Kut disaster, the Palestine campaign, thousands of British lives and millions of our money—it would cost France more to be anticipated in the Syrian field. So, for over a year, nothing worth speaking of could be done for the western Arabs; no demonstration could be made of fidelity to an ideal different from that which was being pursued with the eastern; and there was no chance of our policy on the one side correcting in good time the policy of the other.

In Iraq Arab military co-operation was discouraged at the outset; and Seyyid Talib, the leader of the existing anti-Turkish party, fled to Koweit and, surrendering himself presently to the Government of India, was interned. The Viceroy visited Basra to assure its inhabitants that the Turkish flag should not fly over the town again. His pledge was understood to fulfil their wildest aspirations,

though, as a matter of fact, neither they nor other Iraqis in general had ever hated the Turkish flag for any very strong reason except that it was alien. Ajeimi Saadun of the Muntafiq, and other Arab chiefs who aspired to take a hand in our game, were bidden to stand down, keep quiet and watch our play. When fighting is forward it goes hard with Bedawins not to fight on one side or the other; and in the event a good many fought on the Turk side. Had they put a little more heart into it, Shaiba would not have been a victory for Indian Expeditionary Force D.

It is needless to follow in detail a campaign which was carried forward as it was begun, on the traditional lines of British-Indian penetration. The Arabs of the country were given to understand that they were to be liberated from the tyranny of the Turk, but that we should do the liberating. Serenely confident that they asked for nothing better, our small force, with its inadequate means and equipment, played a gigantic game of bluff which all but succeeded. While half-battalions held hundreds of miles of communications, we raced for Baghdad with less than the full strength of a division. If Townsend had taken the city then, we should have learned within a very short time a good deal about what Arabs really felt; but that opportunity was deferred. The Kut disaster followed; and the hostile Arab demonstrations, which, had they occurred after a success, might have caused us to think, were discounted as due merely to our failure.

It will be remembered that, ostensibly on account of inadequacy of supply and hospital arrangements, the control of further operations was now transferred from the Government of India to the Home Government; but perhaps it is not realised how little the change affected the politics of the campaign. Geographical conditions kept them almost as Indian as ever. The civilian administrative *personnel*, including a great army of clerks and technical subordinates, had still to be drawn from India; so too had the money—U-boats in the Mediterranean saw to that; the main strength of our fighting forces continued to be furnished by the Army of India, and from native troops; and from India came the bulk of their supplies and the majority of their

non-combatant auxiliaries and camp-followers. If the introduction of Indian land-law into the vilayet of Basra was acknowledged to have been a mistake, the proclamation issued by General Maude, when he occupied Baghdad, showed little approximation to the western ideal. Home Rule was vaguely foreshadowed, but not sovereignty or even any considerable measure of autonomy. The Arab tribes in and about Iraq kept our peace, more or less, behind the line of our advance, but not too consistently on its flanks. We declined to arm them, but they found their own ways of acquiring a good deal of armament at our expense. The efforts of Colonel Leachman and the other political officers with the Bedawins were devoted to securing their benevolent neutrality.

Meanwhile, in the late summer of 1915, the Home Government resuscitated its Arab policy with the old guiding principle, but a new plan of action through a different section of western Arabs. Husein, Emir of Mecca, who had been approached in connexion with the original plan on account of the moral support that the adhesion of his metropolitan Holy City might supply to a rising of Syrian Muslamîn, was being considered, on his own suggestion, as a possible military protagonist. The negotiations were protracted by difficulties of communication with a country in enemy occupation and by the incompatibility of the full nationalist claim, put forward by the Emir as the condition of his co-operation, both with those indefinite French interests in Syria, of which we had been so emphatically reminded, and with our own pledges and action so far in Iraq; and, perhaps, they would never have gone through at all, even with those questions reserved, had it not been believed that a rising in Hejaz would result in nothing immediate beyond a salutary demonstration to the Moslem world and a strictly localised military diversion. It is important, however, to observe that, from the date of our first reply to the Emir, the negotiations were governed by the principle that Arab independence, so far as we should be in a position to promote it, was to be the outcome of Arab co-operation in our war with Turkey.

By the autumn of 1917, the unexpected success of the Hejaz revolt, which, after setbacks and perilous pauses,

had established the independence of north-western Arabia and begun to affect the population of Syria, already threatened to bring into the arena of practical politics the two great Arab questions, which had been shelved at its start—the Syrian and the Mesopotamian. The indetermination of both, and the impossibility of solving either in conformity with the accomplished fact in Hejaz, held certainty of trouble before us. As regards the Mesopotamian Arabs, this trouble would not arise from any necessity to reckon with Husein's claims on their behalf, nor from any expectation that they, on their side, would associate themselves with those claims. Seyyid Talib's 'Reform' movement had been neither Sherifian nor pan-Arab. But, while the Iraqis wanted to govern themselves, and not to be governed by any Arab outlander, they were sure to demand at the least equality with the Hejazis, and to recite to us the declarations we had made to the Emir Husein in favour of Arab national independence without expressly excepting any Arabs whatever.

With the Syrian Arabs trouble was even more inevitable, and it was likely to occur sooner, both because the Hejaz revolt had reached their very borders, and because they had developed, even before the War, an Independence party of advanced views, wide ramifications and considerable organisation. Also it would be less easy to deal with, where the issue would lie between four parties at least, the French and the Jews contributing their urgent interests. Though the Balfour Declaration was yet to come, the Zionist claim was already formulated; while the Sykes-Picot agreement—to the effect that France should be suffered to curtail the ultimate independence of northern and central Syria by administration of the coast and domination of any autonomous Arab state which might be formed in the interior—had been in existence since the spring of 1916. When we encouraged the Hejaz movement to pass northwards into Syria, it was known that the principle which had inspired it could not be guaranteed more satisfaction than it had already won—that is to say, we could not count on being in a position to make Arab independence good beyond Hejaz. The only excuses that can be made are: first, that it was hoped and even expected by some

persons of authority that, when the hour of settlement should arrive, France would not claim her pound of flesh; secondly, that a Jewish political state in Palestine was not contemplated; lastly that the bear to be skinned was still at large and defiant, our first efforts to tackle him not having been happy; and, should he eventually succumb, this would be due so much more to our efforts than to the Arabs that it might seem reasonable to grant Syria less than Hejaz, where the Arabs had freed themselves. To the first excuse the Arabs would have replied that, since they knew nothing about the disposal of any of their lands under an Anglo-French Agreement, they would thank France and us for nothing; to the second, that Palestine was an integral part of the Arab lands by the prescription of over a thousand years, and had not been excepted by us in any declarations; to the third, that we had made no stipulation in our declarations to King Husein that any Arabs must free their own districts in order to win recognition of their right to share in the national independence. Whatever we might think of ourselves, there was no doubt what the Arabs on the western side were going to think of us if the ultimate settlement should be governed by obligations to which they had not been made parties. Even towards our imperialist policy and action on the eastern side they would feel less bitterly; *that* was at least straightforward and intelligible.

Avowed champions of Arab Nationalism, we went forward to free southern and northern Syria, pledged to introduce a 'National Home for the Jews' into the one and French administration into the other. Should these pledges have to be met in full, Arab Nationalism would be asked, in satisfaction of all claims, to accept a ribbon of inland territory running along the edge of the Syrian desert, a district without independent access to a port, and practically incapable of paying its way. Any prospect of procuring the amicable settlement of such an account on the day of reckoning was to become still less favourable when President Wilson's pronouncement on Self-Determination was published and accepted by the Allies in apparent confirmation of their earlier pledge to small nations, and of our particular declarations in favour of Arab nationality and Arab

unity. Meanwhile Feisal and an army composed of Syrian Arab elements, with a small but influential infusion of Mesopotamian Arabs, went forward to play its part in the liberation of Syria—a part, in fact, of great importance, and certain to be regarded by Arabs as having more than fulfilled their implicit obligation, if any, to work out their own salvation in that region.

The Sherifian flag was hoisted in Damascus a day before our own, and in Beirut nearly a week ahead of the tricolour. When, in Beirut, we had to bid it be hauled down, and in Damascus could permit it to remain only pending settlement, and on condition that Feisal accepted meanwhile a commission under our military administration, the day of reckoning was in sight; and we could only postpone default by imposing a *moratorium* while the Peace Conference was sitting. How, during the delay, all our efforts, well-intentioned and sincere enough, to harmonise our obligations by procuring the cancellation of some and the readjustment or postponement of others, so failed as to make matters worse, is very recent history. The French stood by their bond; so did the Jews. The American *deus ex machina* failed of effect. Feisal had our support in debate but not in action; and, having pushed him into the Councils of Paris as the accredited representative of an allied nation, we let him return to tell his nation that, except in Hejaz, its independence was to be, in fact, dependence on two alien Powers for an indefinite period.

Thus in the West did the Allies bring to nothing the hopes, which from the first had inspired the Arab nationalists and in particular the Syrian Arabs, by imposing on them just that assimilative domination which, rightly or wrongly, they believe to compromise most deeply their prospects of independence. To the letter of our own pledges we had not been false, for we had never promised the Syrians anything without reserving in full the interests of France; but to the spirit in which, according to Entente declarations about small nations and Self-determination, the Arabs believed we had given these pledges, we had assuredly not been true. Consistently we had put forward an ideal of Arab unity, only to render its realisation impossible, in this generation at least; and, having betrayed the Arab sentiment of

independence, we had not secured to the Syrians anything they counted as material gain. No Arab doubts that, whether there be immediately a Jewish State or not in southern Syria, the promotion of a Jewish 'National Home' will mean that, sooner or later, the Jew and not the Arab will possess the best fruits of the land. As for northern Syria, French exclusive influence is held with equal assurance to entail the ultimate absorption of all that is lucrative by the French trader, the French financier, the French official; further, the Moslem majority, taught how France uses abroad the religion she officially repudiates at home, believes that the Christian minority will be preferred above itself.

Grave as these fears may be, they are, however, only secondary causes of the present discontent in Syria. Above them stands the primary cause, not to be removed by any tact of government or finesse of administration—the refusal of that absolute independence which two years ago was thought to be won and assured.

In Mesopotamia our slowness about setting up any sort of Arab government began to be a subject of Arab complaint in 1918, when for a year we had been in possession of Baghdad. If reminded that we were still at war with Turkey and debarred, by the strict letter of the Hague Convention, from dealing with occupied territory at our own or its inhabitants' discretion until peace was made, the objectors countered the argument by citing instances of inconsistent German action in occupied Poland, and inconsistent action of our own in occupied Palestine. After Damascus had been freed from the Turks, such complaints crystallised into organised propaganda, of which the mouthpiece was the Baghdadi element in the Sherifian army and Government, but the true instigators were rather Syrians, who, seeing their own autonomy in danger, thought to improve its prospects by teaching the Entente a lesson in Iraq. In actual fact, more was being done there in the direction of local administrative devolution than these agitators acknowledged, or perhaps knew. Still less was it known to them that British officials in Mesopotamia had already expressed opinions favourable to the rapid development of autonomy, and unfavourable to the

introduction of a complicated alien system of government. What they heard from Mesopotamia itself was that administration continued to be carried on under a British-Indian *raj*. What they heard from Europe was, not so much proposals for further devolution as insistence on British interests in Mesopotamian oil, suggested British control of a block of territory which divides into two halves the Moslem world, British obligation to support Shiites against Sunnites, Mesopotamia as a home for surplus Indian population, and other similar reasons for treating that country as prize of war.

It would be idle to deny that, in spite of the body of British liberal opinion alluded to above, there existed among our Mesopotamian officers, military and civil, a stronger party which did in fact regard the country as potential British territory. Our arms had conquered it; and passion of possession follows conquest. That this particular conquest was, in great part, impermanent—that, so long as there existed no fundamental desire for British rule, it was not likely to command either sufficient white troops or sufficient will-to-power at home to be sustained—this was imperfectly appreciated in the theatre of our warfare which was less acquainted and concerned than any other with the European political situation and the trend of democratic opinion. Agitators without and agitators within, therefore, had no lack of evidence to support their warnings to the Arabs of Mesopotamia, that, unless they bestirred themselves, the British were come to stay. These agitators have had, no doubt, Turkish helpers and Sherifian helpers and Bolshevik helpers; but their chief allies have been two obvious facts—the betrayal of Syrian independence, and the efficacy of even an unsuccessful revolt in Egypt.

Since the discontent, with whose fundamental causes the foregoing review is concerned, is at this moment patently matured and beyond any stage in which either extenuating circumstances of our past action or demonstration of the impracticable element in the Arab ideal would avail to allay it, no account has been taken of counter-arguments and no attempt made justly to apportion blame for regrettable facts. There are extenuating circumstances enough to be found in the exigencies of the life-and-death struggle during which, and because of

which, we involved ourselves with the Arabs. We saw, and cannot but see still, that the interests of our Indian Empire on the one hand and European peace upon the other outweigh Arab interests in the scale of world civilisation. We know that we had, and have still, the honourable intention to ameliorate the political and economic lot of the Arab lands; and, through representative officers of every grade, working day and night amid discomfort and danger, in singleness of purpose for small reward beyond such satisfaction as bare achievement brings, we have been fulfilling that intention since the first day of our occupation. But to expect considerations, which go far to justify our position to ourselves, so to justify it to Arabs that they will be content to be used as a means to an end not theirs, and sink their own ideals of political and economic well-being in ours, would be pronounced preposterous enough by any one who knows Arab, or indeed common human, nature, even if he had not (as unfortunately he now has!) the advantage of arguing after the fact.

This matter is already up for judgment. One of two courses can be followed by the Allies in the Arab lands, or in some parts of them. They can either, at enormous expense of lives and treasure and by the sacrifice of consistency with recent lip-service to the higher humanistic ideals, hold the Arabs down under themselves; or, at some sacrifice of pride and realisation of self in efficient government, they can put themselves under Arabs. If the last course is to be adopted and carried through to any good purpose, it must be inspired by a belief in Arab local independence developing towards Arab unity. But if either one course or the other is to be followed with any hope of practical success, so far as we in particular are concerned, we must begin by imposing unity on our own Imperial policy and control in the Near and Middle East; and that can only come about through some radical change in the ministerial arrangements of Whitehall.


D. G. HOGARTH.

Art. 12.—TRANS-CAUCASIA PAST AND PRESENT.

SOUTH of the great mass of the Caucasus lies a land of anomalies—anomalies both of nature and of humanity. Through the gloomy iron-grey cleft of Dariel, past Kazbek's 16,000 feet of rock and ice, the Georgian Military Road leads down to Tiflis; and beyond roll the rich corn-fields and pleasant woodlands of the Rion and Kur valleys. The Black Sea coast, land of melons and malaria, is but two days' journey from the parched steppe of Kara Bagh; and from the orchards of Erivan, noted for their little sweet seedless grapes, their luscious peaches, and their peculiar grey bees, can be seen the twin ice-tipped peaks of 'sublime' Ararat. Here too barbarism and civilisation meet in their most extreme forms—and collide. The wild aboriginal tribesmen of the Caucasian highlands can almost look down upon Tiflis, with its electric trams and automobiles in the broad Golovinski Prospekt, its clubs and offices; surrounded by Tatar villages, and facing, across the Caspian, the Turkoman steppe, Baku rises up, the ugliest, the most inhospitable, the most uninhabitable of all industrial cities; in Batum—the port for Europe—with its oil-tanks, its oil-case factory, and its docks, struts, now and then a wild Adjar* from the neighbouring hills.

Historically the Caucasus has always been a No-Man's-Land; its valleys a battle-ground for contending Imperial races, its gorges a refuge for the remnants of broken nations. In the remoter villages can be found a hundred different racial types, the last survivors of forgotten tribes; the Armenians and Georgians themselves are refugee peoples, driven into this corner of the earth by the aggressions of Persians, Romans, Greeks, Arabs, Tatars, Turks. For brief periods during the tenth and twelfth centuries the Armenians and Georgians produced mushroom civilisations, only to be shattered by the great brigand-armies of Central Asia. When Peter the Great descended upon the Caucasus (1722), he found it in a state of feudal anarchy. Georgian 'kings' ruled the western lands, and Tatar khans, vassals of the

* The Adjars, ethnically Georgian but culturally Turkish, inhabit the hill-country south of Batum.



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Persian Shah, were masters of the south-east, while a few Armenian *meliks*, remnant of the mediæval aristocracy of Ani, held sway round Lake Gokcha. The half-century following Peter's campaign saw an attempt to revivify the Georgian kingdom. But unfortunately Georgians do not possess the administrative instinct in the same degree as the patriotic; and Petersburg betrayed them to Turk and Persian. 'Do nothing to strengthen Georgia,' was Catherine the Second's order. Finally, in 1795, a Perso-Afghan horde razed Tiflis; and three years later a ruined Georgia sought union with Russia—union which was soon converted into annexation (1802). During the following half-century the whole of the Caucasus passed to Russia. Persian Shirvan (Azerbaijan) as far as the Aras, with Erivan, Elizabetpol, and Baku, was acquired in 1827; the Turks ceded Akhaltsikh and Poti in 1828, Batum, Ardahan, and Kars in 1878; during the 'sixties the mountain-tribes of Daghestan were crushed.

Of all the Trans-Caucasian peoples the Armenians throve most under Russian rule. They soon established themselves as the commercial and professional element in the country; they made Tiflis almost an Armenian town; they controlled all the shops and businesses in those places, which from Tatar *avouls* were fast becoming flourishing commercial centres; they were the pioneers in the Baku oil-fields. This increased prosperity of the Armenians, in conjunction with their occasionally devious business methods, offended the Georgian and Tatar petty aristocracy, many of whom, in the process of aping the extravagances of the Russian military, had become heavily in debt to Armenian money-lenders; and the large influx of Armenian peasants and labourers from Turkey caused grave discontent among the Georgian and Tatar working classes. In addition to this race-antagonism, the political and social movement against Tsarism had infected the Caucasus. But, while the Armenian bourgeoisie, only anxious for favourable conditions for commerce, were not so extreme in their opinions as the more emotional and strongly nationalist Georgians, the Armenian workers, particularly at Baku, were deeply impregnated with advanced Socialist doctrines. To a certain degree, too, the Armenian revolutionary movement in Turkey affected the

Armenians of Trans-Caucasia and intensified their differences with the Russian Government.

After the Japanese War the revolutionary outbreaks, which occurred all over Russia, quickly spread to Trans-Caucasia. The Governor-General, Golitzin, regarded the Armenians as the principal element of disorder; and his energetic agent, the Georgian Nakashidze, Governor-General of Baku, gave almost open encouragement to the Tatars in the 'pogroms' which took place during 1905 at Baku, Elizabetpol, Nakhitchevan, and elsewhere. The new Viceroy, Vorontzov-Dashkov, was inclined to reverse the policy of his predecessor, but his concessions came too late. The outbreak of 1905 had greatly accentuated all the social and racial hatreds of the Caucasus, and all parties prepared for a coming trial of strength. On the one hand, the activities of the anti-Turkish revolutionary organisation of the Armenians were extended to the Caucasus, and the Armenian Dashnaksution Club adopted a policy of extreme nationalism and sporadic terrorism. On the other hand, the Tatars of Baku were inclined to separate themselves from those of Astrakhan, Kazan, and the Crimea, who aspired vaguely to autonomy within the Russian Empire; and the 'Mussavet' Club, the political organisation of Mussulman landowners and industrial magnates, began to whisper of Tatar independence. They were, no doubt, influenced by the Young Turks and by the Persian Constitutionalists, many of whom were Tatars from Persian Azerbaijan; and the movement was but a further manifestation of the hostility towards Europeans and European rule, which was rising throughout the Middle East, and which had gained impetus from the Italian checks, first in Abyssinia and later in Tripoli, from the Greek defeat in Thessaly, and, more definitely, from the Russian failure in Manchuria.

The dissolution of Russian authority in the Caucasus towards the end of 1917 at last gave liberty, that is to say, freedom from all moral restraint or political control, to this conglomeration of races and tribes, only raised from semi-barbarism by a hundred years of alien administration, and ill-fitted both by their traditions and education to undertake suddenly the responsibilities of self-government. A few native politicians and officials,

trained in the larger school of Russian political life, proclaiming the popular watchwords of Nationalism and Social Democracy, established themselves in precarious power. The threat of a Turko-German invasion, and a common aversion from whatever Russian party happened to be in the ascendant north of the Caucasus, united, for a few short weeks, the rival races in the Federated Social Democratic Republic of Trans-Caucasia. But the Republic, whose one *raison d'être* was that it constituted a geographical, strategic, and economic unit, had not in it any of the human elements of durability. The hill-men of Ossetia and Adjaria were the mortal enemies of the Georgian farmers, as were the Tatar herdsmen of the Armenian peasants. The land-hunger which had been fostered by the late Imperial Government brought neighbouring villages of Armenians, Tatars, and Georgians to blows. The Russian and Armenian merchants and business-men of Tiflis, as an alien bourgeoisie, endured the brunt of all the blind prejudice of the Georgian proletariat; while in Baku the large working-class element of Russians, Tatars, and Armenians, centred round the oil-wells, inaugurated a reign of anarchy far more sanguinary than that which had swept the city in 1905. And, in the country districts, roaming bands of peasants and soldiers not only obstructed communication between the towns, but burned the mansions and robbed and murdered the families of the local Georgian Princes and Tatar Khans.

Eventually, amid mutual accusations of treachery, the component parts of the Federated Social Democratic Republic of Trans-Caucasia dissolved into the Democratic Republics of Georgia, Ararat (Erivan), and Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, 3000 German troops landed at Batum, and General von Lossow marched to Tiflis, while Nuri Pasha, following on the withdrawal of General Dunsterville, occupied Baku. Here the half-Jewish Pasha was greeted with enthusiasm by the Tatar intellectuals, who had imbibed the latest Pan-Turanian and Pan-Islamic doctrines of the Young Turks. Considerable friction was engendered between the Turkish staff at Baku and the Tatars on the one hand, and von Lossow, supporting his puppet republics of Georgia and Ararat, on the other. Thus matters stood, until in November 1918, in accordance with the armistice terms, both Germans and Turks withdrew.

During the following twelve months two factors influenced political developments in Trans-Caucasia—a wholesome respect for the representatives of Great Britain at Tiflis, Baku, and Batum, whose only real strength lay in their prestige, and a dread of aggression on the part of the 'White' Russian armies in the Kuban. Between the three Republics there were reciprocal outbursts of vindictive nationalism, such as the Armeno-Georgian fighting round Akhaltsikh, the massacres of Armenians by Tatars and of Tatars by Armenians in Kara Bagh and at Shusha, the persecution of Russians and Armenians in Tiflis, and the punitive tariffs imposed by one Republic upon another. Only the necessity of seeking help in food and manufactured goods from Great Britain and America imposed some degree of moderation on all parties.

Various causes gradually now tended to draw together Georgia and Azerbaijan, to the exclusion of Armenia. The northern frontiers of Georgia and Azerbaijan were exposed to attack from the 'White' armies, to a degree which caused them to view the Russian situation with an anxiety not shared in the same degree by Armenia. And, in this respect, Denikin's occupation of Temir-Khan-Shura, the capital of the ephemeral North-Caucasian Republic, into which the ambitious Mussulman Colonel Chermoev had endeavoured to weld all the mountain-tribes of Daghestan, did not alleviate their fears. Further, both Georgian and Tatar patriots were offended by the fact that Armenia, during the last months of 1918, was (mistakenly) thought to be the 'spoilt child' of the United States. Again, both Georgia and Azerbaijan had differences with Armenia, the one in respect of Akhalkalaki, the other of Kara Bagh. Lastly, while the Georgians objected to their exclusion by the British from Batum, the Tatars, though reluctant to forgo British protection, resented surveillance in such matters as the Kara Bagh disputes.

The hostility of the Georgians was to a great extent negative, but that of the Tatars was positive and, in a degree, dangerous. The position of Georgia was precarious, menaced as it was from the north by Russian invasion, and imperilled internally by discontented

minorities of Russians, Armenians, and Adjars, and by a restless working-class element. But the position of the Tatars seemed less insecure. The Government of Baku was strongly Mussulman and Tatar, and therefore pro-Turkish in character; and, although troubled by the unruly and heterogeneous industrial population of the capital, it enjoyed the solid support of the mass of Tatar peasantry. Among the latter the Pan-Islamic, Pan-Turanian propaganda of the 'Mussavet' nationalists had been effectively developed before the war; and their fanaticism had, during the last four years, been greatly inflamed by the Russian war against Turkey, and later by local *jacqueries* and attacks on columns of disbanded Russian soldiers, and on Christian villages. In addition, large numbers of Turkish ex-officers and disbanded soldiers, forming an incendiary element, were to be found in Baku and the country-towns. Small-arms and ammunition were also sold to or distributed among the Tatar peasantry when the Turkish army withdrew in November 1918, so that the Moslem peasants in the border villages had a considerable advantage over their Armenian neighbours, who did not enjoy the same opportunities of obtaining arms.

The Government established by Nuri at Baku and afterwards tolerated by the British was composed of members of the 'Mussavet' party, such as Usubekov, Fath'Ali Khan Khoiski, Hassan Aghaiev, and General Mekhmandarov. The Mussavet, although representative of seditious nationalism under the Russian regime, was conservative in home affairs, and only indirectly anti-British, in that it was pro-Turkish and ardently Pan-Turanian. At the same time it had no desire to come under the ægis of the Young Turks, but rather sought to make Baku the centre of the Turkish and Sunni world, and to create a great Tatar-Moslem State round the Caspian, including Trans-Caspia and Turkestan, Daghestan, Persian Azerbaijan (where there is a population of 400,000 Turkish-speaking Tatars), Batum, and most of the territory of the Armenian Republic. These plans naturally clashed to a certain extent with those of Nuri and Khalil Pashas, who appeared in Azerbaijan soon after the armistice, and of Enver Pasha, who was reported to be working in Daghestan. Nevertheless, the

Mussavet was strongly in favour of a close alliance with the Ottoman Empire.

More extreme than the Mussavet, but originally an offshoot of that body, was the 'Ittihad' Club, the leaders of which were Ahmed Beg Bebinov, the Minister of Public Instruction under the Mussavet Government, and the Social Democrats Vezirov and Haidarov. The left wing of the Ittihad was formed by the 'Gummet' or Bolshevik Party, the leading spirit of which was a not over-scrupulous and very ambitious doctor, Nariman Narimanov. While the Mussavet, with one eye on Denikin and the other on Paris, pursued a middle policy, the reward of which was the recognition by the Supreme Council of the independence of Azerbaijan (Jan. 31, 1919), the Ittihad, instigated no doubt by the Young Turk refugees, Nuri and Khalil, urged an alliance with the Bolsheviks, and an attack, in conjunction with the Turks, on the British contingents and the Armenians.

The recall of the British naval officers in charge of the Caspian flotilla and the withdrawal of British troops from Trans-Caspia and Baku strengthened the hands of the Ittihad. In October 1919 a defensive and offensive Treaty of Alliance was signed at Constantinople between Kerimov, representing the Baku Government, and Djevad Pasha, acting for the Turkish Nationalists ('Times,' March 20, 1920); and, shortly afterwards, a further agreement, probably directed against Denikin, was concluded with the Georgian Government. At the same time, the Tatar attitude towards Armenia became more aggressive. Tatar and Turkish agents were agitating among the Mussulman peasants in the territory of the Erivan Government; while Dr Sultanov, the Governor of Shusha, took a leading part in creating disturbances on the border. The Armenians responded by a series of injudicious and singularly atrocious outrages on Tatar villages.

The collapse of the 'White' armies in the Kuban, and the internment of Denikin's flotilla at Enzeli (April 1920), precipitated a crisis in Trans-Caucasia. Baku lay at the mercy of the Bolshevikships at Astrakhan or of their troops at Petrovsk. Bolshevik risings might be expected among the Russian and Armenian workmen at Baku, Tiflis, and Batum. The situation at Baku was further complicated

by a serious deadlock in the oil industry. For eighteen months the export of oil to the Volga basin, which had before the Revolution been Baku's largest market, had been interrupted; and the pipe-line to Batum could not cope even with the comparatively meagre supply of oil produced during 1919. A surplus of 4,000,000 tons of petroleum products awaited export from Baku. The local directors were unable to provide money for the wages of the workmen, and the Azerbaijan Government dared not permit a restriction of output by means of a lock-out. Thus, faced with economic disaster, the Tatar oil magnates were tempted to come to terms with the authority which controlled their principal market. On April 27, 1920, the Mussavet leaders retired *à la Karolyi* to Elizabetpol, and gave place to the Gummet, the leader of which, Narimanov, proclaimed himself 'Chief Commissary of the Mussulman Republic of Soviet Azerbaijan.' A Russian detachment from Petrovsk, under the ex-Imperial General Levandovski, subsequently occupied Baku.

The situation was extremely involved. Among the Russians it is possible to trace two trends of opinion; among the Tatars, three. The official Bolshevik attitude was to conclude peace with the Caucasus Republics, while attempting to introduce the Communist form of government; but the Bolshevik Staff, containing many professional soldiers, desired to re-impose Russian authority under the guise of Bolshevism, and to re-establish Russian influence in Northern Persia. Thus, while Moscow proclaimed theoretical non-intervention in the affairs of the 'Mussulman Republic of Soviet Azerbaijan,' Levandovski repressed Mussavet risings at Elizabetpol and Shamkhor with savage efficiency. Further, while the Soviet Government, having sent a representative to Tiflis and summoned an Armenian Peace Delegation to Moscow, contented itself with organising Bolshevik outbreaks at Tiflis, Kars, Alexandropol, and Erivan, the Russo-Tatar troops of the 'Military Revolutionary Soviet of the Caucasian Army' attacked the Armenians at Zangezur and the Georgians at the Poili bridge, and embarked simultaneously on extensive raids into Ghilan and Mazanderan (May-June 1920).

Of the three Tatar groups, the Bolshevik Gummet

was established in Baku, as the puppet of the 'Military Revolutionary Soviet of the Caucasian Army.' The members of the Ittihad—chief of whom was the chauvinistic Turkophil Sultanov—who had been under the impression that the alliance with the Bolsheviks would be followed by the suppression of Armenia and co-operation with Mustafa Kemal—were thrown into prison. The Mussavet, after its sterile activities at Elizabetpol, fled to Tiflis, where, at the end of June, Khan Khoiski and Hassan Aghaiev were assassinated.

It is questionable whether the Russian Soviet Government would have treated with or attempted to suppress the Caucasian Republics during the summer, had not the Polish offensive compelled them to concentrate all their available resources in Western Russia. As it was, all aggression in the East, whether against Georgia and Armenia or in the direction of Anatolia and Afghanistan, was suspended. While the landing in Persia degenerated into an abortive raid, and Kemal received nothing more than rousing messages of encouragement, Georgia and Armenia were happy in concluding treaties * confirming their independence, and compromising with regard to the disputed zones at Zakatali, Poili, and Zangezur (June 1920).

The future of Trans-Caucasia, however, remains uncertain and fraught with dangerous possibilities. To attempt to gauge it requires consideration of the situation of the neighbouring countries, and an estimate—such as is possible here—of those forces and ideas whose action and interaction bear upon the issue.

The countries which separate those two great political organisations, the Russian State and the British Empire in India, are, perhaps, socially, physically, and politically, the most difficult and the most unamenable to disciplined civilisation in the world. In Persia and Turkey, on the débris of a dozen civilisations, are planted inefficient and decadent military oligarchies. There is a peasantry which has been brutalised and embittered by a crude struggle during centuries with elemental enemies such as drought, plague, and famine, with destroying

* For details see 'The New Russia,' Aug. 5 and 26, 'Latest Events in Trans-Caucasia,' by V. M.

armies of invaders, with an oppressive administration, and with a grasping upper class. In the Caucasian mountains, in Khurdistan, Western Persia, Khorasan, and in the Arab regions, there are communities whose sole political activity is brigandage. The bitterest inter-tribal, inter-racial, and religious hatreds divide the different national groups. And over all this region the only forces introducing the influence of modern thought and modern culture have been the casual European traveller and consul, the East-European trader, and, in the Caucasus, the Russian soldier and official. Over all these regions European progress has been seen for the most part in military roads, military railways, and military telegraphs; and European capitalism has been chiefly manifest in Baku, with its vulgar flamboyance of wealth and its sordid savage poverty. After three years of war and ruin and satiation of racial passions, these countries are left without external authority. All sections have machine-guns and rifles ready to hand. The half-cultured are intoxicated with uncomprehended subversive social doctrines, and the uncultured starve and hate. Hence arise exaggerated ideas; people become frightened, even hysterical. One hate reacts upon another. All demand an impossible maximum, hoping to be allowed to keep a minimum. And so we have a Georgia which would comprise nearly all the Caucasus; an Armenia which would stretch to the Halys; a preposterous Pan-Turanian Idea, conceived by that interesting dreamer Armenius Vambéry, fostered and distorted by Salonika Jews, proclaiming that Turan shall stretch from Buda-Pesth to Omsk; and an ambitious Pan-Islamic Idea, preached alike by atheistic Young Turks, Shiah Persians, and Sunni Arabs.

Yet these nationalisms, egotistical and irrational though they be, are essentially healthy. They represent a reaction against standardisation, the self-assertion of a type. Georgian and Armenian leaders may appear narrow and chauvinistic; we may laugh at their rhetorical polemics, their hysterical vituperations and their melodramatic references to a romantic past, but we must not forget that they are struggling against political extinction, against cultural immersion, and against material exploitation.

Similarly it is unwise to ignore the justice or to minimise the significance of Pan-Turanianism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Asianism, or whatever term we may apply to the revival of self-consciousness among the Muhammadan peoples of the East. The attitude of the Turks and Tatars is actually the more aggressive manifestation of this movement—not yet co-ordinate nor co-operative—which exists in Syria, Egypt, Persia, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and India.* It has been exploited by Germany in a war against Powers with large Muhammadan populations, and by adventurers of the type of Talaat and Enver. But, at its best, it signifies what Mr H. M. Hyndman, in a somewhat unequal book, has styled 'The Awakening of Asia.' It represents the protest of educated and active Asiatics against the political domination and economic exploitation of Asia by foreigners.

Pan-Asianism is neither pro-Bolshevik nor pro-Entente, though the Bolsheviks, like the Germans before them, are making great efforts to turn it to their advantage. Their present success can but be gauged by the fact that, while their 'Conference of Eastern Peoples' sits at Baku, Tatar bands are harassing the Petrovsk-Baku railway line; a formidable insurrection, under a certain Usun Hadji, has broken out against them in Daghestan; and they are fighting against Muhammadans in Bukhara and Ghilan. It would be difficult to believe that the Soviet Government, whatever its political and social ideals, can genuinely desire to arouse the Mussulman world to a great aggressive rising; for unconditional access to the oil of Baku and Trans-Caspia, and to the cotton of Turkestan, is vital to the reconstruction of their industries. It would seem rather that their encouragement of Pan-Asianism is merely opportunist, their propaganda, dangerous and malicious though it be, merely a weapon against British interests.

The aroused self-consciousness of the races of the Middle East should, if wisely directed, prove the salvation of those countries, and should afford a far more satisfactory guarantee of future peace for Britain than any

* In a recent article Prof. Rostovtsev notes the spread of this movement in French North Africa. See 'The New Russia,' June 29, 1920.

costly and widely-developed strategic system. And it is to Britain, whose Imperial policy, unhappy though some phases of it have been, contrasts so favourably with that of rival Powers, that these races must inevitably look for guidance. The great problems, the foci of which are alternately Anatolia, Trans-Caucasia, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Persia, require to be approached in a spirit of firmness tempered with moderation. The constitutional reforms in India, the Persian Treaty—which has unfortunately been misinterpreted—the consideration given to Mussulman opinion at the Peace Conference, and lastly, the Egyptian agreement, are tokens of a wise statesmanship which can hopefully approach other questions.

For the present, however, the situation is far from satisfactory. The Turkish settlement, while apparently securing the success of British strategic policy in the Middle East, has placed Britain in a position politically precarious and morally false. A number of difficult circumstances, which it would be unprofitable to criticise, have impelled the Supreme Council to permit Greece to assume a position in Asia Minor which can scarcely be conducive to permanent peace. The Turks, who at the Armistice, were utterly exhausted and anxious for peace, have been driven to giving a desperate support to their old chauvinist leaders. The Arabs have been disappointed and antagonised in Mesopotamia by an administration which appears to have lacked sympathy with the native population and its leaders; in Syria by the conduct of an Allied Power which has signally failed to give expression to the democratic principles enunciated during the last months of the war; and in Palestine by a movement as aggressive as it is artificial. In Persia, the British appear to be continuing the Tsarist policy of supporting a regime, which in the opinion of patriotic Persians, requires radical reformation. Lastly, it has proved impractical to succour the remnants of the Turkish Armenians, who for two years after the Armistice have been the victims, at the hands of the Young Turks, of a policy of extermination, the admitted aim of which is to make impossible the establishment of an autonomous Armenian area in Eastern Turkey.

The result is anarchy and famine in Anatolia, a hideous racial conflict in Cilicia, and formidable unrest

in Syria, Persia, and Mesopotamia. It will be possible to crush and to hold down by force of arms each of these insurrections. Militarily neither the Turkish Nationalists, nor the Arabs, nor the Persians are strong. Militant Pan-Islamism is a movement, itself vague and sporadic in manifestation, which is not based on numerical strength, and has its seat among races undeveloped and unorganised, incapable of any effort more significant than guerilla warfare. But it is disconcerting in that it involves unlimited anarchy over an area in which Great Britain is naturally desirous of good order, for the purposes of trade and Imperial communication; and it is dangerous when considered in relation to the menace of aggressive Bolshevism. The Bolsheviks, antipathetic though all their theories be to the cultural ideals of Pan-Islamism and to the nationalism of the leaders of Turan, can and will exploit the unrest in Middle Asia in furtherance of their professed aim of World-Revolution. Controlling the Caspian and the railway system of Turkestan, they can threaten all the lands between the Black Sea and the Hindu Kush that form the British front in Asia. Hence the pacification of Anatolia, the satisfaction of Arab aspirations, and the assumption of a sympathetic attitude towards the Persian Nationalist movement—a movement which is the only living and regenerative force in modern Persia—are immediate and necessary developments of British policy, the achievement of which will be difficult but by no means impracticable.

The consolidation of Georgia and Armenia as independent States represents both a favourable initiation of the policy of understanding outlined above, and an effective check on Bolshevik militarism south and east of the Caspian. There is good reason to hope that the period of intransigent nationalism in the Caucasus States is past, and that the leaders both of the Georgians and of the Armenians, and indeed of the Tatars, are anxious for peace and reconciliation. The Governments of Tiflis and Erivan have withstood the manifold perils of two most difficult years, and their position may now be regarded as comparatively stable. The surrender by the Allies of Batum to Georgia—an action which has met with no little criticism, but which was, in the circumstances, the only logical solution of a tiresome

problem—has further improved the relations of Georgia with the Entente, whilst tending to solidify the internal situation in that country.

The future is naturally dependent on the greater issues which are now under discussion in London. If hostilities between the Western Powers and the Bolsheviks continue, there can be no doubt that the Caspian countries will be the centre of grave military developments during the coming year. If the Bolsheviks should attempt to raise an extensive Muhammadan insurrection against the British in Turkey and Persia, Armenia would certainly be disastrously involved. But for the winter the position of Georgia and Armenia may be deemed secure. The Georgians hold the Caucasus passes from the Dariel to the Black Sea, and they are capable of withstanding any attack which may come from the direction of Baku. The activities of General Wrangel must prevent any formidable concentration of Bolsheviks against the Caucasian States in the immediate future; in fact, these latter have, for the moment, more to fear from cholera, typhus, and famine than from invasion. On the other hand, if the British Government should arrive at any broad basis of agreement with the Soviets, the question of the future of the Caucasian States must form the subject of discussion in common with that of Finland and the Baltic States. Morally it must be recognised that these border communities have every right to a reasonable degree of self-expression; and politically it would be a mistake to allow them to be absorbed into the body of the Soviet State, in which case they must inevitably endure the imposition of the Bolshevik system of social organisation.

If peace be concluded with Soviet Russia, the independence of Georgia and Armenia, which the Bolsheviks appear to be willing to recognise, at least provisionally, must be secured. Situated on the very borders of Bolshevik Russia and of the restless Muhammadan world, their interests are of extreme importance to ourselves. Propaganda of the subversive doctrines of Bolshevism must inevitably continue; and whether an understanding is arranged or not, the Soviet Government will make great efforts to perpetuate discontent and to arouse mistrust against Great Britain, in

Turkey, Persia, and Mesopotamia, during the coming difficult half-century of reconstruction and pacification. Georgia and Armenia should constitute the outposts of British influence in the Middle East. Their political and economic orientation must necessarily be towards the power controlling Constantinople and the Mediterranean, and their position on the flank of the Russian oil areas should be significant; whilst Batum, as an advanced naval base from Constantinople, should be a potential menace to the South-Russian grain ports.

The idea of a Trans-Caucasian Federation may now be effectively revived. It failed during the crisis of the Russian collapse and the Turko-German invasion, for it was hastily conceived, and its authority, neither recognised nor organised, was impotent to cope with adverse circumstances. It is now regarded with favour not only by representative Georgians and Armenians, but by Mussavetist Tatars. The inclusion of Azerbaijan must, however, remain hypothetical. The future independence of that country is indeed in doubt, and, while Baku forms a component part of the Russian economic system, the Tatars of Azerbaijan have a culture in common with large communities whose territory must inevitably form an integral part of Soviet Russia. Forming, with the Kazan Tatars and the Turkish peoples of Turkestan, a solid group of 17,000,000, their influence in any future Russian State should be considerable. On the other hand, the Georgians and the Armenians have little in common with Russia; and Georgia's largest potential industry, forestry, in contrast to the petroleum industry of Baku, has suffered by the economic union with Russia, since it was the policy of the Imperial Government to restrain the development of a Georgian timber-trade, in favour of the forests of Russia proper. Now, adequately exploited, the forests of Georgia should prove a valuable economic asset to the Mediterranean countries. Further, any coalition between Georgia and Armenia will be but another manifestation of the movement towards co-operation among the groups of smaller states in Central Europe, who find themselves unable politically and economically to stand alone, as, for example, the Scandinavian countries, and, more recently, the 'Little Entente'

in South-Eastern Europe, whose example the Baltic States appear to contemplate following.

If it should be possible to treat eventually with a Government in Russia which does not preach doctrines of subversion and revolution, the demand of the Caucasian States for complete independence might be modified. General Wrangel appears to represent principles in which it is not easy to trace indications of the old Pan-Slavist spirit, but which, in an age of over-statement, are remarkable for their good sense and moderation. In the event of the triumph of these principles, a broad measure of federation for all the Russian border-states, including those of the Caucasus, would appear sufficient guarantee for their individual development. If the terms of federation were to establish national militias in the border-states, to the exclusion of Russian military forces, future peace would be further secured.

If, simultaneously with the federalisation of the Caucasus, a process of political evolution were successfully developed, under British direction, in Turkey, Persia, and the Arab lands, a group of prosperous self-governing states might eventually separate the areas of British and Russian interest, and effectively prevent the possibility of any conflict between the two Empire-States. Whatever the future form of Government in Russia, it is to be hoped that there will be sufficient weight of reasonable opinion in both Great Britain and Russia to eliminate the folly of quarrelling over border-lands, and to enforce peaceful agreement, with the primary aim of the welfare of the inhabitants of the lands in dispute.

W. E. D. ALLEN.



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